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This thesis explores whether clusters of East Asian economies better suited for monetary 
union exist. To do so, the thesis investigates the degree of similarity in economies and 
policies among East Asian economies, as a foundation towards a monetary union 
formation. The results in this study suggest that the prospects for forming a monetary 
union among any subsets of regional countries are not very promising at the current 
moment. 
 
This thesis is organized into three main parts. The first part provides the rationale for this 
study as well as the review of literature on monetary integration. The second part conducts 
the empirical tests in examining the suitability of regional economies for monetary union. 
The third part suggests policy implications arising from this study. 
 
Owing to the diversity of the East Asian economies, a practical approach towards 
monetary integration is to begin with smaller clusters. This thesis applies the Cluster 
Analysis technique to identify convergent groups of economies for Europe and the Asia-
Pacific based on the Maastricht convergence characteristics as a first premise for 
comparison. It then adds real and structural variables in clustering the heterogeneous 
economies of Asia-Pacific. The results suggest two consistent clusters of economies, 
including Malaysia and Thailand and to a lesser extent, Indonesia and Philippines, that are 
more convergent in their economic characteristics for the period under study. In the final 
analysis, no ‘champion’ cluster emerged that were consistently similar in their economic 
outcomes and policies as well as enjoy high trade intensity. 
 
A supplementary study employs the Structural Vector Autoregression approach to 
examine countries for monetary union based on the symmetry of shocks. The results 
indicated two sub-regional groupings of economies, namely Singapore and Malaysia, and 
Japan and South Korea, which had displayed greater symmetry of shocks, due perhaps to 
geographical proximity. However, the Variance Decomposition results indicated that 
underlying structural differences exist in the economies. Nevertheless, the symmetry of 
shocks is only a sufficient condition in the judgment towards monetary union.  
 







This thesis also clarifies the ‘endogeneity’ hypothesis, through the experience of a real 
world currency union in East Asia. There exists other important but less explicit 
preconditions that ensure the stability of currencies, which in turn lead to greater trade 
flows and a semblance of ‘endogeneity’. The thesis also completes the ‘endogeneity’ 
argument by discussing the balance of costs and benefits in joining a monetary union, 
especially among asymmetric members.  
 
Given that economic as well as political preconditions are currently lacking, this thesis 
suggests a gradual approach towards regional monetary integration in three broad stages. 
The first stage is to create a zone of external monetary stability due to increasing regional 
interdependence. The second stage is to harmonize clusters of convergent economies, and 
the third stage is to integrate these clusters towards a common currency area, once a 
sufficiently high degree of convergence and real economic integration is attained. 
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1.1. MOTIVATION FOR STUDY 
  
Monetary integration in East Asia can become a reality if the conditions are right. In 
2002, 12 European economies adopted a single currency, the Euro, and that of a 
common monetary policy and central bank. The launch of the Euro could lead to the 
trend towards fewer currencies1. Already, there are talks of monetary integration in 
other parts of the world. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) has recently announced the desire for a common currency, in line with 
greater regional economic cooperation. Talks were also rife in the Mercosur region to 
forming a currency area in order to keep the momentum of its integration process. 
Besides Europe, monetary integration is also actively being pursued in the West 
African states. 
 
There are benefits and costs to monetary integration. The benefits of monetary 
integration, especially in the form of a common currency, are lower transaction costs as 
a result of the elimination of multiple exchange rates, increased economic integration, 
higher levels of investment and trade, and the convergence towards a single price for 
each good.  Lower transaction costs for businesses can translate to increased efficiency 
in regional trade activity. However, a regional monetary arrangement means that 
member countries will have to contend with the loss of economic and monetary 
autonomy in response to country specific shocks and macroeconomic policy 
adjustment. On the positive side, a regional monetary union could act as a deterrent 





                                                 
1 Dornbusch, R (1999).  








The issue of an East Asian currency area would have been unthinkable a decade ago. 
However, the Asian financial crisis in mid-1997 jolted the thinking of many policy 
makers and led some prominent figures (for e.g. Mckinnon) to call for exchange rate 
co-ordination. Some political figures, for e.g. Mr Joseph Yam, Chairman of Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority and Mr Mahathir Mohamad, the former Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, have even floated the idea of a common currency for this region.  
 
Some authors have also argued that had East Asia been a monetary union bloc in 1997, 
many of the adverse effects of the Asian crisis would not have been as wide-ranging2. 
However, others have questioned whether various forms of regional monetary 
integration are necessarily the answer to fend off currency speculation, beyond looking 
at the country’s economic fundamentals. Nevertheless, given East Asia’s differing 




1.2. OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
 
The objectives of this thesis are threefold, namely to: 
 
 Explore clusters of plausible regional economies for monetary union;  
 Shed light on the existing preconditions and relevant state of affairs as well as;  




This study focuses mainly on the economic issues. It seeks to answer the ‘what’, ‘why’ 
and ‘how’ of monetary integration in East Asia. The ‘what’ refers to the varying forms 
of monetary integration, the ‘why’ includes the background and evolving factors 
shaping the agenda, and the ‘how’ explores the practical possibilities towards achieving 
regional monetary integration, given the existing state of relevant affairs. This thesis 
will also infer from the recent experiences of European monetary integration in drawing 
implications for policy issues of monetary integration in East Asia. 
 
                                                 
2 See discussions in Bashar, K and Moller, W, eds. (2000). 








1.3. SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
 
Although the idea of an East Asian currency arrangement appears conceptually 
appealing, what remains to be investigated is its practicality for this region. The 
successful launch of the Euro has also sparked the public’s imagination for a common 
Asian currency3. Hence, it is natural to ask whether Europe’s historic unification of 
currencies would be an inspiration for monetary regionalism in other parts of the world, 
and especially for East Asia in our case. 
 
It is indeed timely this thesis endeavors to investigate the prospects for East Asian 
monetary integration, given the significant developments in the international monetary 
scene. This thesis seeks to provide a detailed study and analytical insight into some of 
the key issues concerning an East Asian monetary area that are still hotly debated. This 
study would be of current interest and practical relevance to policy-makers and 
academia alike.   
 
Furthermore, this thesis also seeks to contribute to the relatively scarce economic 
literature and research on East Asian monetary integration. The majority of literature on 
monetary integration pertains mainly to the European region, where the issue had 
immediate relevance. The value of a monetary union topic for East Asia is likely to 
appreciate over time in line with deeper regional economic integration.  
 
To tackle the questions at hand, this thesis sets forth a series of steps and stages, and 




1.4. STRUCTURE OF STUDY 
 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the overall content and direction of this thesis. Chapter 2 reviews 
the theoretical literature of monetary integration, and deals predominantly with two 
approaches in examining this issue: the Theory of the Optimum Currency Areas, and 
                                                 
3 Pillay, S (1999) and Buenaventura (2001).  








the Economics of monetary integration. The theory of the Optimum Currency Areas 
(OCA) basically focuses on a set of conditions that should make monetary union, i.e. a 
system of irrevocably fixed exchange rate or a single currency, among any groups of 
countries more or less desirable. However, in the wake of significant developments in 
the economics of international monetary arrangements, the early theory of the OCA has 
fallen into disrepute. It is argued that the early theory of the OCA is incomplete and 
probably a misleading guide to policy-making. The next section not only updates the 
‘traditional’ theory of the OCA, but also presents a ‘contemporary’ theory, which 
incorporates a ‘monetary’ perspective and other newer perspectives, such as the 
‘endogeneity’ of the OCA criteria, as well.  
 
In view of the recent criticisms on the relevance of the theory of the OCA, increasing 
analytical attention has been placed on analyzing the economics of monetary 
integration. This involves the trade-off between the macroeconomic costs of losing 
monetary independence, and the microeconomic benefits of using a single currency. In 
addition, the real world phenomenon of economic convergence and divergence of 
member countries impact on the economics of monetary integration and is being 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
Chapter 3 provides an overview on the empirical literature of monetary integration, 
which has typically used the theory of the OCA as a framework for discussion. Much of 
the concentration of the OCA empirical literature has focused on the symmetry of 
underlying shocks as well as emphasis on the European region. The rest of the 
empirical studies involve tests of the other OCA conditions, such as the extent of factor 
mobility, flexibility of wages and prices, and studies involving regional comparisons, 
mainly between the United States and Europe. In addition, an emerging trend in 
monetary union research is the use of the Cluster Analysis approach to identify better 
suited union members based on a set of relevant characteristics.  
 
Chapter 4 gives a comparative overview on the national indicators across countries of 
the East Asian region to provide a backdrop to the discussions in ensuing chapters. The 
chapter also examines the extent of intra-regional trade and economic interdependence, 
as a rationale for greater external monetary cooperation. The chapter identifies 
particularly high-trade partners, such as Hong Kong and China, and Singapore and 








Malaysia, which creates incentive for bilateral exchange rates stability, which is 
conducive to trade. However, the suitability of these high trade partners for exchange 
rate coordination depends on their similarity in economic characteristics and policies as 
well. Finally, chapter 4 reviews the state of monetary cooperation in East Asia as well 
as member countries’ preferences for external monetary or exchange rate policies.  
 
Given East Asia’s diversity, a practical approach towards regional monetary integration 
is to begin with smaller clusters of economies first, and the enlargement of these 
clusters, when a sufficient degree of convergence and harmonization is attained. If the 
clustering of economies to monetary integration is deemed logical, then the question is 
how to determine the various clusters. Standard empirical approaches have yet to 
provide a coherent method in examining a set of criteria for monetary union.  
 
Chapter 5 introduces the Hierarchical Cluster Analysis technique, which allows a set of 
criteria to be jointly assessed for monetary union. The Hierarchical Cluster Analysis is 
an agglomerative methodology that searches for hidden groups and classifies observed 
data into related clusters, on the basis of the values of several variables.  
 
The chapter begins by examining the convergence of the European economies based on 
the Maastricht convergence characteristics between the period 1990-97. The results 
identified a core group (comprising of Germany, France, Austria and Netherlands) and 
a periphery group of countries including Italy, Portugal and Spain.  These two distinct 
groups of countries are also termed the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ to European monetary 
union. This result could have suggested at least a 2-speed approach in the drive towards 
European monetary unification. The Maastricht convergence characteristics were also 
applied to assess the Asia-Pacific region. It found that the Maastricht convergence 
characteristics, comprising mainly of nominal variables, were not adequate in 
segregating heterogeneous regional economies into distinct clusters. After adding real 
and structural variables, the groupings of economies became more distinct. Overall, 
three clusters stood out as being more similar in their economic outcomes. They are 
namely, Australia and New Zealand, Malaysia and Thailand and to a lesser extent, 
Indonesia and Philippines. On the other hand, Singapore, Hong Kong and China 
remained mostly different from the rest of the group. This outcome indicates that it is 








likely to be more costly for the later group of countries to join a monetary union, as 
they are simply more different.  
 
Apart from enhancing our understanding on the degree of economic convergence or 
divergence among countries of a region, the use of the Hierarchical Cluster Analysis 
technique to group a set of economies into relatively similar clusters represents a new 
contribution to the literature. A key implication from this research is that convergence 
of economic outcomes and policies enhance the stability and sustainability of the 
monetary system, since it “screens” out divergence members, thus reducing the need 
for alternative adjustment mechanism and lowering the costs of monetary integration. 
Therefore, this thesis takes a pro-active approach in first identifying convergent groups 
of economies, as a foundation for monetary unification. This additional insight is 
useful, given that no single OCA criterion is superior in assessing the suitability of 
countries for monetary union. Furthermore, a number of analysts note that the OCA 
criteria played no practical role in Europe to identify the best-suited groupings of 
countries. Rather, monetary unification in Europe was based on the economics of 
convergence.  There is common understanding that lasting convergence is a necessary 
prerequisite for successful monetary unification. 
 
Despite the recent criticisms on the traditional theory of the OCA, in order to be 
comprehensive, this study also provides a section on the nature of underlying shocks 
among the Asian countries. This is in part fulfillment of the standard requirement of the 
empirical literature of the OCA, and that this study can be used as a basis for 
comparison with other studies. Chapter 6 empirically assesses the extent to which the 
conditions identified by the OCA theory are met in East Asia. In addition, it extends the 
existing literature on “shocks” analysis by differentiating the types of shocks into real 
and nominal demand and supply shocks respectively. The results indicated two sub-
regional groupings of economies, namely Singapore and Malaysia as well as Japan and 
South Korea, which appeared to display greater symmetry in their underlying shocks. 
However, the variance decomposition results, which allow us to infer the relative 
importance of the structural shocks, suggested that structural differences exist in the 
economies.  
 








The analysis in this study reveals that an over-reliance on the symmetry of shocks 
among countries in drawing conclusions is misleading. Even though countries may be 
confronted with identical shocks, individual nations may require different responses 
arising from their different starting positions, and will face adjustment costs, especially 
in the presence of limited factor mobility and the lack of alternative adjustment 
mechanism. Hence, a theme from this part of the study is that the symmetry of 
underlying shocks is only a sufficient condition, and the suitability of countries for 
monetary union should not be predominantly judged by this criterion alone. This thesis 
has also introduced a different perspective that takes the concentration away from 
underlying shocks to assess the suitability of countries for currency union, which has 
often been the thrust of the existing empirical literature. By applying an original 
methodology to examine the real life experience of monetary union based on 
convergence, the cluster analysis methodology offers a novel approach in the clustering 
of economies towards the goal of monetary union. As such, the cluster analysis 
provides the empirics to understand convergence patterns of monetary union that best 
reflects real world experiences.  
 
The third part looks into the newer perspectives to the Theory of the OCA, and to what 
may be expected of East Asian monetary integration as a result of the EMU (European 
Monetary Union). Chapter 7 looks into the policy issues and implications as a result of 
our findings and questions the justification for a common currency arrangement in East 
Asia. In addition, despite the popular argument of the ‘endogeneity’ of the OCA 
criteria, this study warns of an undiscriminating acceptance of this proposition. The 
formation of a currency union per se does not warrant  ‘endogeneity’. Rather, it is the 
existence of other important but less explicit preconditions that ensure the stability of 
currency, and as such increased trade flows, and hence a semblance of ‘endogeneity’. 
The ‘endogeneity’ argument will be illustrated through a practical example of an 
existing currency union in East Asia. In addition, the chapter completes the 
‘endogeneity’ argument by discussing the balance of cost and benefits in joining a 
monetary union especially among asymmetric members. This is critical in assisting 
countries make informed decisions, which are relevant to their analysis of the 
economics of monetary union participation. 
 








Given that the practical approach to Asian regional integration is gradualism, how 
could one chart the future course? Chapter 8 offers some suggestions on the practical 
steps towards the process of regional monetary integration. It lays down various options 
in each stage of monetary integration that can be further considered and explored for 
future policy directions. The chapter also notes the important dimensions in which East 
Asia differs from Europe, and thus the thinking that EMU does not readily transfer. 
Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the study’s findings and also offers some research 
directions to be explored going forward.  










THE THEORY OF MONETARY INTEGRATION 
 
 
This chapter provides a review of the theory of monetary integration. In so doing, the 
chapter identifies, defines, organizes and evaluates the literature. Two popular 
perspectives have been used to assess the issue of monetary integration. The first is 
based on the Theory of Optimum Currency Area, while the second is on the economics 
(i.e. benefits and costs) of monetary integration.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 deals with the genesis on the 
theoretical literature of monetary integration. Section 2.2 covers the Theory of Optimum 
Currency Area, while Section 2.3 updates the latest developments to the early theory. 




2.1. GENESIS ON THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE OF MONETARY 
INTEGRATION 
 
The issue of monetary integration is a central and long-standing concern in monetary 
economics. Money is one of humanity’s greatest innovations. However, we do not all 
use the same money. Therefore, the question of the appropriate domain of a currency 
area might seem “purely academic since it hardly appears within the realm of political 
feasibility that national currencies would ever be abandoned in favour of any other 
arrangements”. It is only with the publication of Mundell (1961) Theory of the 
Optimum Currency Area (OCA), coupled with the experiments towards regional 
monetary integration, that research in this area became in the mainstream. In particular, 
the progress towards the European monetary unification has led to a gain in momentum 















2.1.1. What is monetary integration? 
 
There is no generally accepted and standard definition of ‘monetary integration’ in the 
literature. The term monetary integration is broadly used to define a range of 
integration options, ranging from coordination to complete unification. While 
incomplete forms of monetary integration refer to looser forms such as monetary policy 
coordination or exchange rate cooperation, strict or complete form of monetary 
integration implies the option to adopt a single currency. The following paragraph 
provides the working definitions of monetary integration as used in the literature.  
 
 
i) Exchange rate coordination refers to the agreements by participating member 
countries to follow some forms of exchange rate policy rules, such as to adhere 
to pre-determined exchange rate bands or to adopt a common basket peg.  
ii) Exchange rate or incomplete currency union is an arrangement where 
participating members irrevocably fixed their exchange rates with one another 
and fluctuation margins are not allowed. There is some form of monetary policy 
co-ordination. But, there need not be the formal integration of financial markets 
or monetary policies. 
iii) Monetary union, as implied by the Werner Report of 1970, refers to the total 
and irreversible convertibility of currencies, the elimination of fluctuation in 
exchange rates, the irrevocable fixing of parity rates and the complete liberation 
of movements of capital.  
iv) Single currency union refers to complete monetary unification, which involves 
the use of one money and member countries sharing one monetary policy and 
having a common central bank. The modern day example of a single currency 





Exchange rates systems 
|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| 
Flexible        Fixed; pegged or rigid                  Single currency  
               
     degree of rigidity  
 
Flexible exchange rates Æ Incomplete monetary integration, i.e. adjustable peg or 
immutably fixed exchange rates (i.e. monetary union) Æ Complete monetary 














In the spectrum of alternatives that includes both flexible and fixed exchange rates (see 
Figure 2.1), currency and monetary unions both fall in the category of fixed exchange 
rates. But while a monetary union involves two or more exchange rates immutably 
fixed to each other, a single currency union implies an agreement to share a common 
currency; which is the ultimate stability in fixed exchange regimes. The literature on 
monetary integration emerged as an outgrowth of the debates over the relative merits of 




2.2. THEORY OF THE ‘OCA ‘ 
 
There is no single theory to Monetary Integration. However, the theory of the Optimum 
Currency Areas (OCA) is a popular approach used in the examination of monetary 
integration issues. Basically, this theory focuses on a set of criteria that should make 
monetary union, i.e. a system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates or a single currency, 
among any groups of countries more or less desirable. The following section surveys 
the developments on the theory of the OCA.  
 
 
2.2.1. Origins of the OCA Theory 
 
Friedman (1953) observes that a country afflicted with price and wage rigidities should 
adopt flexible exchange rates in order to maintain internal and external balance of 
payments. The argument is that a flexible exchange rate can be a potential shock 
absorber when an economy is faced with wage and price rigidity. Friedman’s argument 
in favor of flexible exchange rates had left the impression that nations should adopt 
flexible exchange rates, regardless of their economic characteristics. However, 
countries also differ in many extents. The benefits of a fixed exchange rate system or a 
common currency among regional countries could be enjoyed when conditions exist to 
replace the flexibility of the exchange rate as a stabilization tool. 
 









2.2.2. An Optimum Currency Area 
 
An ‘optimum currency area’ is defined as a region of a single currency or a system of 
immutably fixed exchange rates among members of the region. The optimal domain of 
the region is bounded by perfect factor (notably labor) mobility within and imperfect 
factor mobility without the region4. Sharing these properties reduce the usefulness of 
nominal exchange rates adjustments within the currency area by fostering internal and 
external adjustments.  
 
Therefore, Mundell (1961) views the flexibility of exchange rates as redundant if 
factors mobility can replace the flexibility of exchange rates as a macroeconomic 
stabilization tool. The domain of a currency area should be as large as the domain of 
factor mobility. But if factors cannot move within the region, then the real exchange 
rates must adjust. And if wages and prices are inflexible, then the nominal exchange 
rate must also do the adjustment. Otherwise, countries within the region will be able to 
enjoy the transaction cost savings from a fixed exchange rate system or a stable unit of 
account from the creation of a single currency.  
 
 
2.2.3. A ‘Criteria’ Approach to the Theory of the OCA 
 
Since Mundell’s pioneering thesis in 1961, several authors added other criteria to 
forming an OCA. Ingam (1962) identifies a high degree of financial integration 
between two areas, as a criterion which can help finance interregional payment 
imbalances, cushion the adjustment process in the short run and/or facilitate a spreading 
out of the adjustment process over the longer run. Under a high degree of financial 
integration, slight changes in interest rates would bring about equilibrating capital flows 
across member countries. This reduces the long-term differences in interest rates and 
the easing of external imbalances as well as fostering an efficient allocation of 
resources.  
 
                                                 
4 Mundell, R (1961). 








Mckinnon (1963) suggests the degree of openness, in the sense of a large sector 
producing tradables relative to that of the sector producing non-tradables, as another 
criterion for the optimality of a single currency area. A high degree of openness reduces 
the efficacy of the nominal exchange rate flexibility as a policy instrument. More open 
economies are likely to experience a larger impact from exchange rate changes 
(through tradable goods), and hence large fluctuations in internal prices. As such, the 
flexibility of exchange rates would become less effective as a control device for 
external balance and could be more damaging to internal price level stability.  
 
At the same time, Mckinnon (1963) defines the  “optimality” of a single currency area 
as one within which monetary-fiscal policy and external flexible exchange rates can be 
used to give the best resolution of the three objectives of: 1) full employment, 2) 
balanced international payments and 3) stable domestic prices.   
 
Kenen (1969) proposes that economies with a high degree of product diversification 
should form a single currency area. The reason is that more diversified economies are 
less likely to face frequent terms of trade shifts, and thus should require less frequent 
exchange rate adjustments. Other things being equal, the higher the degree of product 
diversification, the lesser is the need to retain the flexibility of the exchange rate to 
mitigate the effects of economic shocks. Therefore, countries with a high degree of 
diversification in product and consumption are characterized by a low degree of real 
exchange rate variability, as independent shocks hitting the different product sectors 
tend to cancel each other out.  
 
In addition, Kenen (1969) touches on the issue of fiscal integration as another criterion 
for forming a monetary union. The higher the level of fiscal integration between two 
areas, the greater their ability to smooth out diverse shocks through fiscal transfers from 
a low unemployment region to a high unemployment one. In other words, fiscal 














Fleming (1971) advocates that countries with similar inflation rates should join a 
currency union. He notes that when inflation rates between countries are low and 
similar over time, their terms of trade would also remain fairly stable. This in turn 
implies that similar inflation rates equilibrate current account transactions that take 
place within the fixed exchange rates area and reduces the need for nominal exchange 
rate adjustments. 
 
In summary, the OCA properties can be divided into those belonging to region specific 
criteria, such as the degree of regional factors mobility, financial and fiscal integration, 
and the similarity of inflation rates among countries of a region. On the other hand, the 
country specific criteria include the degree of price and wage flexibility, economic 
openness and the extent of country’s diversification in production and consumption 
structure.  The country-specific criteria of the OCA theory coincide with the country’s 
conditions for choosing a system of fixed exchange rates. A country’s entry into a 
monetary union tantamount to it adopting a system of fixed exchange rates with other 
partner members.  
 
 
2.2.4. Some Assessments on the early Theory of the OCA  
 
The early theory of the OCA has provided important insights. However, the framework 
for defining the ‘optimum’ currency area domain could be outdated and narrow. The 
early theory of the OCA is incomplete in one important respect: the ‘monetary’ criteria 
behind the motivation for the formation of currency areas.  
  
The early OCA theory had dealt so intently with the ‘real’ criteria or the ‘real’ shocks 
affecting countries that it completely neglected the negative effects that can be 
associated with asymmetric monetary shocks under a system of adjustable exchange 
rates. Nevertheless, this traditional or ‘first-generation’ theory of the OCA was 
developed in an environment with relatively limited capital mobility and international 
financial market integration. 
 








Things are rather different today. In an open economy with a high degree of capital 
mobility and financial market integration, the shock absorber properties of a flexible 
exchange rate could be outweighed by the destabilizing effects of freely floating 
exchange rates and/ or the speculative behavior of foreign exchange market 
participants, regardless of macroeconomic fundamentals. These destabilizing effects of 
monetary shocks and speculative activities, by its own merit, provide an important 
argument against all monetary arrangements based on market-determined exchange 
rates (see also Buiter, 1999a).  
 
Second, the OCA criteria do not always point in the same direction. For example, small 
open economies should preferably adopt fixed exchange rates following the openness 
property of Mckinnon (1963). However, small open economies also have the tendency 
to be less diversified in production than larger ones. Conversely, Kenen (1969) notes 
that more diversified economies should find fixed exchange rates or a single currency 
beneficial. In such cases, the OCA theory has not suggested a criterion of the highest 
importance. Hence, it would be difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions on the 
desirability of currency union formation. Furthermore, the tendency for separate 
contributors to add to the OCA theory; focusing only on one criterion at a time, gives a 
somewhat ‘disjointed feel’5. This led some authors to conclude that the OCA theory 
does not provide a unifying framework for a coherent assessment of the costs and 
benefits of currency union participation (see Emerson et al, 1992, Tavlas, 1994).  
 
Several authors had attempted to synthesize the OCA criteria. Bayoumi (1994), for 
instance, incorporated the Mundell (1961), Mckinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) criteria 
into a general equilibrium model with regionally differentiated goods. The choice of a 
currency union depends upon the size of the underlying disturbances, the correlation 
between these disturbances, the costs of transactions across currencies, factor mobility 
across regions, and the interrelationships between demand for different goods. It is 
found that the net benefits of currency union membership increases for a given country 
facing asymmetric shocks with the degree of openness (Mckinnon, 1963), regional 
labor mobility (Mundell, 1961) and product diversification which reduces the impact of 
aggregate shocks (Kenen, 1969). 
                                                 
5 See also Bayoumi, T (1997). 








In addition, Melitz (1995) showed that the net benefits of giving up the nominal 
exchange rate if there is some wage-price stickiness, depends on a country’s trade 
weighted covariance of real exchange rates with its trading partners. A high covariance 
means that a change in the nominal rate will move the real rate in the desired direction 
in terms of each partner so devaluation/depreciation is effective. But if the covariance is 
low, devaluation/depreciation may be appropriate for some, but not for all partners, so 
the exchange rate weapon becomes less effective and the costs of joining a monetary 
union are reduced.  
 
Nevertheless, these attempts to synthesize the OCA theory are not the mainstream. 
Moreover, with the developments in macroeconomics as well as the international 
financial scene, for instance, the phenomenon of high capital mobility and speculative 
behavior, the original theory of the OCA is sometimes perceived as an incomplete 
guide to policy in our modern day world (see also Bofinger, 1994 and Buiter, 1999). 
Therefore, the following section will discuss the new additions and perspectives to the 
original Theory of the OCA.  
 
 
2.3. ‘NEW’ THEORY OF THE OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS 
 
This section clarifies the other motivations behind the emergence of real world 
currency areas that does not seem to be explained by the traditional OCA criteria. In 
addition, the developments in international and monetary economics have also shifted 
the balance in favor of monetary union formations.  
 
2.3.1. A ‘Monetarist” Approach 
 
‘Credibility Issues’  
 
A country whose authorities have a reputation of pursuing inflationary policies will find 
it difficult to shed that reputation without a long and costly process of disinflation. 
Therefore, by tying the hands of the monetary authorities to some kind of monetary 
discipline of the low-inflation anchor, the authorities can in turn enhance its own anti-
inflationary credibility (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1989).  









Take the CFA franc zone, for instance, it is far from qualifying as an optimum currency 
area, owing particularly to the very small degree of intra-regional trade, some 
inflexibility of prices and wages and a wide diversity of incidence to shifts in terms of 
trade. The main motivation behind the CFA franc zone as well as the East Caribbean 
currency union, have been the desire for enhanced monetary stability, rather than the 
size of intra-regional trade. The view is that a high inflation country increases its 
credibility by pegging its currency to that of a low inflation country. Countries in the 
CFA zone have benefited from the discipline and stability of being associated with the 
nominal anchor provided by the link to the Franc. Furthermore, membership in the 
franc zone has also given the countries access to France and to Europe (Masson and 
Taylor, 1993).   
 
Several theoretical works also have examined the credibility issue within the context of 
the European Monetary System (EMS). Fratianni and von Hagen (1990) observed that 
the literature stressed that historically high inflation European countries suffer from low 
credibility, and therefore might find it worthwhile to tie their monetary policies to that 
of a low inflation anchor (for e.g. Germany). This was in order to benefit from the 
credibility of the low inflation anchor. In this respect, the credibility gain for the non-
German members of the EMS were often cited as one important feature of the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), by which other central banks imported the inflation 
stability of the German Bundesbank. 
 
 
Inflation and Unemployment Trade-Offs? 
 
Corden (1972) and Fleming (1971) argued that the main cost of joining a currency area, 
besides the forfeiture of the exchange rate, was the nation’s loss of monetary policy to 
choose an optimal point along the long-run Philips curve, in which there is a trade off 
between inflation and unemployment. The implication that the unemployment rate 
cannot be lowered by raising the rate of inflation is the benefit of an independent 
exchange rate and independent monetary policies; the ability to choose a different 
inflation rate with no effect on employment. Therefore, the mid-70s literature assumed 
that flexible exchange rates would allow a nation to pursue an independent monetary 








policy so as to choose an optimum point along its Philips curve. However, subsequent 
studies have shown that there is no permanent Philips curve trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment (Robson, 1987). In other words, the output costs of disinflation 
could be viewed as temporary, with output and employment returning in the medium 
term to the equilibrium.  
 
If a trade-off does not exist between inflation and unemployment, then it is preferable 
for nations to aim for a low rate of inflation. Given the perceived desirability of low 
inflation, the question is whether the output costs of bringing down inflation are higher 
within or outside of the monetary union. If the commitment and credibility of the low-
inflation anchor in pursuing price stability is strong, then there may be a marked 
improvement in the output-inflation trade off to the high-inflation countries as 
inflationary expectations are lowered. By joining a union with a low-inflation country, 
the high-inflation country immediately reaps the benefits of a low-inflation reputation, 
without any loss of output and employment (De Grauwe, 1997, Talvas, 1993, Masson 
and Taylor, 1993). Nevertheless, despite these potential benefits, the transition costs in 
adjusting to low inflation anchor should be weighed against the credibility gains in 
tying to this anchor. 
 
 
Market-Determined Exchange Rates as ‘Noise’ 
 
In an open economy with a high degree of capital mobility, the foreign exchange 
market could possibly be a source of ‘noise’ and instability as well. Contrary to what is 
implicitly assumed in the OCA theory, flexible exchange rates might actually 
exacerbate the consequences of economic shocks. Bofinger (1994) viewed the 
avoidance of asymmetric monetary shocks, defined as capital movements that have lost 
any contact to macroeconomic fundamentals, as constituting a fundamental benefit of a 
monetary union. The adverse effects of asymmetric monetary shocks on countries 
involved provide an important argument against all monetary arrangements based on 
adjustable exchange rates.  
 
 








Buiter (1996, 1997) argued that asymmetric shocks, far from being an argument against 
a fixed exchange rate or common currency, are in fact an argument in favour of a fixed 
exchange rate or common currency. This is when the shocks in question are 
predominantly monetary and the degree of international financial capital mobility is 
high. 
 
Poole (1970) advocated that the choice of monetary policy regime depends primarily on 
the nature of underlying shocks, i.e. monetary or real disturbances. If the shocks 
affecting real output are mainly monetary shocks, then the optimum policy is to set the 
interest rate (and thereby the exchange rate) and let the money supply adjust to a level 
that is compatible with the interest rate/ exchange rate target. On the hand, if the object 
of policy is to stabilize output around its natural level and if the shocks affecting the 
economy emanate mainly from the goods market (demand or supply shocks), then the 
optimum policy is to control the money supply and let the interest rate (and or 
exchange rate) adjust to a level consistent with the money supply target.  
 
 
International Risk Sharing  
 
Mundell’s (1961) classic article seems to come down against a common monetary 
policy, and to argue in favor of making currency areas smaller rather than larger, 
especially in the face of asymmetric shocks. However, in a later paper, Mundell (1973) 
appeared to have changed his mind and presented a different analytical perspective6. If 
a common money can be managed so that its general purchasing power remains stable, 
then the larger the currency area even one encompassing diverse regions or nations 
subject to “asymmetric shocks”, the better. 
 
Mundell (1973) showed how having a common currency across countries can mitigate 
such shocks by better reserve pooling and portfolio diversification. A country suffering 
an adverse shock can better share the loss with a trading partner because both countries 
hold claims on each other’s output in a common currency. Whereas, under a flexible 
exchange rate without such portfolio diversification, a country facing an adverse shock 
                                                 
6 McKinnon, R (2000a).  








and devaluing finds that its domestic-currency assets buy less on world markets. The 
cost of the shock could be more ‘bottled up’ in the country where the shock originated. 
Therefore, based on the risk sharing properties within a currency area, the case for a 
common currency is justified, even if countries are subject to asymmetric shocks, as 
long as there is international portfolio diversification in capital markets. As such, a 
country which suffered an adverse shock could easily borrow from other countries in 
the currency area and share the risks of asymmetric shocks. 
 
In addition, Ching and Devereux (2000) developed a simple model to analyze the 
nature of risk-sharing benefits of a single currency area for emerging market 
economies, based on Mundell’s (1973) hypothesis. An important pre-requisite for the 
risk-sharing benefits of a single currency is that there be limited trade among countries 
in national-currency denominated bonds. The authors showed that a single currency 
area might support risk sharing that could not be achieved under floating exchange 
rates. On the other hand, the potential for risk-sharing within a single currency area 
seem to remain. 
 
 
In sum, despite the shortcomings of the early theory of the OCA, the theory has 
however provided a simple checklist of criteria in assessing countries for monetary 
union. Willett and Wihlborg (1999) also pointed out that  in spite of the criticisms on 
the early OCA theory, the usefulness of this theory is not seriously undermined. 
Therefore, intuitive insights from the theory of the OCA can still be drawn.  
 
Finally, the OCA criteria should be viewed as a set of sufficient factors that either 
‘push’ (i.e. impede) or ‘pull’ (i.e. facilitate) the process of monetary integration. This 
set of factors acts as a preliminary guide to country’s choice of joining a currency 
union. Similarly, Willet (2002) viewed the OCA analytics is ‘an approach for thinking 















2.3.2. The Issue of ‘Endogeneity’  
 
In a series of recent papers, Frankel and Rose (1996 and 1998) argued that the OCA 
criteria might be endogenous. A country's suitability for entry into a currency union 
include, inter alia, the intensity of trade with other potential members of the currency 
union and the extent to which domestic business cycles are correlated with those of the 
other countries. Frankel and Rose (1996 and 1998) developed and investigated the 
relationship between trade intensity and business cycles of potential currency union 
countries. They found that countries with closer trade links tend to have more tightly 
correlated business cycles.  
 
Frankel and Rose therefore challenged the view expressed by Krugman (1993), 
according to which currency unions tend to exacerbate asymmetric shocks by inducing 
regional concentration and specialization in production. Krugman (1993)  argued that 
increased regional specialization will render the currency area regions much more 
subject to random, idiosyncratic demand and technology shocks, so that region-specific 
recessions and crises will more likely to occur. Furthermore, when combined with 
increased factor mobility that trade integration promotes, such region-specific shocks 
will lead to divergent long-term regional growth paths. Thus, given that monetary union 
member states will no longer be able to use the exchange rate mechanism as a policy 
instrument, the only way regional adjustment problems can be ameliorated is by 
transferring a significant part of national budgets to the region’s monetary union to 
allow fiscal federalism to function as an automatic stabilizer. 
 
Frankel and Rose (1996 and 1998) on the other hand suggested that tighter trade 
linkages between countries in a currency union will make their economic structures and 
business cycles more similar and shocks more symmetric (particularly if demand or 
other common shocks predominate or if trade is concentrated within a given industry). 
The authors also highlighted that a country not fulfilling the OCA criteria at the outset 
may satisfy them ex-post once their economic structure have adapted to the currency 
union. As such, there could be benefits forgone of not joining a currency union. 
  
 








Nevertheless, the critical question is how monetary union will affect economic 
structures and whether business cycles will be synchronized across members of a 
monetary union. On theoretical grounds, both hypotheses by Krugman (1993) and 
Frankel and Rose (1998) are equally plausible, but the empirical evidence is 
inconclusive (see Soltwedel, R, Dohse, D and Krieger-Boden, C, 2000). Hence, policy 
should take a cautious stance.  We shall return to the issue of ‘endogeneity’ in greater 
details in Chapter 7. 
 
 
2.4. ECONOMICS OF MONETARY INTEGRATION 
 
Another approach used in studying the issue of monetary integration is in assessing the 
benefits and costs of joining a monetary union. Basically, the choice of an exchange 
rate regime boils down to a trade-off between the microeconomic benefits of a single 
currency and that of the macroeconomic costs of losing monetary autonomy. The wave 
that concentrated on the benefits and costs of a monetary union included early 
contributors like Corden (1972), Mundell (1973), Ishiyama (1975), Tower and Willet 
(1976) and other more recent authors like De Grauwe (2000) and Gros and Thygesen 
(1998).  
 
2.4.1. Microeconomic Benefits and Macroeconomic Costs 
 
From a microeconomic efficiency viewpoint, one of the most persuasive arguments in 
favor of a common currency is the elimination of transaction costs and exchange risks. 
By eliminating the need for the exchange of one currency for another, monetary union 
saves real resources and removes exchange rate uncertainty.  
 
The stability of money could in turn promote trade and investment flows. In this way, a 
common currency can be seen as a policy instrument designed to promote deeper 
economic integration. In addition, a single monetary policy in areas with a very high 
degree of financial market integration could also enhance the stability of money 
demand and the efficiency of monetary instruments. Furthermore, in a supposedly 
integrated market, through the operation of the ‘law of one price’, the use of a common 
currency could promote competition and price convergence. The other additional 








benefit is a wider international use and circulation of the single currency. The 
usefulness of money, i.e. as a unit of account, medium of exchange, standard for 
deferred payment, by a single currency circulating over a wider area, can also be 
increased. 
  
Another equally compelling argument in favor of a common currency is the elimination 
of competitive devaluations and beggar thy neighbor attempts to improve a country’s 
competitiveness through its exchange rate policy. For this reason, a common currency 
is often seen as a surrogate form of regional policy coordination. With a single 
currency, speculative currency attacks basically cannot occur. In recent times, the idea 
of a common currency has also surfaced as a regional agenda against international 
currency speculation. 
 
Although the drive towards a monetary union might deliver benefits to its members, on 
the other hand, it also has its costs. The most contentious economic aspects of a 
monetary union concern its implications on a nation’s ability to conduct 
macroeconomic stabilization. In joining a monetary union, a country relinquishes  
autonomy over its monetary policy in response to different economic challenges and  in 
macroeconomic adjustments.  
 
Although the optimal currency literature has invoked a variety of factors that may 
improve the stabilizing capacity of monetary union - notably, a high degree of labor 
mobility, and a central budget capable of making large fiscal transfers, the use of the 
exchange rate is usually a more rapid and less painful policy tool than other adjustment 
mechanism. Furthermore, when a member country exhibits relatively higher price and 
wage rigidities, such nominal rigidities tend only to be reduced by means of structural 
reforms. Therefore, the costs of joining a monetary union is higher the greater the 
structural rigidities a country faces. 
 
In addition, when common fiscal restraints (such as the “Stability and Growth Pact of 
the EMU) are used, the ability of national governments to conduct autonomous fiscal 








policies are largely reduced7. This would impact countries with higher public debt or 
larger budget deficits.  
 
Another argument against currency unions centers on the loss of a domestic lender of 
last resort. When a country irrevocably ties its exchange rate or gives up its currency, 
the central bank can no longer print money as needed to shore up the domestic banking 
system. National governments also forsake the option of “inflating away” their national 
debt in the future, as direct control of part of their reserves and other assets are 
transferred to a supranational central bank. 
 
Therefore, monetary integration delivers both benefits and costs to member countries. 
As such, the purpose of convergence is to reduce the costs of monetary integration, by 
reducing the need for a differentiated monetary policy. The convergence and 




2.4.2. Convergence and Divergence and Monetary Integration 
 
Convergence can be seen as a process of achieving similar (e.g. economic) outcomes 
across member countries, and that these outcomes fulfill basic objectives, and are 
sustainable over time8. Conversely, ‘divergence’ refers to the degree to which countries 
differ in their national characteristics, as a result of the differentials in initial conditions, 
such as economic development, structure, policy preferences and transmission 
mechanism and institutional framework. Therefore, one observes asymmetries in 
business cycles, inflation and interest rates, government budgets and other forms of 
responses. 
 
The convergence and divergence of prospective members impact on the economics (i.e. 
benefits and costs) of monetary integration. However, the OCA theory is silent about 
convergence requirements. The theory stresses that the need to have labor market 
flexibility and mobility as important requirements for a successful monetary union. 
                                                 
7 Mongelli, F (2002). 








According to this theory, if these conditions are satisfied, there is no need for a 
transition to monetary union (De Grauwe, 1997). However, in practice, the 
convergence of prospective members is important in the transition towards monetary 
union. For instance, the lead-up to the European Monetary Union was conditional on 
countries satisfying the specified convergence criteria (to be discussed in Chapter 5), as 
is in the case of the West African monetary zone participation9. The general principle is 
that convergent members make better candidates for monetary integration, since it 
reduces the economic costs of adjustments.  
  
The costs of monetary integration also decrease with the trade integration of the 
member countries. Figure 2.2 illustrates the benefits and costs of monetary unification 
with respect to the extent of trade integration as well as the extent of convergence and 
divergence among its members. For upward sloping curve AB, the benefits of monetary 
unification increase with higher degrees of trade integration as well as convergence (i.e. 
reduced divergence) among union members. On the other hand, downward sloping 
curve CD indicates that the costs of monetary unification decrease with the degree of 
trade integration as well as reduced divergence (i.e. increased convergence) among its 
members.   
 











                  
         
    
 Trade Integration 
 
                                                                                                                                              
8 Crockett, A (1994). 
9 Convergence criteria were set under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monetary 
Cooperation Program. The criteria include:  1) single digit inflation rate by 2000 and 5% by 2003;  2) budget 
deficit (excluding grants) to GDP ratio of not more than 5% by 2000 and 4% by 2002;  3) central bank 
financing of budget deficit to be limited to 10% of previous year’s tax revenue; and 4) gross external reserves 
to cover at least three months of imports by end-2000 and six months by end 2003. 
Decreasing costs (reducing divergence) 














At the intersection point E*, the costs equal the benefits of monetary unification. To the 
left of E*, the costs of monetary unification is greater than its benefits given the level of 
trade integration. To the right of E*, the benefits of monetary unification is greater than 
its costs given the level of trade integration. Therefore, the net benefits of monetary 
unification result with a higher level of trade integration, as illustrated by the balance of 
benefits and costs to the right of E*. However, the actual point where the benefits 
surpass the costs of monetary union given the level of trade integration is difficult to 
quantify (see also Saccomanni and Papadia, 199410).  
 
In addition, the stability of the monetary union is also dependent on the convergence or 
divergence of members. If market participants perceive that fixed parities among 
divergent members are not sustainable, the monetary system would in turn be 
vulnerable to speculative attacks. For instance, the speculative attacks against the 
European Monetary System (EMS), when market participants perceived that the agreed 
fixed parities could not be maintained by some members due to their divergent 
economic performance. The issues of convergence and divergence of monetary union 
members will further be discussed in Chapter 5.   
 
Finally, the argument for and against monetary unions goes beyond economics. A 
prime example is the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). While it was 
said that monetary union was a necessary step to complete the single European market, 
however the drive towards such union was motivated by political considerations11. 
Eichengreen and Frieden (1994), for instance, conclude that uncertainty about the 
empirical magnitude of the benefits and costs suggests the absence of a clear economics 
case in favor of EMU. However, events in Europe are mainly driven by political 
factors. Therefore, in reality, political considerations are even more important, and 
could overwhelm economic factors in the process. Nonetheless, detailed political 
analysis behind the drive towards monetary union is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
                                                 
10 As such, authors like: Mordi, Charles, 2002; Itsede, 2001; De Grauwe, 1997, 2000; Bogetic, Z, 1999; 
Crockett, 1994; Steinherr, 1994 etc, have discussed the potential costs and benefits of monetary 
integration (whether graphically or by description) to bring knowledge and awareness to such issues. 
This thesis has also raised awareness to the economics of regional integration, by assessing its benefits 
via the extent of trade interdependence, and its costs through an examination of the extent of regional 
divergence. However, a formal quantification of the net costs and benefits of regional monetary union is 
not attempted in this thesis.   
11 Goodhart, C (1995) and Willett, T (2000). 









EMPIRICAL LITERATURE OF MONETARY INTEGRATION 
 
The driving force behind the empirical works of monetary integration comes from the 
potential agglomeration of currencies. Most of the empirical works have concentrated 
on Western Europe, where the issue had immediate relevancy. As Europe moves 
towards a single currency, so has the empirical research on the suitability for such an 
experiment. The following section provides an overview of the empirical literature of 
monetary integration. Much of this empirical literature has focused on the Theory of the 
OCA as a framework for analysis. 
 
It seems appropriate to recall the criteria under the traditional theory of the OCA. These 
include: the symmetry or asymmetries of underlying shocks, intra-regional factor 
mobility, the openness of economies to international trade and diversification in trade 
(see e.g. Mundell, 1961; Mckinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969). As such, it is not surprising 




3.1. SOURCES OF UNDERLYING DISTURBANCES 
 
Central to the empirical literature of the OCA has been the nature of the underlying 
shocks. Many authors pointed out that an important condition for following a common 
monetary policy depends critically on the nature and mix of shocks to which the 
participant countries are exposed. If the impact of output disturbances on particular 
areas (and not just countries) was similar, a common currency or a fixed exchange rate 
system was appropriate. However, if disturbances were asymmetric, the necessary 
adjustment in relative prices to restore equilibrium could be achieved either through 
exchange rates or through high labor mobility and/or wage flexibility. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that a large number of empirical studies on OCA are dedicated to 
measuring the extent of asymmetries between regions in order to assess their 
advantages in having a common currency.  
 








Several approaches were used to analyze the degree of similarity or dissimilarity of 
country-specific shocks of a region. The earliest studies used the degree of cross-
country correlations in macroeconomic variables, while the later studies focused on 
employing the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) methodology to examine the 
nature of economic shocks. 
 
The earlier studies had examined the degree of cross-country correlations in selected 
macroeconomic variables. The standard OCA “indicators” were the correlations in 
output, prices, real exchange rate movements, unemployment and etc. The finding that 
when these correlations were low, it implied that the countries were subject to 
idiosyncratic shocks and that the costs of forming a monetary union would likely be 
large, especially in the face of factor immobility. Conversely, when countries of a 
region faced largely similar shocks, it implied that the costs of forming a monetary 
union are smaller. 
 
Another strand of literature to gauge the extent of asymmetric shocks was through an 
examination of the countries’ economic structure. In related analysis, some studies 
search for asymmetric shocks by looking at countries’ industrial structure, for example, 
the differences in the shares of output accounted for by different industries. The 
assumption is that countries with similar industrial structures are thought to be prone to 
symmetric terms-of-trade shocks, negating the effectiveness of the exchange rate tool 
between the countries. Nicholas (1999), for instance, examined the similarity in 
production and in trade structures for the ASEAN economies and found divergences in 
their levels of industrial structures. In addition to the assessment of other OCA related 
criterion, Nicholas concluded that the case for creating a currency area within ASEAN 
is quite weak both economically and politically. 
  
Another approach to gauge the extent of asymmetric shocks has been to compute the 
variability of the real exchange rates, since changes in the relative prices reflect shifts 
in demand and supply affecting one region relative to another (Eichengreen, 1997). 
Poloz (1990) compared real exchange rates variances among European countries and 
the regions of the United States and Canada. However, Von Hagen and Neumann 
(1994) found this standard of comparison unsatisfactory, as there existed large 
structural differences between the American and European economies. This implied 








that they were exposed to different economic shocks in the past. Hagen and Neumann 
then compared the conditional variance and the persistence of real exchange shocks 
within the German monetary union and between Germany and eight European 
countries to assess the viability of a monetary union in Europe. Their findings 
suggested a 2-speed Europe, led first by a smaller group of more similar European 
economies.  
  
A subsequent strand of literature explored the determinants of the incidence of shocks. 
Cohen and Wyploz (1989) were the first to use the time series of output to investigate 
the asymmetry of shocks. They transformed the real GDP data for France and Germany 
into their sums and differences. They interpreted the movements in the sum as 
symmetric disturbances, while movements in the differences as asymmetric 
disturbances. The authors find that symmetric shocks were much larger than 
asymmetric shocks. Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) analyzed the incidence of shocks 
through changes in selected macroeconomic indicators, namely real GDP, GDP 
deflator, real wages and the current account ratio for France and Germany. 
Transforming data on real GDP into sums and differences, they interpret movements in 
the sum as symmetric disturbances and movements in the difference as asymmetric 
disturbances.  They found that the symmetric shocks to the two economies are larger 
than asymmetric ones. However, the reverse was not true when “Europe” (France and 
Germany) was compared to the United States. Furthermore, the authors found that 
asymmetric shocks tend to be more permanent than temporary. From these results, 
Cohen and Wyplosz concluded that monetary integration between France and Germany 
might be more viable than between Europe and the United States. 
 
The limitation of Cohen and Wyploz (1989) approach is much the same as the previous 
approaches which had focused on observed economic variables. In a series of 
influential contributions, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, 1996) made a distinction 
between cross-country correlations of observed economic variables (like output and 
prices) and those of underlying structural shocks (demand and supply disturbances 
originating from shifts in technology, preferences, policy changes, etc.) Observed 
economic variables can display strong international correlations even if the underlying 
shocks are not interrelated, if the international transmission mechanism is sufficiently 
strong, particularly with high financial integration. 








Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, 1994) pointed out that the earlier approaches in 
previous studies had failed to provide enough information to distinguish disturbances 
from responses. Observed movements in macroeconomic indicators reflect the 
combined effects of both disturbances and responses. Among the first empirical papers 
to have dealt with the issue of macroeconomic disturbances through a statistical 
approach were those by Bayoumi and Taylor (1992) Caporale (1993) and Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993, 1994). Bayoumi and Taylor (1992) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1993, 1994) used a variant of the SVAR methodology, first proposed by Blanchard 
and Quah (1989), to identify economic disturbances.  
 
Blanchard and Quah (1989), using a bivariate VAR system, showed how to decompose 
real GNP and recover two pure shocks. They have reconsidered the Beveridge and 
Nelson (1981) decomposition of real GNP into temporary and permanent components. 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) provided an alternative way to the Choleski decomposition 
of identifying structural shocks. They developed a macroeconomic model such that real 
GNP is affected by demand and supply side disturbances. In this AD-AS framework 
consistent with the natural-rate of employment hypothesis, demand shocks have only 
transitory effect on output, while supply shocks, such as technological advancement, 
institutional factors, have a permanent effect on output.  
 
The empirical VAR procedure begins with the standard decomposition into its 
temporary and permanent components. In an influential contribution, Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993) applied a variant of the VAR methodology proposed by Blanchard 
and Quah (1989) to assess the nature of macroeconomic disturbances among different 
groups of countries. The underlying rationale of their study is that countries 
experiencing similar disturbances are likely to respond with similar policies, thus 
making them better candidates for forming a monetary union. The authors measured the 
importance of asymmetric demand and supply shocks across members of the European 
Community (EC) and compared them with the ones prevailing in the United States. 
Their results indicated that first, the EC was divided into a “core” group of countries, 
made up of Germany and her immediate neighbors (France, Netherlands, Belgium and 
Denmark), with stronger “structural” correlations than the “peripheral” ones, and 
second, the supply and demand shocks to the core EC countries were on average 
smaller and more correlated with each other. 









Caporale (1993) regressed nominal and real GDP for EU countries on three own lags 
and examined the correlation of the residuals across countries in an attempt to 
determine to what extent Europe was affected by symmetric as opposed to asymmetric 
disturbances. The results for nominal and real GDP were similar and seemed to suggest 
that symmetric shocks account for a large part of GDP fluctuations in the EU. 
However, the results for real GDP were “somewhat peculiar: the correlation of ‘shocks’ 
to the Dutch and German economies are if anything negative; only in Denmark and 
Portugal do shocks follow  those of Germany”. According to Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1996), the peculiarity of Caporale’s results may be explained by the lack of distinction 
between supply and demand disturbances in his estimated residuals12. 
 
 
The recent OCA literature has emphasized the importance of not only analyzing the 
nature of macroeconomic disturbances as temporary and permanent shocks, but also the 
decomposition of shocks into its real and nominal components (see Bhattacharya and 
Binner, 1998 and Buiter, 1999). Based on the Poole (1970) theoretical underpinning, 
nominal exchange rate flexibility is desirable when an economy faces mainly IS or 
goods market shocks. To the extent that movements in real output are driven by 
nominal shocks, the cost of forgoing the exchange rate as a shock absorber could be 
overstated.  
 
Several authors extended the bi-variate VAR model to identify more than just demand 
and supply shocks respectively. Erkel-Rousse and Melitz (1995) extended the structural 
VAR approach of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) by isolating separate shocks to 
represent the effects of surprises in monetary policy and unexpected fiscal policy. 
Based on six major European countries, the authors show that the maintenance of 
independent fiscal policy is important for all countries except Germany. Furthermore, 




                                                 
12 Cortinhas, C (2002).   









Following the identification schemes of Clarida and Gali (1994), Thomas (1997) found 
that real shocks account for over 60 percent of the forecast error variance of the real 
exchange rate, comparable to the percentage in the number of core EMU countries. To 
the extent that the demand shocks were related to macroeconomic policies that are 
under the control of the authorities, the cost of relinquishing the exchange rate is no 
higher, if not lower for Sweden than most of the core EMU countries. 
  
In keeping with the work of Erkel-Rousse and Melitz (1995), Bhattacharya and Binner 
(1998) used a four-equation structural VAR to model the joint behaviour of real output, 
nominal interest rates, real interest rates and real money disturbances in response to 
four exogenous disturbances. Identifying restrictions were used so that disturbances can 
be interpreted as supply, money supply, IS and money demand shocks. The analysis 
was performed on five major European economies of Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy. The study indicated that the five economies had 
faced very different types of economic shocks. The conclusion was that unless a 
convincing empirical case could be made that there would be substantial net benefits 
from European monetary union formation, otherwise the process should proceed with 
extreme caution. 
 
Funke, M (2000) used the structural VAR model to identify relative supply, relative 
demand, and relative nominal shocks in Euroland versus the United Kingdom (UK). 
The empirical results indicated that most of the variation in relative output is caused by 
supply shocks while the shocks driving the real ECU exchange rate are mainly non-
monetary demand shocks in nature. Therefore, the loss of the exchange rate as a shock 
absorber would not be great for the UK. On the other hand, the costs to the UK of being 
outside EMU would be numerous. An additional message of the paper for private and 
public decision-makers is that greater prudence and structural flexibility in UK would 














3.2. CROSS-REGIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
 
Oftentimes, when judging the desirability for an European monetary union, researchers 
used the United States as a benchmark for comparison. Most comparative studies 
usually found that the correlation in the United States is very much higher than those in 
Europe. However, such findings could be misleading. The results of the studies are to 
be expected: a unified United States of America should exhibit a greater degree of 
correlation than a pre-unified Europe, what more, when the system of alternative 
adjustment mechanism is yet to be in place. As such, comparative studies between a 
unified and a pre-unified region should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, this 
chapter also supplies several cross-region comparative studies to provide a 
comprehensive overview on the OCA empirical works. 
 
Eichengreen (1997) pointed out that the VAR decompositions has allowed the analysis 
to proceed considerably further and that disturbances can be identified more precisely 
than the simple correlations of growth and inflation rates permit. The authors had 
earlier measured the importance of asymmetric demand and supply shocks across 
members of the European Community (EC) and compared them with the ones 
prevailing in the United States.  
 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) approached the OCA issue by directly measuring the 
importance of asymmetric demand and supply shocks in the EU and comparing them 
with the ones prevailing in the US. After identifying these shocks through a structural 
VAR methodology, Bayoumi and Eichengreen concluded that the correlation among 
supply and demand shocks were on average smaller among EU countries than across 
US states. 
 
Bayoumi and Thomas (1994) used structural vector autoregressions to analyze the 
relationship between real output and relative prices within the European Union (EU) 
and the United States. Relative price variability appeared to be more important for 
adjustment within the EU than the United States, reflecting the lower integration of 
goods and factor markets. In the absence of higher market integration, the lower 
relative price variability implied by the introduction of a single currency in the EU 
could well cause significant economic disruption. 








DeSerres and Lalonde (1994) used a VAR system that includes measures of industrial 
production, consumer price index and M1 monetary aggregate. They extended the 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) method and used long-run restrictions to decompose the 
VAR reduced-form residuals into three structural innovations, namely, supply shocks 
and monetary and non-monetary (or real) demand shocks for the European and U.S. 
regions.  In a clear demarcation from Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) approach, 
DeSerres and Lalonde (1994) argued that on the demand side, only monetary shocks 
have no permanent effect on real balances while a real demand shock (like fiscal or 
consumer preference shocks) may have an important impact on the evaluation of the 
costs of losing exchange rate flexibility and therefore should be analyzed separately. 
Their results showed that supply shocks account for a much larger proportion of output 
variance in Europe than in the U.S. regions. Furthermore, instead of two groups as 
identified in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) study, three groups of countries had 
experienced highly correlated supply and real demand shocks. They were 1) Germany 
and Switzerland, 2) an intermediate group of Austria, Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK, and 3) Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Sweden 
formed the European periphery. The study also found that both supply and demand 
shocks affecting Canada had little correlation with those in the U.S. with the same 
occurring in the case of Mexico and the U.S.  
 
Eichengreen (1990) assessed the extent of labour mobility and incidence of shocks in 
Europe by comparing them with comparable measures for Canada and the United 
States. A variety of measures suggested that labour mobility and the speed of labour-
market adjustment remain lower in Europe than in the United States.  
 
Bayoumi and Prasad (1995) compared sources of disturbances to output and labour 
market adjustment in the US currency union compared to a set of EU countries. 
Comparable datasets for eight US regions and eight European countries are constructed 
and used to study the relative importance of industry-specific, region-specific, and 
aggregate shocks to output growth. Both areas were subjected to similar overall 
disturbances although a disaggregated perspective reveals some differences. Inter-








regional labour mobility appeared to be a much more important adjustment mechanism 
in the United States, which has a more integrated labour market than the EU13. 
 
In assessing the Euro area for entry into EMU, the HM Treasury (2003) examined how 
the U.S. functioned as a large economy with a single currency, and how that has 
contributed to economic performance. The study found that U.S. regions have coped 
with various adjustment mechanism, especially labour mobility, in response to 
asymmetric shocks. However, fiscal policy appeared to provide as much, if not more 
assistance to regional adjustment in Europe than in the U.S.  
 
The existence of a single currency has also benefited the U.S. states in both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic performance. At a macroeconomic level, there is 
evidence to suggest that the U.S. monetary union has contributed to greater 
consumption stability. The large single market, well-integrated financial markets and 
trade integration could had helped the U.S. to stabilize consumption both over time and 
between regions. In addition, the single currency has helped stimulate inter-state trade 
and investment, and provided a spur to competition.  
 
The study ended that a direct comparison between the U.S. and the Euro area is 
difficult for a number of reasons, most notably that the institutions and policy 
frameworks of the U.S. monetary union have evolved over a significant period of time 
in response to economic need, and not according to an ex ante design as in the Euro 
area14. This suggests that perhaps the most important lesson from the US experience is 
that a key feature of a successful monetary union is a high degree of confidence that, 
should difficulties occur, both the economic and institutional structures of the union 




                                                 
13 Bayoumi, T and Prasad, E (1995). 
14 Moreover, the political context for the two monetary unions is very different. Ultimately the U.S. states 
chose federal structures for fiscal policy to underpin political union. In the EU, fiscal policy is the 
responsibility of Member States – as set out in the Stability and Growth Pact, and subject to the 
provisions of the EC Treaty. 








In a cross regional study on monetary unification in various parts of the world, 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) distinguished between demand and supply shocks 
statistically and estimated the correlations of underlying shocks among the East Asian 
countries. The authors found supply shocks as symmetrical among 1) Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan and 2) Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Demand 
shocks were also found to be highly symmetrical for the latter group of countries. 
Based on the criterion of symmetry in underlying disturbances, they concluded that 
these two groups of countries are likely to form separate OCAs. 
  
In a subsequent study, Bayoumi and Mauro (1999) used the structural VAR approach 
and compared empirical results between Europe and the Asean countries. Bayoumi and 
Mauro (1999) examined the correlation, size and speed of adjustment to the underlying 
disturbances for Asia, and compared the results with those for Europe. The results for 
ASEAN indicated that Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore had relatively similar 
disturbances, while the Philippines and Thailand experienced more idiosyncratic 
shocks. Based on the correlation of supply shocks, the authors found the results 
somewhat similar to those found earlier for Western Europe, where shocks appeared to 
be relatively highly correlated between France and Germany, and more idiosyncratic in 
Italy and Spain. 
 
However, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) pointed to the much wider variation in the 
economic and financial conditions in Asia than was the case in Europe. For instance, 
some Asian markets are very open while some are highly regulated and restricted. The 
authors suggested that “on standard optimum currency area grounds, the economies of 
East Asia would seem to be more or less as plausible candidates for internationally 
harmonized monetary policies as the members of the European Union. While they do 
not satisfy all the standard OCA criteria, nor does Europe”. 
 
Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro (2000) added that the “underlying (aggregate 
supply) disturbances are relatively highly correlated across certain Asean countries, but 
the correlations are typically lower than they were in Europe…the speed of adjustment 
is much faster in Asean, presumably reflecting the region’s more flexible labour 
markets… and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is only slightly more 
diverse within Asean than in Euro area”. The authors concluded that overall, on the 








economic front, Asean today is less suited for a regional currency arrangement than 
Europe was before the Maastricht Treaty, but these differences are not large. 
Nevertheless, politically, there is still a long way to go. 
 
In a later study, Yuen (2000) used a Structural VAR approach to empirically assess the 
symmetry of demand and supply shocks in East Asia, as satisfying one of the 
conditions for forming an optimum currency area. She found two significant positive 
correlations within the Southeast Asian bloc, namely those between Singapore and 
Malaysia, and that between Malaysia and Indonesia. The Northeast Asian grouping of 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan also displayed significant positive correlations of 
supply disturbances with each other. In addition, the study also found an overlapping 
subgroup, comprised of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, whose supply disturbances 
were also significantly positively correlated. Yuen (2000) study suggested that there 
exists some scope among selected groups of East Asian economies for potential 
monetary integration. However, the author cautioned against a speedier move towards 
Asian monetary integration due to the diversity of regional development. 
 
In another study, Chow and Kim (2000) investigated the feasibility of a common 
currency peg in East Asia from the perspective of Western European countries. They 
noted that the domestic outputs of East Asian countries are strongly influenced by 
country-specific shocks while regional shocks are far more important in European 
countries that have joined the Economic and Monetary Union. The authors stated that 
their results are robust to various changes in specifications of the model. They also 
suggested that East Asian countries are structurally different from each other and thus 
more likely to be subject to asymmetric shocks. They concluded that based on optimum 
currency area grounds, a common currency peg in East Asia would be more costly and 
difficult to sustain.  
 
 
Despite the Structural VAR studies in attempting to uncover the symmetry of shocks 
among countries of a region, several authors highlighted the shortcomings of the 
methodology. Talvas (1994) pointed out that empirical results from the structural VAR 
models are often ambiguous and in conflict. He added there is no concurrence on the 
theoretical underpinning of the tests, for example, on the relationship between 








exchange rate variability, trade, investment and other economic variables. In other 
words, empirical authors could have resorted to ‘incredible’ identification of their 
structural VAR frameworks in order to recover the underlying shocks.  
 
Buiter (1997, 1999) recognized that though there is a growing number of OCA 
empirical literature15 on the magnitude and persistence of asymmetric shocks, however, 
convincing evidence on the nature and source of these shocks is hard to find. He added 
that while the earlier studies failed to distinguish between LM shocks and IS shocks, 
and the more recent ones that do, have resorted to heroic identification restrictions that 
fail to convince. 
 
Finally, the structural VAR methodology should be viewed as an indicative approach. 
This is because the approach is also limited by its ability to identify at most the number 
of shocks as there are variables. This limitation was being recognized by the original 
authors of the approach, Blanchard and Quah (1989), in their study. Therefore, the 
results arising from the structural VAR methodology should be taken as suggestive 





                                                 
15 For example, Minford and Rastogi (1990), De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1991), Minford, Rastogi 
and Hughes Hallet (1993), Masson and Symansky (1993), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), Erkel-
Rousse and Melitz (1995), Gerlach and Smets (1995), and Bhattacharya and Binner (1998). 








 3.3. NON-MONETARY ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM   
 
While the type of disturbances which occur within an area has been central to the 
empirical OCA literature, they are not the only factor to be considered. The literature 
also examined the use of alternative adjustment (non-monetary) mechanism to alleviate 
economic imbalances. These include the flexibility of prices and wages, the mobility of 
factors and the availability of fiscal transfers etc.  
 
 
3.3.1. Factor Mobility 
 
The degree of factor mobility can be another adjustment mechanism to asymmetric 
shocks. Mundell (1961) argued that unless factors of production (labor and capital) can 
move freely, shifts in demand in one region might lead to unemployment in the absence 
of nominal exchange rate flexibility.  
 
But for labor mobility to mimic a flexible nominal exchange rate, significant net 
migration flows would have to take place at cyclical frequencies. And limited labor 
mobility and the absence of a federal budget with redistributive powers are also 
obstacles to monetary union.  
 
Several studies have established that labor mobility was much lower within the 
European states than in the United States (Masson and Taylor, 1993). For instance, 
Eichengreen (1990) found that the variation in unemployment in European union was 
twice that of the United States.  
 
Thomas (1993) noted substantial differences between Europe and the United States in 
their responses to the unemployment rate to economic shocks. In the United States, 
unemployment shocks that arise from a fall in demand for goods and services in a 
particular region are not persistent due to a high degree of inter-regional migration of 
the labor force. On the other hand, changes in unemployment rate in Europe tend to be 
persistent due to a low degree of labor mobility across countries.  
 








Several factors had also helped to explain low labor mobility in Europe. Bertola (2000) 
observed that quantity and price dimensions of labor market rigidity were inter-related 
and the lack of employment flexibility with wage rigidity reinforce each other. Other 
factors to labor migration include migration rules and restrictions, language and cultural 
differences etc.   
 
A panel of experts set up by the EU Commission (1996) partly attributed low labor 
mobility in Europe to a combination of institutional and administrative factors 
including limited cross border portability of social protection and supplementary 
pension rights, administrative difficulties and the high costs of gaining legal resident 
status, restrictions on public sector employment and so forth16. 
 
 
3.3.2. Wage and Price Flexibility 
 
Another adjustment mechanism with shock absorbing properties is that of the flexibility 
of wages and prices. The freedom to modify the nominal exchange rate can be helpful 
if nominal wages are sticky, but redundant when wages and prices are flexible. In a 
world with fully flexible prices and wage, monetary policy is largely irrelevant for real 
activity.  
 
There is broad agreement that price flexibility is low across European countries. OECD 
(1999)17 and EU Commission (1999)18 found that price flexibility was hampered 
(although by differing degrees across the Euro region) by the slow implementation of 
the Single Market Program, a slow dismantling of some internal and external non-tariff 
trade barriers, and continuing state aid to several sectors. For example, there is 
relatively low market competition and monopolistic tendency in sectors with a high 
concentration of state owned enterprises or of previous state monopolies.  
 
Low wage flexibility is also an important factor behind the lack of price flexibility. 
Despite significant progress in recent years, real wages were still quite rigid across 
                                                 
16 Mongelli, F (2002).  
17 “EMU: Facts, Challenges and Policies”, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Paris: France.  








most European countries (see Calmfors and Driffil, 1998, Boeri, Borsch-Supan and 
Tabellini, 2001). There is also a significantly lower speed of real wage adjustments in 
Europe (OECD, 1994). Unemployment does put some pressure on real wages in 
Europe, however, a large share of adjustment is borne by employment (OECD, 1994). 
Cadiou, Guichard and Maurel (2001) find significant labor market asymmetries across 
EU countries and that the overall responsiveness of wages to unemployment rose in the 
1990s. Several labor market characteristics also contributed to low wage flexibility in 
Europe including: wage bargaining features and minimum wage provisions, 
employment protection and unemployment insurance system (see Blanchard, 1999, 
Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000 and EU Commission, 1999).  
 
 
3.3.3. Fiscal Transfers  
 
Another policy instrument to cushion the impact of asymmetric shocks across members 
of a currency area is through cross borders income transfers (Kenen, 1969, Sachs and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1991, Von Hagen, 1991, Atekeson and Bayoumi, 1993).  In this way, 
when an economy of a union is faced with adverse shocks it will automatically receive 
transfers from other union members or make lower tax payments. Since monetary and 
exchange rate policies will not be used autonomously by the different economies of the 
union, fiscal policy will play the equilibrating role of regional differences in 
unemployment and income fluctuations.  
 
Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) showed that in the United States (U.S.), the federal tax 
and transfer system served as an important shock absorber by increasing federal tax 
payments from and lower transfer payments to those regions that are prospering relative 
to the national average, and conversely for those that are relatively depressed.  
 
Canada also provided an interesting case study of federal taxes and transfers within a 
currency union. The cushioning effects of taxes on disposable income are larger than 
for transfers (Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, 1992), but magnitudes of both seemed to be 
lower in Canada than in the U.S. (Bayoumi and Masson, 1991).  
 
                                                                                                                                              
18 “The Competition of European Industry” , 1999 Reports, Bruxelles.  









Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) concluded that to be successful, the future European 
monetary union ought to have a system of taxes and transfers on a similar scale as that 
in the U.S. and Canada.  
 
Mongelli (2002) observed that the Euro area lacked a public risk sharing facility, i.e. a 
federal budget. Given the high diversification in production and consumption and the 
relatively high similarity in the types of shocks faced by several European countries, 
this cost could be quite contained. However, if asymmetric shocks will prevail in the 
future, for example, due to increasing specialization, then the lack of a supranational 




3.4. ‘OPERATIONALIZATION’ OF THE OCA CRITERIA(?) 
 
To be useful, the OCA theory should be able to predict the optimum group of countries 
where exchange rates should be fixed or a single currency adopted.  Somehow,  
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996, 1997) claimed to have ‘operationalized’ the OCA 
theory, such that the group of countries that give the lowest exchange rate variability 
among themselves are considered to be ‘optimum’.  
 
The authors estimated bilateral exchange rate variability in relation to selected OCA 
criteria for main European countries and their major trading partners over the period of 
1971-1995 (with some of the data after 1987 being predicted or forecasted ). The 
selected OCA criteria were: asymmetric disturbances to output, trade linkages and 
economic size. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996, 1997) used two proxies to measure 
the indicator ‘asymmetric shocks’, that of output disturbances and the dissimilarity of 
the commodity composition of the exports of any two countries. The indicator ‘trade 
linkages’ were measured as the average value of the ratio of bilateral exports to 
domestic GDP for the two countries. The indicator ‘economic size’ was measured as 
the arithmetic average of the log of real GDP in U.S. dollars of the two countries.  
 








The estimated results were highly significant and had the predicted signs, that is, 
“countries that trade more heavily have more stable exchange rates, as do smaller 
economies, countries whose GDP’s generally fluctuate together, and countries with a 
more similar composition of exports”.  Following that, an index of unsuitability for 
membership in the contemplated currency area was  constructed (for each country 
except Germany) by using coefficients obtained in the cross-section regression whose 
dependent variable was the variability of bilateral exchange rates with Germany. The 
index indicated that Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland would 
be relatively suitable for inclusion in the union, whereas Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom would be relatively unsuitable. 
 
Although the groupings seemed sensible enough, however, it must be recognized that 
their approach yielded only rankings of suitability, not actual cost-benefit measures that 
would indicate where the line separating included versus excluded currencies should be 
drawn (McCallum 1999). Therefore, accordingly, one could still argue that true 
‘operationalization’ of the OCA concept has not been achieved. 
 
 
3.5. ‘ENDOGENEITY’ OF THE OCA CRITERIA   
 
Frankel and Rose (1996, 1998) provided new evidence centered on the role that trade 
intensity plays in fostering cross-country correlation of business cycles. Trade flows, 
fostered by the single currency, give rise over time to stronger international correlation 
of output and inflation. After regressing output co-movements on proxies of trade 
intensity for a sample of 20 industrialized countries over 30 years, Frankel and Rose 
(1996 and 1998) concluded that “close trade linkages between two countries are 
strongly and consistently associated with more tightly correlated economic activity 
between the two countries”. Their findings led to a number of conclusions on the 
prospects and desirability of EMU. Continued European trade liberalization could be 
expected to result in more tightly correlated European business cycles, making a 
common European currency both more likely and more desirable. Indeed, monetary 
union itself might lead to a further boost to trade integration and hence business cycle 
symmetry. Countries which join EMU, no matter what their motivation, might satisfy 
OCA criteria ex post even if they do not ex ante! 









A further related set of empirical results provided by Artis and Zhang (1996, 1997) 
focused on the role of the ERM in inducing common business cycles among 
participating countries.  The interpretation they proposed is roughly similar to that of 
Frankel and Rose, but their perspective is somewhat different. Artis and Zhang viewed 
the ERM as strengthening cyclical correlation in Europe by fostering coordination in 
fiscal and monetary policies more than by increasing trade intensity. The evidence they 
provided, however, was compatible with both interpretations since they focused 
directly on changes in cyclical correlation before and after the ERM start (1961-79 and 
1979-95). Comparing the evidence in the two periods, Artis and Zhang (1996) found 
stronger evidence of a European business cycle under the ERM, while the correlation of 
ERM participants’ cycles with the US and other non-participant EU countries had not 
increased. Evidence was also found of a negative relation between exchange rate 
volatility and the correlation of cyclical movements. 
 
Frankel and Rose (1996, 1998) and Artis and Zhang (1996, 1997) contrast with the 
view that monetary union is likely to lead to asymmetric shocks due to increased 
specialization.  This view led mainly by Krugman (1993) believes that closer economic 
integration leads to increased regional concentration of industries (in order to profit 
from economies of scale) and thus to more economic divergence between countries. 
Krugman (1993) drew from the US experience in reaching his conclusion that increased 
integration is likely to increase specialization, which would tend to worsen the problem 
of asymmetry. 
 
The above discussion reminds us that an assessment of the issue of monetary 
integration is never absolute, but relative to the existing conditions and circumstances. 
Therefore, it is equally possible that both the ‘endogeneity’ argument of Frankel and 
Rose (1996, 1998) and the greater divergence argument advocated by Krugman (1993) 
could come true in the formation of monetary union. Nevertheless, this thesis will 
provide greater revelation on the ‘endogeneity’ argument in Chapter 8. 
  
 








3.6. BEYOND OCA EMPIRICAL RESEARCH  
 
3.6.1. Cluster Analysis to Monetary Union 
 
A emerging strand of research has been dedicated to the use of Cluster Analysis in 
determining the choice or ‘appropriateness’ of monetary union members. The Cluster 
Analysis methodology is motivated by the real life experiences of monetary union 
formation, where members selection are based on the economics of convergence, rather 
the criteria of the OCA theory. Basically, the Cluster Analysis approach searches for 
relatively similar cases or countries based on a set of criteria and groups them into 
clusters. The methodology is also capable of assessing the issue of convergence and 
divergence among prospective members for monetary union participation. This is 
because the technique can examine the similarities (i.e. convergence) and dissimilarities 
(i.e. divergence) of economic structure in the data and to group the countries according 
to various sets of criteria. This is important as lasting convergence is needed for 
successful monetary integration. Among the pioneering studies using the Cluster 
Analysis approach are those by Artis and Zhang (1998, 2002), Yuen (2000a, 2003) and 
Boreiko (2003). 
 
Artis and Zhang (1998) applied the clustering techniques to the member countries of 
the European Union to arrive at an identification of preferred monetary union 
groupings. The criteria employed were those suggested by the traditional Optimal 
Currency Area theory as well as those under the Treaty of Maastricht. The countries 
chosen for the study included the G-7, the European Community members (except 
Luxembourg) plus Norway and Switzerland. Both sets of criteria used identified well-
identified sub-groups, where a distinction could be made between a core group and one 
or more peripheral groups. The results suggested an EU-core formed by Germany, 
Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Austria and an EU-periphery group formed by 
Italy, Ireland, the UK, Denmark, Portugal, Norway, Greece and Spain). Their analysis 
also identified other clusters: a U.S. group (the U.S., Canada, Sweden and Finland) 












In another similar paper, Artis and Zhang (2002) examined the readiness for EMU of 
the EU countries, using techniques of clustering to ascertain the ‘degree of 
belongingness’ of each country, either to a core group of EMU-ready countries or to 
some other grouping. The issue of ‘belongingness’ or ‘homogeneity’ of the EMU 
membership was clearly of significance for the smooth running and sustainability of the 
declared ‘Euro-zone’. Furthermore, their study sought to identify sources of tensions 
within the EMU, given the ‘ins’ (and ‘outs’) of the ‘Euro-zone’. 
 
The variables used in Artis and Zhang (2002) study were inspired by the OCA theory. 
The study centered on Germany, which was taken as the anchor country and included 
the following six variables: a country’s bilateral trade intensity with Germany; the 
flexibility of a country’s labor market with respect to Germany’s (measured by the 
relative ranking of its employment protection legislation); the synchronization of a 
country’s monetary policy (measured by the real interest rate) with that of Germany; 
the synchronization of a country’s business cycle with Germany’s; the volatility of its 
real DM exchange rate; and its inflation rate relative to Germany’s. The inclusion of the 
last of these measures was a proxy for counter-inflationary commitment, a variable 
suggested by later additions to OCA theory.  
 
The first cluster formed in the sequence described is that between the US and Canada 
(alike, in effect, in being distant from Germany), followed by a Southern Periphery 
Group, a core group and a Northern Periphery Group. Japan is the last single country to 
enter a cluster. Despite some differences, the similarity between the groups 
distinguished by the alternative sets of criteria was quite striking. On the whole, this 
could be good news for the sustainability of the ‘Euro-zone’. 
 
Following on Artis and Zhang (1998, 2002), Boreiko (2003) estimated the readiness of 
the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe for EMU or unilateral 
‘Euroization’ using the clustering algorithm. The purpose was to identify a group of 
countries which were ‘more EMU-ready ’or better suited to enter into a currency board 
against the Euro (i.e. monetary union) and whether these countries were from the 1998 
Accession Group or they have already implemented a currency board arrangement. 
 








The variables to which the algorithm was applied were suggested by the criteria in the 
Maastricht Treaty (nominal convergence) and by Optimum Currency Area theory (real 
convergence). The algorithm revealed that Estonia and Slovenia were the leaders in 
both nominal and real convergence, whereas the other countries from the 1998 
accession wave have achieved substantial results only in real convergence. Moreover, 
Poland was excluded from the leading group in the most recent years due to its 
worsened economic performance.  
 
 
In a separate development, without knowledge of the clustering technique previously 
employed, Yuen (2000a) used the agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis to classify 
selected Asia-Pacific economies into relatively similar groupings. The purpose was to 
identify smaller clusters of economies as a practical step to begin monetary union.  The 
study jointly assessed a set of macroeconomic indicators, as a basis for identifying 
convergent groups of economies for monetary integration. In addition, the author used 
the Discriminant Analysis technique to establish what distinguished the various clusters 
of economies from each other. 
 
The study statistically identified 5 broad clusters of economies based on a set of 
economic characteristics. These clusters were:  1) Australia, New Zealand, United 
States and Japan, 2) Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, 3) Hong Kong and Singapore, 4) 
Indonesia and Philippines, and 5) China. The most ‘distant’ or dissimilar economy was 
China. She was the last to be formed into a group. The Discriminant Analysis technique 
also provided a graphic distinction among the various groups of clusters formed. The 
findings of this study is crucial in providing a foundation for identifying distinct groups 
of economies for monetary integration, which is especially significant given the drive 
towards regional integration. 
 
Yuen (2003) used the agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis to jointly assess a set 
of macroeconomic indicators, as a basis for identifying similar groups of economies 
better poised for monetary integration. In particular, economies of the European and 
Asia-Pacific regions were assessed respectively. The cluster results supported a natural 
‘core’ and ‘periphery’ group of European countries prior to the formation of the 
European monetary union (EMU). When the EMU convergence criteria were applied to 








the Asia-Pacific economies, it is found that they were not sufficient to sort the 
heterogeneous regional economies into relatively similar clusters. An implication from 
the study is that regional monetary integration in Asia-Pacific region would have to 
begin with smaller clusters. The rationale is that the economic costs of monetary 






The above review of the empirical works on monetary union is not exhaustive. Rather, 
the chapter provided an awareness on the more notable empirical studies pertaining to 
monetary union research. Much of the monetary union empirical literature has been 
dominated by tests of the OCA theory. Nonetheless, there emerge other types of 
research work beyond the OCA empirics. The direction of future research on monetary 
union will depend on the utility and relevance of how the empirical research can shed 
light to the monetary issue on hand.  
 









STYLIZED FACTS OF THE EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES  
 
The coverage of East Asia differs across studies. This region is commonly taken to 
mean the stretch of land on the eastern seaboard of Asia that starts from Northeast Asia 
of Japan, the Korean peninsular and China down to Southeast Asia of Indochina, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. In this study, East Asia refers particularly to the main 
economies of Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Philippines and China19.  
  
 
4.1. EAST ASIA’S DEVELOPMENT  
 
East Asia has a remarkable record of high and sustained economic growth. From 1965 
to 1990, the twenty-three economies of East Asia grew faster than all other regions of 
the world. Most of this achievement is attributable to seemingly miraculous growth in 
just ten economies: Japan; the ''Four Dragons"—Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan; and the four newly industrializing economies (NIEs) or “Tigers” of 
Southeast Asia - Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines; and newly emerging 
China.  
 
It is true that most East Asian economies are characterized by high rates of growth, 
savings and investment and are major exporters, but these fundamentals do not tell the 
entire story. The approach to growth and development, not to mention policy 
orientation, among the East Asian economies differ. Some East Asian countries (like 
South Korea and Japan) relied on big conglomerates, while others (like Hong Kong and 
Taiwan) have made small and medium enterprises (SMEs) their main growth engines. 
Others (like China and Indonesia) have big domestic markets and some (like Hong 
Kong and Singapore) do not. There are also country differences towards trade openness 
and inflation tolerance, wage and price determination, exchange rate regimes (ranging 
from currency pegs at one extreme to free-floating at the other) as well as the types of 
regulation and political systems.  
                                                 
19 The Indo-China economies of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam as well as Brunei and North 
Korea,  are not covered due to the lack of up-to-date information and data.  








This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 gives a comparative overview of the 
East Asian economies’ main indicators; Section 4.3 examines the extent of intra and 
bilateral trade patterns in the region; Section 4.4 documents the state of East Asian 
monetary cooperation, Section 4.5 highlights the types of exchange rate regimes 




4.2. COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL INDICATORS  
 
Table 4.1 reports the key average economic indicators for the East Asian countries over 
the recent past.  It shows that the income per capita of countries of this region ranges 
from high to low. For instance, over the recent period between 1990-2000, the regional 
per capita income ranges from US$2,629 (China) to US$13,136 (South Korea) to 
US$23,756 (Japan).  
 
 
The growth rate of countries in the region also reflects on the one hand, the world’s 
fastest growing economy (i.e. China), to one of the most matured developed economies 
(Japan). In this instance, the average regional real GDP growth ranges from 1.78% 
(Japan) to 9.59% (China) for the period 1990-2000. Developing economies such as 
China and Indonesia, with lower growth bases, could possibly expand faster, than say, 
matured economies like Japan and Hong Kong, and thereby accounting for the growth 
differences. In addition, the dispersion from mean (i.e. standard deviation) of growth 
rates range from a low of 1.73% (Japan) to a high of 6.41% (Indonesia). 
 
Over the period 1990-2000, the levels of consumer inflation in the East Asian 
economies range from 1.03% (Japan) to 5.41% (South Korea) to 13.54% (Indonesia), 
with standard deviation of 1.31% to 2.53% to 15.19% respectively (see Table 4.1). The 
extent of variation in inflation and interest rate signal the underlying diverse economic 
conditions and circumstances of the East Asia economies. For instance, during the 
period of Asian financial crisis, the levels of inflation as well as interest rates had shot 
up substantially, in particularly Indonesia, reflecting the underlying risk and market 
sentiment conditions. 










Comparative Economic Indicators in main East Asian Economies over recent past (Ave, 1990-2000) 
Variable** Japan S.Korea Hong Kong Singapore Malaysia Indonesia Philippines Thailand China 




















          




















          




















          




















          




















          




















          




















          




















          




















          




















*      Figures calculated from data drawn the World Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
**    The specifications of the variables are explained in the text.  
***   Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations. 










At the same time, the ratio of monetary base to GDP varies across the countries. For 
instance, the monetary base to GDP ratio varies from 44.14% in Indonesia to 178.59% 
in Hong Kong. Such differentials reflect the different monetary policy preferences and 
conditions of the various economies. In this regard, regional coordination in exchange 
rates would be extremely difficult to maintain, as such arrangements would require 
similar monetary policy preferences among participating economies as well. 
 
The varying degrees of economic contributions to GDP also reflect the varying stages 
of development and industrialization in countries of this region. From Table 4.1, it is 
observed that the Value Added (VA) of agriculture to GDP of the more developed 
economies of the region, such as Japan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, is on the 
lower end, while those of the emerging economies, such as China, Philippines and 
Malaysia, are on the higher end of the share to GDP. In addition, the investment to 
GDP ratio also accounted for different shares of the regional economies. 
 
The regional economies also experienced different degrees of urbanization. The 
differences in economic development and progress can also be inferred from their 
extent of urbanization.  For instance, there are largely urbanized economies like 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan, with urban population ratios at 100%, 99.97% and 
78.1% respectively. In contrast, developing economies like China, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, have urban population ratios at 29.28%, 35.68% and 53.64% respectively. 
Hence, the heterogeneous nature of regional development and modernization also 
denote varying levels of urbanization.  
 
The more open an economy, the greater is the weight of tradable goods in domestic 
costs and consumption. The degree of openness (as measured by the ratio of total trade 
to GDP) reflects the significance of trade to the East Asian economies. It ranges from 
relatively less open economies like Japan and China to the exceptionally open 
economies like Singapore and Hong Kong, with the openness ratio more than double 
that of their national GDP. In this case, the value of the exchange rate is likely to be 
higher in these economies. 
 
 










4.3. EXTENT OF INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE FLOWS 
 
An important rationale for external monetary coordination among high trade dependent 
economies is that intra-currency stability promotes further trade flows. As such, this 
section examines the extent of intra-region trade flows. Table 4.2 depicts the direction 
of trade for main East Asian economies. More than half of East Asia trade20 is currently 
within itself. About two decades ago, East Asia (particularly Japan) relied heavily on 
markets outside East Asia for its products. That reliance has reduced sharply. Between 
1985-2000, intra-East Asian trade (i.e. imports plus exports) has increased by about 
8%; from 44% to more than 52%. In particular, the intra-regional imports share jumped 
by 8.89%; from 46.03% in 1985 to 54.90% in 2000, while intra-regional exports share 
increased by 6.61%; from 42.26% to 48.87%. On the other hand, the region’s share of 
trade to the U.S.A. fell from 22.01% to 18.18% between the same period (see Table 
4.3). Specifically, the exports share of East Asian economies to the USA dropped by 
5.14%; from 26.62% in 1985 to 21.84% in 2000, while its imports share reduced by 
2.86%; from 17.39% in 1985 to 14.53% in 2000.  
                                                 
20 It is useful to note that the measurement for intra-East Asian trade has included re-exports. Commonly 
used data sources such as the Direction of Trade Statistics published by the IMF also do not distinguish 
between re-exports and domestic exports. Re-exports are important for the small and openness 
economies of Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
  





     
                 Table 4.2 
Direction of Trade within East Asia     
           
    1985      1990      2000     
               
  Imports (%)   Exports (%)   
Imports 
(%)  Exports (%)   Imports (%)   Exports (%)   
               
   Japan  25.51  24.07  26.58  29.61  39.59  39.83   
               
South Korea 34.88  25.84  36.69  35.86  42.32  43.94   
               
Hong Kong 68.82  40.85  73.97  44.15  77.74  50.02   
              
Taiwan 37.20  26.33  41.67  37.04  54.05  48.85   
              
China 49.60  58.70  52.28  66.48  53.60  47.19   
               
Indonesia 42.85  64.63  47.85  66.55  51.48  57.65   
                    
   Malaysia 54.04  60.73  54.94  56.36        60.84  53.23  
             
 Philippines  45.02  39.61  43.38  37.06  54.51  47.54  
             
 Singapore 52.57  42.92  52.10  44.85  58.90  54.93  
            
 Thailand  49.79  38.95  54.94  37.26  55.97  45.47  
             
 Ave.  46.03  42.26  48.44  45.52  54.90  48.87  
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various years. 
Note: The Imports column refers to the percent of total imports by a given country from East Asia, while the Exports column refers to the percent of total exports from 
a given country to East Asia. The East Asian countries include Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and 
China.   
 
 
    
  








       Table 4.3      
         Direction of Trade of East Asia     
              (Imports plus Exports)       
             
    1985       1990       2000    
              
   
Percent 
Share     
Percent 
Share     
Percent 
Share   
              
               
Industrial Europe  13.62    16.55    13.71   
               
USA  22.01    20.11    18.18   
               
Intra-East Asiai  44.15    46.98    51.89   
               
Others  20.22    16.36    16.22   
               
Total  100    100    100   
                       
i: Refers to 10 economies of Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and China. 
Source: International Monetary Fund  









Table 4.4: Exports by partner economy (Ave percent, 1990-2000) 
Exports by 
/ to  Japan  China   HK   Korea Taiwan Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Japan - 16.73 5.64 13.52 10.86 28.02 13.01 16.47 7.46 16.14 
 China  4.59 - 31.69 6.71 0.8 3.87 2.51 1.31 2.55 2.41 
 Hong Kong  5.85 28.21 - 7.42 20.68 2.95 4.5 4.68 7.91 4.99 
 Korea  5.95 3.73 1.68 - 1.9 6.28 3.29 2.28 2.71 1.54 
 Taiwan  6.36 1.59 2.91 3.21 - 3.64 3.48 4.3 4.15 2.45 
 Indonesia  1.78 0.83 0.58 2.17 1.48 - 1.38 0.54 2.36 1.32 
 Malaysia  2.86 0.85 0.8 2.15 2.21 2.06 - 2.42 15.87 3.23 
 Philippines  1.58 0.53 1.06 1.45 1.55 1.07 1.26 - 1.79 0.93 
 Singapore  4.37 2.44 2.66 3.93 3.47 9.55 20.41 5.11 - 10.25 
 Thailand 3.34 0.95 0.95 1.68 2.15 1.36 3.58 2.64 5.22 - 
 USA  29.47 16.25   22.88  21.29 26.45   13.64 19.59   35.31  18.88  20.82 
Source: Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 
Note: Bold figures reflect bilateral high trade partners.  
 
   Table 4.5: Imports by partner economy (Ave percent, 1990-2000) 
Imports by 
/ from Japan  China   HK  Korea Taiwan Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Japan - 19.47 14.59 22.48 28.27 20.34 24.16 20.91 18.68 27.72 
 China  10.29 - 38.64 5.68 2.69 3.83 2.64 2.16 3.63 3.42 
 Hong Kong  0.74 11.64 - 0.78 2.07 0.87 2.27 4.52 2.92 1.37 
 Korea  4.90 6.93 4.66 - 4.2 5.98 4.02 5.79 3.25 3.7 
 Taiwan  4.03 10.1 8.32 1.96 - 4.37 5.27 5.7 3.93 4.85 
 Indonesia  4.64 1.73 0.78 2.85 2.02 - 1.86 1.85 3.92 1.38 
 Malaysia  3.12 1.61 1.84 2.28 2.97 2.05 - 2.69 14.83 4.41 
 Philippines  1.26 0.31 0.55 0.56 1.01 0.24 1.15 - 1.19 0.84 
 Singapore  1.68 2.31 4.56 1.75 2.72 7.5 14.19 5.23 - 6.42 
 Thailand 2.69 1.14 1.44 0.78 1.47 2 3.06 1.67 4.2 - 
 USA 22.42 11.55 7.48 21.69 20.42 12.06 16.72 19.43 15.61 12.10 
Source: Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 
Note: Bold figures reflect bilateral high trade partners. 
 
  Table 4.6: Total Trade by partner economy (Ave percent, 1990-2000) 
Trade 
/ with  Japan  China  HK   Korea Taiwan Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Japan - 18.1 10.115 18 19.565 24.18 18.585 18.69 13.07 21.93 
 China  7.44 -  35.165 6.195 1.745 3.85 2.575 1.735 3.09 2.915 
 Hong Kong  3.295 19.925 - 4.1 11.375 1.91 3.385 4.6 5.415 3.18 
 Korea  5.425 5.33 3.17  - 3.05 6.13 3.655 4.035 2.98 2.62 
 Taiwan  5.195 5.845 5.615 2.585 - 4.005 4.375 5 4.04 3.65 
 Indonesia  3.21 1.28 0.68 2.51 1.75 - 1.62 1.195 3.14 1.35 
 Malaysia  2.99 1.23 1.32 2.215 2.59 2.055 - 2.555 15.35 3.82 
 Philippines  1.42 0.42 0.805 1.005 1.28 0.655 1.205  - 1.49 0.885 
 Singapore  3.025 2.375 3.61 2.84 3.095 8.525 17.3 5.17 - 8.335 
 Thailand 3.015 1.045 1.195 1.23 1.81 1.68 3.32 2.155 4.71 - 
 USA 25.94 13.9 15.18 21.49 23.44 12.85  18.16 27.37   17.25 16.46  
Note: i. Bold figures reflect bilateral high trade pairs.  
         ii. Though many East Asia economies have the U.S.A. as their main trading partners, the converse is  
         not true, except for Japan. 
 










Table 4.2 to Table 4.6 show that Japan and the U.S.A. remain important trade 
partners of the East Asian economies. This implies that East Asian economies cannot 
just peg to one major currency (namely the U.S. dollar) if they are to gain stability in 
the exchange rate. In addition, many East Asian economies such as Philippines, 
Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand have Japan and the U.S.A. as their main trading 
partner, but the converse is not true (Table 4.6).  
 
In addition, there also exist several pockets of high trade partners in the region. These 
are namely: 1) Hong Kong and China21, 2) Singapore and Malaysia22 3) Thailand, 
Cambodia and Laos23 and 4) Australia and New Zealand24. These high trade partners 
tend also to be regional neighbors25. Hence, there exists incentive for these high trade 
partners to enter into some form of currency alliances so as to stabilize bilateral 
exchange rates, which is conducive for trade. The issue of currency alliance and 
stabilization brings us to the next subject on the forms of monetary cooperation in 
East Asia.   
                                                 
21 Because of its location, Hong Kong has always depended heavily on imports from China.  China’s 
exports had historically been very dependent on entrepot activity in Hong Kong.  
22 Singapore and Malaysia have been important trading partners with each other for many years. 
23 We focus on only main regional economies. Hence, Cambodia and Laos are not reflected in Tables 
4.5-4.7, but they are mentioned as identified high trade partners of Thailand.   
24 See Brouwer (2000). 
25 This is not surprising since close geographical distance leads to lower transaction costs. Therefore, 
geographical distance could be another  (implicit) criterion for forming currency areas as it implies 
closer trade links. 









4.4. FORMS OF EAST ASIAN MONETARY COOPERATION 
 
Given that trade among East Asian economies is increasing, there exist incentives to 
prompt greater monetary cooperation to prevent volatile exchange rate movements to 
disrupt regional trade. Therefore, this section chronicles the state of East Asian 
monetary cooperation.  
 
Monetary cooperation in East Asia begun long before the onset of the Asian financial 
crisis. In the late 1950s, a forum called SEANZA (Southeast Asia, New Zealand, and 
Australia) was formed to provide training for central bankers in the region. In 1966, 
ten Southeast Asian countries established SEACEN (Southeast Asia Central Banks) 
with a research and training center in Kuala Lumpur. In 1991, eleven Asian central 
banks established EMEAP (Executives' Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks), 
which organizes high-level meetings and hosts working groups on financial markets, 
central bank operations, and prudential supervision. 
 
EMEAP is an important instrument for enhancing Asian monetary co-operation. Out 
of the meetings of EMEAP evolved a web of bilateral repurchase (repo) agreements 
among its eleven members, under which a country may exchange US dollar Treasury 
securities it holds for U.S. dollars from its neighbours in order to support its currency. 
These repo agreements enable a central bank to obtain US dollar liquidity at short 
notice.  
 
Simultaneously, the ASEAN countries have devised their own defense mechanism 
against currency attacks. In March 1997, the five ASEAN member countries - 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand - set up a currency swap 
arrangement, under which a central bank exchanges domestic currency for U.S. 
dollars, but agrees to buy back the domestic currency with U.S. dollars after a 
predetermined period. The swap transaction period is for up to three months, although 
this can be extended to a maximum of six months. Unlike the repo agreements among 
the EMEAP central banks which provide only short-term liquidity, the currency swap 
arrangement among the ASEAN Members give short-term credit facilities. 
Unfortunately, the amount of the ASEAN swap arrangement was only a modest 









U.S.$100 million (but later expanded to U.S.$200 million), which could hardly act as 
an effective deterrence against currency speculators.  
 
Asian monetary cooperation gained further momentum after the collapse of the Thai 
baht in July 1997. At the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) of finance ministers in 
Bangkok in September 1997, Japan proposed an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) to 
prevent the recurrence of the Asian currency crisis and to institutionalize financial 
cooperation among the Asian nations. Japan was willing to contribute up to one-half 
of its initial capital of U.S.$100 billion, with the rest of the fund reportedly coming 
from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. The AMF did not take off as it was opposed 
by the Americans and Europeans, on the grounds that it could dilute the influence of 
the IMF and allow debtor countries to evade adjustments.  
 
In November 1999, the ASEAN plus three nations (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, namely ASEAN, and China, Japan, and Korea) made a formal Joint 
Statement on East Asia Cooperation. This statement led to the Chiang Mai Initiative 
in May 2000. The Chiang Mai Initiative focuses on monetary cooperation in the area 
of currency reserves safety net to help manage severe instabilities of currency 
movements, with the aim of establishing a regional financial arrangement to 
supplement existing international facilities. These mechanisms provide liquidity 
support to members in the event of temporary balance of payment difficulties.  
 
The existing ASEAN Swap Arrangement was also enlarged to include Brunei, 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. The original five ASEAN members agreed 
to increase the total amount of funds under their currency arrangement from U.S.$200 
million to U.S.$2 billion.  
 
The Chiang Mai Initiative is a symbolic direction towards greater monetary 
cooperative activities and agreements within the ASEAN plus three grouping. This 
Initiative is an effective mechanism to kick-start and nurture currency cooperation in a 
non-binding manner. There are also efforts beyond the Chiang Mai Initiative to 
coordinate regional macroeconomic and exchange rate policies. For instance, an 
ASEAN Task Force was established in March 2001 to look into the feasibility of an 
ASEAN Currency and Exchange Rate Mechanism. Greater regional exchange rate 









stability is an appropriate direction towards East Asia’s long-term economic interests 
and trade promotion, especially among high trade partners. The exchange rate is a 
basic tenet in external monetary cooperation. In a monetary union, member countries 
adopt a common monetary arrangement and policy. Section 4.5 reviews the types of 
exchange rate regimes across regional economies.  
 
 
4.5. EXTERNAL MONETARY POLICY PREFERENCES 
 
Table 4.7 summarizes the exchange rate regimes of East Asian economies. Current 
exchange rate regimes range from a hard peg (Hong Kong and Brunei) to a managed 
currency basket (Singapore and Cambodia) to an independent float (Japan and Korea).  
 
The variety of exchange rate arrangements in East Asia would undoubtedly 
complicate regional monetary cooperation, what more when officially declared 
currency regimes of some countries do not necessarily match what is practiced26. For 
instance, Thailand officially operated a multi-currency basket peg prior the Asian 
financial crisis but in practice has pegged quite closely to the US dollar to maintain 
export competitiveness. China was supposed to be managed float since 1990, however 
had rigidly fixed to the US dollar since 1994. The Philippines and South Korea have 
rather opaque currency regimes, though their exchange rates are supposedly floating. 
Therefore, the countries’ de facto exchange rate regimes may not necessarily be their 
de jure ones. Besides, while some East Asian economies have full currency 
convertibility (such as Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore), others (like China, 
Indonesia and Malaysia) still maintain some forms of currency inconvertibility or 
capital controls. 
 
The exchange rate regime has also been an important and critical component in many 
East Asian countries’ goals of economic development, consumption and export 
competitiveness27. As such, changes in the exchange rate regimes (say as a result of 
East Asian monetary cooperation) could undermine such national developmental 
goals and have repercussions on domestic economic and financial variables. 
                                                 
26 See Wilson, P (2002). 
27 Refer to Collignon, S, ed al (1999) and Williamson, J (1996, 1999) for an overview of the exchange 
rate regimes and their functions in domestic policy developments of the East Asian nations.  









Table 4.7:Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asia 
  1982   1990   1999 2001 
Hard peg   Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Hong Kong 
    Brunei  Brunei  Brunei 
           
Peg Indonesia  Macau  China  China 
  Laos    Malaysia  Malaysia 
  Thailand    Macau  Macau 
           
Basket Peg China  China  Myanmar  Myanmar 
 Malaysia  Malaysia       
  Myanmar  Myanmar       
  Singapore  Thailand       
  Vietnam         
           
Bands and    
Crawls     Vietnam 
 
Vietnam 
          
Managed Philippines  Indonesia  Cambodia  Cambodia 
Float   Laos  Laos  Laos 
    Korea  Singapore  Indonesia  
    Singapore  Taiwan   Singapore 
    Vietnam    Taiwan  
    Taiwan     Thailand  
        
Independent Hong Kong  Japan  Indonesia  Japan 
Float Japan  Philippines  Japan  Korea 
      Korea  Philippines 
      Philippines   
      Thailand   
Total 14   15   15  15 
Sources: Glick (2000) and authors' estimates. 
               International Financial Statistics, various years. 
 
Therefore, to suggest that East Asian nations adopt a common monetary arrangement 
is not particularly illuminating, as the region is diverse to be constrained by a 
common monetary policy. The different stages and speeds of development of East 
Asian nations would also necessitate variability to the exchange rate. However, the 
region’s growing trade flows provides a good economic rationale for greater external 
monetary cooperation.  
 
In sum, the issue of monetary cooperation leading to integration in East Asia is not so 
straightforward. On the one hand, greater exchange rate stability provides benefits to 
the region’s high trade partners. However, exchange rate coordination incurs costs to 
participating countries as it reduces their policy autonomy in macroeconomic 
adjustments and stabilization.  









4.6.       SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has provided a comparison of the main indicators of regional economies. 
The range in national indicators reflects the varying state of development and 
conditions across the region. As such, the subject of regional monetary arrangement 
would not be particularly appealing as it impinges on the policy autonomy of 
heterogeneous economies. This chapter has also showed the extent of growing intra-
regional trade. This trend could provide the impetus to motivate regional monetary 
cooperation, which is a precursor to monetary integration. Already there exists 
encouraging forms of monetary cooperation in East Asia, such as the swaps 
arrangements among the Asean plus three framework. Nevertheless, the 
presupposition28 is that the net cost of monetary union in East Asia is higher, given 
existing regional diversity despite growing trade integration29. 
 
The chapter has also identified several pairs of high-intense trade partners, such as 
between Hong Kong and China and Singapore and Malaysia respectively. Therefore, 
based on the trade criterion, there is economic justification for currency stability 
among them, as volatile exchange rates would be disruptive to trade. However, the 
trade picture is only part of the story. The suitability of these high trade partners for 
common monetary arrangement would also hinge on their similarity in economies and 
policies, besides political will. Many analysts suggest that to the extent economic 
structure and policies differ among monetary union members, currency arrangements 
would potentially destabilize the system.  
 
Therefore, going forward, Chapter 5 assesses whether these identified pairs of high 
trade partners are also compatible on economic and policy fronts, which serves a 
foundation for monetary integration. Specifically, it examines whether the possible 
groupings of economically similar clusters match the identified high trade pockets. 
Chapter 5 also provides a comparative perspective on the European monetary 
unification and its founding members and implications for the East Asian region. 
                                                 
28 This presupposition is also supported by many authors (such as Eichengreen, 2004; Wyplosz, 2001) 
that East Asia lacks the preconditions for monetary union despite its growing trade interdependence, 
due to regional countries’ diversity as well as the absence of relevant transnational institutions, such as 
the institution of a regional central bank and monetary authority. 
29 With reference to Figure 2.2, East Asia tends to be on the left of E*, i.e. the costs of monetary 
unification is greater than its benefits given the existing level of trade integration. 











EMPIRICAL STUDY – PART I 
CONFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC OUTCOMES AND POLICIES 
 
 
The experience of European Monetary integration is instructive. The quest for 
accommodating a fairly large number of relatively dissimilar economies (for instance, 
Germany and France versus Spain and Greece) in the monetary integration process 
could possibly undermine its stability and puts into question its sustainability. 
Although the drive towards European Monetary Union (EMU) might deliver benefits 
to its members, it also has costs. The greater the divergence of the participating 
economies, and the less flexible are their economic structures, the greater the costs.  
 
Due to Asia’s diverse economic circumstances and conditions30, the practical 
approach to any form of regional co-operation or integration would be to begin with 
smaller clusters first, followed by the enlargement of these clusters at a later stage. If 
clustering31 of Asian economies to regional integration is deemed necessary, then the 
logical question is how and by what standard to determine the various clusters.    
 
This study uses a rigorous methodology to cluster economies into relatively similar 
groupings. In particular, the agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis as a grouping 
procedure is selected because it is an effective tool for identifying distinct groupings 
within a population or data set (Everitt, 1993).  
 
A general question facing researchers in many areas of inquiry is how to organize 
observed data into meaningful classes, that is, to develop taxonomies. The 
agglomerative hierarchical methodology uses an algorithm to classify hidden groups 
of observed data into related clusters, on the basis of the values of several variables. 
The method aims to make sense of multivariate data in a systematic manner.  
 
 
                                                 
30 See also Vichyanond, P (2000) and Ramstetter, ed. (2000). 
31 Clustering is the grouping of entities into subsets on the basis of their similarity across a set of 
attributes (Lorr, 1984). 









We assume that ‘countries’ are non-homogenous entities, but can be classified as 
members of relatively similar groupings. This study considers the variants of the 
EMU convergence indicators, and other key macroeconomic indicators. Based on the 
indicators of the EMU convergence criteria per se, we could not sufficiently delineate 
the set of economies. This is because the EMU convergence indicators alone do not 
necessarily capture the structural differences and levels of economic development of 
the participating countries. Hence, to better facilitate the delineation of the 
heterogeneous economies, we include other key macroeconomic variables as well.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 discusses the issue of 
economic convergence in monetary union, and makes particular reference to the 
European monetary union and implications for regional monetary integration, Section 
5.2 documents the origins and applications of Cluster Analysis, Section 5.3  to Section 
5.4 study the degree of confluence in Europe and Asia-Pacific based on the EMU 
convergence characteristics, Section 5.5 includes both real and nominal convergence 
criteria in the clustering of Asia-Pacific economies, Section 5.6 and Section 5.7 
examine the robustness of  the cluster results over time and Section 5.8 explores the 
convergence of economic policy preferences across regional countries. Finally, 
Section 5.9 gives an overall evaluation and implications for regional monetary 
integration arising from the findings of this study. 
 
 
5.1. MONETARY UNION AND ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE 
 
In reality, the process of economic convergence plays an important role in real life 
monetary union formations. Wyplosz (2001), a notable monetary economist, observed 
that the OCA criteria had played no practical role in Europe to identify the best-suited 
groupings of monetary union members. He added that given the generally high level 
of trade integration already achieved in Europe, the economics is on the convergence 
of its members and the rest is likely to be politics. We understand why.  
 
In joining a monetary union, the participating countries surrender the exchange rate or 
monetary policy as a useful tool in macroeconomic stabilization. This implies that the 
exchange rate or monetary policy can no longer be at the country’s disposal to 









cushion differences in business cycles or help them adjust to asymmetric shocks. 
Hence, economic convergence is to reduce the need for a differentiated monetary 
policy (or for exchange rate adjustments) as far as possible, and to reduce the costs of 
monetary union participation. As such, economic convergence among countries 
should lead and not lag monetary integration. This is because if the pre-integration 
levels of divergence are wide among participating economies, the economic costs of 
adjustments are likely to be high. The issue of convergence is even more crucial in the 
absence of factor mobility and/ or structural and institutional flexibility. 
 
Furthermore, the robustness and credibility of a monetary union also depends on the 
kind of union members. If market participants perceive fixed parities among divergent 
members are unlikely to be sustainable, the monetary union is in turn vulnerable to 
speculative attacks. With reference to the EMU, Artis and Zhang (2001) states that the 
union’s sustainability would depend on a reasonable degree of  homogeneity among 
its members, which  would be threatened by evidence otherwise. Therefore, there is a 
general understanding that lasting convergence of members is the key to successful 
monetary unification. This is because convergence reduces the costs of adjustment, as 
well as the political difficulties of sustaining a largely asymmetric union (see also 
Björksten and Syrjanen, 1999, Gros and Thygesen,1998, Crockett, 1994). As such, a 





5.1.1. EMU Convergence Criteria 
 
The Maastricht Treaty specified five (nominal) criteria of convergence for countries 
to qualify for entry into the European Monetary Union. The convergence criteria set 
out in Article 109j(1) of the EC Treaty are as follows32:  
 
1.Price Stability  
In practice, the inflation rate of a given Member State must not exceed by more than 
1½ percentage points that of the three best-performing Member States in terms of 
                                                 
32 Source: “Europa”, portal site of the European Union. 









price stability during the year preceding the examination of the situation in that 
Member State. 
 
The Treaty stipulates: "The achievement of a high degree of price stability [...] will be 
apparent from a rate of inflation which is close to that of, at most, the three best-
performing Member States in terms of price stability." 
 
2. Exchange Rates 
The Treaty stipulates: "the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for 
by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two 
years, without devaluing against the currency of any other Member State." 
The Member State must have participated in the exchange-rate mechanism of the 
European monetary system without any break during the two years preceding the 
examination of the situation and without severe tensions. In addition, it must not have 
devalued its currency (i.e. the bilateral central rate for its currency against any other 
Member State's currency) on its own initiative during the same period. 
 
 
3. Long-Term Interest Rates 
In practice, the nominal long-term interest rate must not exceed by more than 2 
percentage points that of, at most, the three best-performing Member States in terms 
of price stability (that is to say, the same Member States as those in the case of the 
price stability criterion).  
 
 
The Treaty stipulates: "the durability of convergence achieved by the Member State 
[...] being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels”. The period taken into 
consideration is the year preceding the examination of the situation in the 
Member State concerned. 
 
 
4. Government Finances 
In practice, the Commission, when drawing up its annual recommendation to the 
Council of Finance Ministers, examines compliance with budgetary discipline on the 
basis of the following two criteria: 
(i) the annual government deficit: the ratio of the annual government deficit 
to gross domestic product (GDP) must not exceed 3% at the end of the 
preceding financial year. If this is not the case, the ratio must have 
declined substantially and continuously and reached a level close to 3% 
(interpretation in trend terms) or, alternatively, must remain close to 3% 
while representing only an exceptional and temporary excess;  
(ii) government debt: the ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not 
exceed 60% at the end of the preceding financial year. If this is not the 
case, the ratio must have sufficiently diminished and must be approaching 
the reference value at a satisfactory pace (interpretation in trend terms).  









The Treaty stipulates: "The sustainability of the government financial position [...] 
will be apparent from having achieved a government budgetary position without a 




Rationale for EMU Convergence Criteria 
 
Underpinning the EMU convergence criteria was the aim to achieve similar 
macroeconomic outcomes across member economies, and that the outcomes be 
sustainable over time. In particular, the overriding objective for the Euro zone was 
targeted at price stability. As such, the emphasis was placed on nominal 
convergence33. Therefore, inflation convergence criterion was to enforce inflation 
control across countries. This was to mitigate tensions arising from inflation 
differentials, which complicates the adoption of a single currency and monetary 
policy. The criterion of ‘interest rate’ convergence was to maintain exchange rate 
stability; as differentials in the interest rates could translate to exchange rate changes. 
The criterion for ‘exchange rate’ convergence was to prevent countries from 
managing their exchange rate so as to force entry at a more favorable exchange rate, 
i.e. at a depreciated rate34. Finally, the criterion of ‘fiscal convergence’ was to ensure 
sound budgetary positions, so that governments would not be pressured to monetarize 
budgetary deficits or to reduce debt burdens through inflationary finance.  
 
The Maastricht Treaty criteria had ensured that prospective members observe 
monetary and fiscal rectitude prior to joining the EMU, and that they would continue 
to apply such discipline even after entry.  The convergence criteria also provided a 
good yardstick to evaluate the country’s extent of commitment to sound 
macroeconomic policies and in making macroeconomic adjustments35 to qualify itself 
for monetary union participation. 
 
 
                                                 
33 See Crockett, A (1994) and the Europa website on the rationale of the convergence criteria.  
34 See also De Grauwe, P (1997). 
35 See also Acquah, P (2002). 









5.1.2. Lessons from Europe’s Monetary Unification 
 
The rationale underlying economic convergence is sound, as it is to ensure that the 
union has sufficient robustness and discipline to survive. Thus, the issue is not 
whether economic convergence is needed, but the type of economic convergence. The 
Maastricht-type criteria, however, implicitly assumed that economies of prospective 
members had already reached sufficient real convergence in terms of productivity and 
underlying economic structures, so that nominal convergence was deemed the key to 
successful entry. This assumption is not necessarily accepted in the literature.  
 
A number of authors (e.g. De Grauwe, Genberg, Cockrett, Schumacher) stress that to 
be successful, ‘convergence’ would have to tackle a wider agenda than those 
stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty. In particular, the sticking point would be a lack of 
real economic convergence (such as income and growth) even when acceding 
countries to the EMU meet the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria.  
 
The significance of real convergence is best illustrated by the failure to achieve it. 
Real divergence in per capita income and business cycles, for instance, can create 
problems and complicate the process of adopting a common monetary policy across 
the Euro zone. Since there is no recourse to the exchange rate for economic 
adjustment, and unless alternative adjustment mechanism (for e.g. wages and prices) 
are made sufficiently flexible, the underlying real divergence could itself create 
tension in the monetary system. This in turn destabilizes the system, and increases the 










                                                 
36 Furthermore, Bjorksten (2000) notes that when the Central and Eastern Europe countries began to 
join the EMU, structural differences among Euro area countries would present the European Central 
Bank with new challenges in maintaining price stability, as trend inflation would be higher in poorer 
countries and lower in richer ones.  Therefore, it is hoped that acceleration in real convergence, 
whereby worker productivity and income, could take place with monetary union. 









5.1.3. Implications for Regional Monetary Integration 
 
The state of macroeconomic conditions in the East Asian economies is reflected in 
Table 4.1. The varying levels of regional development and macroeconomic 
conditions imply that any practical approach towards monetary integration would be 
to begin with smaller clusters first, and the enlargement of such clusters later. 
Nevertheless, there remains an integrated technique that can be used to jointly assess a 
set of macroeconomic indicators for identifying distinct groups of economies, as a 
foundation for monetary union.  
 
This chapter applies the cluster analysis methodology to uncover the similarities of 
economic structure in data across countries and to identify homogeneous subgroups 
(clusters) of countries with regards to sets of economic criteria. Ultimately, the aim of 
monetary union is to find a group of more compatible or convergent countries for 
union, among which is the compatibility in economic characteristics and national 
policies. 
 
The next section describes the genesis and application areas of Cluster Analysis. A 















5.2. CLUSTER ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
 
Cluster Analysis, first used by Tryon (1939), refers to the technique of grouping 
entities into relatively homogenous subgroups on the basis of their similarity across a 
set of attributes. It is a multivariate37 analysis technique that organizes information 
based on the similarities in variables, and the results are groupings, classes or 
categories of entities. Cluster Analysis is also known as segmentation analysis or 
taxonomy analysis, typological classification and pattern recognition. Cluster analysis 
has many purposes, with the general aims to identify natural clusters within a dataset 
(believed to represent several distinguishable groups) and to construct useful schemas 
for classifying entities38.  
 
 
5.2.1. Brief History of Cluster Analysis39  
 
The systematic grouping of objects on the basis of common properties dates back to 
Aristotle and the Greeks. To Aristotle, taxonomy consisted of efforts to discover 
whatever properties define the essence of a class or taxon. These properties are then 
necessary to justify membership in a class. Once a classification is established, an 
object is first assigned to the larger group (the genus) to which it belongs by virtue of 
possession of essential characteristics of that group. The object is then assigned to the 
sub-group (species) on the basis of the essential characteristics of the species and so 
on. 
 
Historically, the early taxonomic schemes consisted of efforts to discover whatever 
characteristic defined the essence of a class of objects or entities. This approach was 
followed, at least in part by Linnaeus the Swedish botanist and taxonomist in his 
classifications of plants (Genera Plantarum, 1793), animals, and minerals. His 
schemes for the classification of botanical specimens had widespread impact on other 
fields. 
 
                                                 
37 Multivariate cluster analysis is based on multiple measures, while univariate cluster analysis groups 
are based on a single measure. 
38 Lorr, M (1984). 









Sneath and Sokal (1973) credited Adanson (1763), a botanist, with the idea that 
natural taxa should be based on the concept of similarity, which is measured by taking 
many characters into account. Such taxa or types are polythetic, i.e. based on multiple 
characteristics of the objects compared. Some modern biological taxonomists (for 
instance, Sneath and Sokal, 1973) viewed as subgroups of organisms that manifest a 
fair number of shared properties. Arrangements made on the basis of overall 
similarity are said to reflect phenetic relationships. The process of grouping taxa 
(individuals or groups) by numerical method is called numerical taxonomy by 
biologists.  
 
In many respects, ‘Cluster Analysis’ was given its major impetus in the 1950s by the 
development of high-speed computers and the rapid appearance of clustering 
algorithms. The biologists active in proposing clustering techniques were Sneath 
(1957) and Sokal and Michner (1958); in psychology, McQuitty (1957, 1961) 
suggested very similar procedure. Another event of importance was the publication of 
Principles of Numerical Taxonomy by Sokal and Sneath (1963). The book reviewed 
much of the literature, presented a clear outline of the various steps taken in a cluster 
analysis, and described many clustering techniques available at that time.  
 
The 1970s saw publication of five new texts and a revision of by Numerical 
Taxonomy by Sneath and Sokal (1973). Tryon and Bailey (1970) published Cluster 
Analysis, a text describing a package of computer programs called the BCTRY system 
for clustering variables and objects. Mathematical T, Jardine and Sibson (1971) was a 
highly technical and mathematical work directed primarily at biologist. Anderberg’s 
Cluster Analysis for Applications (1973) was concerned with clustering variables, as 
well as entities, it is thorough in its coverage, well-illustrated, and critical in its 
approach. Clustering Algorithms by Hartigan (1975) was the first text presented from 
the Statistician’s viewpoint: a wide range of procedures are described and illustrated, 
and Fortan programs were presented for the various algorithms. Everitt’s Cluster 
Analysis (1974) was thorough in its coverage, but readers are expected to be fairly 
knowledgeable in statistics.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
39 Source: Lorr, M (1984). 









Duran and Odell’s Cluster Analysis: A survey (1974) seemed directed at the 
statistically sophisticated economist. Van Ryzin (1977) presented the proceedings of 
an advanced seminar conducted at the University of Wisconsin by the Mathematics 
Research Centre and included sixteen papers by well-known Mathematicians and 
Statisticians such as Hartigan, Kruskal, Rao and Solomon. There were a number of 
useful critical reviews of cluster analysis. Still relevant were early reports by Ball and 
Hall (1965), Fleiss and Zubin (1969). Blashfield and Adenderfer (1978) reported a 
useful review of the cluster analysis literature of the 1970s, and Hartigan (1975) 





5.2.2 Applications of Cluster Analysis  
 
Due to the science of pattern recognition, Cluster analysis has been popularly 
employed in many fields of investigations. The applications of cluster analysis are 
evident in fields like engineering, medicine40, physical and natural sciences41, social 
sciences like psychology, psychiatry42 and sociology and business, e.g. marketing 
segmentation, and so forth. 
 
In Economics, there is a growing number of papers applying the Cluster analysis in 
the research and understanding of economic issues. For instance, Cluster analysis has 
been applied to economic research issues such as the identification of competitive 
industry clusters and implications for regional economy, unemployment segments and 
corresponding policy measures, transfer pricing practices and so forth (see for e.g. 
Hill and Brennan, 2000; Rosenfeld, 1996; Doeringer and Terkla, 1995; Gittleman and 
Howell, 1995; Johnson, 2001). In monetary union research, Cluster Analysis has 
assumed a new role in identifying potential convergent members for monetary union 
(more details were described in Chapter 3). 
                                                 
40 In the field of medicine, the clustering of diseases, cures for diseases or symptoms of diseases can 
lead to very useful taxonomies. 
41 This includes the field of biology with flora and fauna taxonomy. 
42 In the field of psychiatry, the correct diagnosis of clusters of symptoms such as paranoia, 
schizophrenia etc, is essential for successful therapy. 










The cluster analysis technique is a useful tool that mathematically identifies regional 
convergent clusters based on a set of characteristics without first setting restrictions. 
This allows us to understand the economic meaning of the clusters from the data and 
to draw implications, rather than to look at the countries and allow our intuition to 
drive the cluster labeling. In our context, the ‘cases’ for clustering and analysis are 




5.3. EMPIRICAL STUDY: DEGREE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
CONFLUENCE  
 
The experience of European monetary unification has attracted wide interest and 
became the focal point of empirical and theoretical research in the area of monetary 
integration. The first part of this chapter identifies the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) convergence criteria, as a basis for clustering regional economies into 
relatively similar sub-groupings better poised for monetary integration. It is however 
found that the EMU nominal indicators might be insufficient in delineating even more 
diverse regions than that of Western Europe. As such, the chapter also conducts a 
cluster analysis, involving both real and nominal indicators, in a bid to effectively 
group a set of heterogeneous economies into relatively homogenous sub-groups as a 




5.3.1 EMU Convergence Characteristics  
  
As of Jan 1st 1999, countries that qualified for entry into the EMU are namely, 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Portugal43. The Euro effectively became the single currency 
for eleven EU member states and their national currencies are, in effect, subdivisions 
of the Euro.   











Prior to the formation of the EMU, the Maastricht Treaty had specified five key 
criteria of convergence that should be met by prospective monetary union candidates. 
These convergence criteria, as stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, are namely those 
of:  CPI inflation, nominal interest rates, exchange rate index, government debt-to-
GDP and budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. This section is based on these EMU 
convergence indexes.  
 
 
Standardized Data  
 
The hierarchical cluster method accounts for the scale differences of data by 
transforming or standardizing the variables, since larger valued variables contribute 
more to the calculations of distance measures than the smaller valued variables. 
Therefore, the values of each variable are standardized to a range of between 0 and 1 
(the smallest value for each becomes 0 and the largest becomes 1). In this way, we 
avoid problems associated with scale differences. The dataset is drawn from The 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
 
The sample period covers 1990-97. This is a critical period delimited on one end by 
the Delors Report, the document that launched the drive for economic and monetary 
union, and on the other by the deadline for determining the EU founding members for 




                                                                                                                                            
43 Greece participates in the Euro from 1 January 2001, which increases to 12, the number of Member 
States of the Euro zone. 









5.3.2 Results of the Cluster Analysis  
 
 
Table 5.1: Proximity Matrix for EU countries 
 
.39 .41 .11 .20 .37 1.75 .63 .07 1.77 1.03
.39 .68 .48 .52 .54 1.30 1.40 .28 1.69 1.03
.41 .68 .26 .64 .72 1.03 1.22 .60 1.69 .67
.11 .486 .26 .12 .305 1.54 .43 .12 1.63 .73
.20 .52 .64 .12 .464 1.94 .22 .10 1.33 .78
.37 .547 .72 .30 .46 1.31 .83 .24 2.12 .97
1.75 1.30 1.03 1.54 1.94 1.31 2.95 1.77 1.42 .56
.63 1.40 1.22 .43 .22 .83 2.95 .50 1.88 1.27
.07 .28 .60 .12 .10 .24 1.77 .50 1.70 .98
1.77 1.69 1.69 1.63 1.33 2.12 1.42 1.88 1.70 .41













1:Austria 2:Belgium 3:Finland 4:France 5:Germany 6:Ireland 7:Italy 8:Luxemb 9:Netherl 10:Portuga 11:Spain
Squared Euclidean Distance
This is a dissimilarity matrix 
 
 
The proximity matrix44 among the group of countries is presented in Table 5.1. In 
terms of the EMU convergence indicators, the most similar pair of economies with the 
smallest pairwise distance between them, was that of Austria and Netherlands. 
Therefore, both Austria (country numbered ‘1’) and Netherlands (country numbered 
‘9’) were combined as stage 1 in the Agglomeration Schedule45 (Table 5.2). Their 
pairwise distance (0.076) was displayed in the ‘Coefficient’ column of the 
Agglomeration.  
 
Based on the next smallest pairwise distance, that between France (country numbered 
‘4’) and Germany (country numbered ‘5’), both countries were grouped as stage 2 in 
the Agglomeration Schedule with a coefficient of 0.121. Austria and France were 
combined as stage 3 of the Agglomeration Schedule. Their coefficient of 0.139 is the 
average pairwise distance of Austria and France (0.115), France and Netherlands 






                                                 
44 The Cluster method used here is ‘between-group linkage’, a common ‘average linkage’ method, 
which uses the “Square Euclidean distance’ as a distance measure in computing the Proximity Matrix 
(see Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984, for further discussions). 
45 The Agglomeration Schedule identifies which countries or clusters are combined at each stage. The 
smaller is the pairwise distance between any two cases, the more likely they are to be combined first 
into clusters. 
 














Austria was combined with Ireland (country numbered ‘6’) at stage 4 in the 
Agglomeration Schedule. Their coefficient of 0.348 is the average pairwise distance 
of Ireland and Austria (0.378), Ireland and Netherlands (0.246), Ireland and Germany 
(0.464) and Ireland and France (0.305). Netherlands, Germany and France were the 
other partners, which have clustered with Austria earlier. Therefore, at stage 4, the 
coefficient between Austria and Ireland is also the average of the pariwise distance 
between Ireland and the respective countries, which have earlier clustered with 
Austria, i.e. Netherlands, Germany and France.  
 
At stage 5, Portugal (country numbered ‘10’) and Spain (country numbered ‘11’) 
were grouped as a cluster with a coefficient of 0.419, which is also the pairwise 
distance between the two countries (see proximity matrix Table 5.1). At stage 6 of the 
Agglomeration Schedule, Austria and Belgium (country numbered ‘2’) were grouped 
with a coefficient of 0.447. This coefficient is derived as the average of the pairwise 
distance between Belgium and Austria (0.394), Belgium and Netherlands (0.285), 
Belgium and Germany (0.526), Belgium and France (0.486) and Belgium and Ireland 
(0.547). 
 
At stage 7 of the Agglomeration Schedule, Austria was considered with Finland 
(country numbered ‘3’). Their coefficient of 0.557 is the derived as the average 


























in slope Cluster  Cluster   
1 10 1 9 0.076 - - 0 0 3 
2 9 4 5 0.121 1.586 - 0 0 3 
3 
8 1 4 0.139 1.149 0.725 1 2 4 
4 7 1 6 0.348 2.505 2.180 3 0 6 
5 6 10 11 0.419 1.203 0.480 0 0 9 
6 5 1 2 0.447 1.068 0.887 4 0 7 
7 4 1 3 0.557 1.245 1.166 6 0 8 
8 3 1 8 0.752 1.350 1.085 7 0 10 
9 2 7 10 0.995 1.323 0.980 0 5 10 
10 1 1 7 1.457 1.465 1.107 8 9 0 









(0.609), Finland and Germany (0.643), Finland and France (0.261), Finland and 
Ireland (0.724), and Finland and Belgium (0.685).  
 
Austria and Luxemburg (country numbered ‘8’) were combined in stage 8 of the 
Agglomeration Schedule. Their coefficient of 0.752 is the average pairwise between 
Luxemburg and Austria, Luxemburg and Netherlands, Luxemburg and Germany, 
Luxemburg and France, Luxemburg and Ireland, and Luxemburg and Belgium and 
Luxemburg and Finland.  
 
Italy (country numbered ‘7’) was only being introduced at stage 9 of the 
Agglomeration Schedule. She was being considered with Portugal.  Their coefficient 
of 0.995 in the Agglomeration Schedule is the average of the pairwise distance 
between Italy and Portugal, and Italy and Spain. Being the last case to be introduced 
into the clusters, Italy was the most ‘distant’ or different economy among the entire 
group. 
 
Finally, at stage 10 of the Agglomeration Schedule, Austria was joined to Italy. Their 
coefficient of 1.457 is the average pairwise distance between Italy and the respective 
partners which have earlier clustered with Austria, i.e. Netherlands, Germany, France 
Ireland, Belgium, Finland and Luxemburg. The clustering stops at stage 10, and the 
mapping of the countries is reflected in the Dendrogram of Figure 5.1.  
 
 















The graphic representation of the clustering process is reflected in the Dendrogram 
map46 (Figure 5.1). The actual distances have been rescaled to fall in the range of one 
to twenty-five, with one corresponding to the smallest squared Euclidean distance at 
which countries were merged and twenty-five to the largest distance.  
 
As one reads from left to right in the Dendrogram, individual countries that are highly 
similar are initially formed into clusters at relatively small distances, then these 
clusters are merged with other clusters at greater and greater distances until the entire 
sample of countries has been combined into one all-inclusive cluster. 
                                                 
46 The Dendrogram map is the visual representation of the hierarchical cluster structure. It charts the 
sequential grouping of the countries into clusters. The countries are represented as nodes in the 
Dendrogram and the branches illustrate when the cluster method joins subgroups containing that 
country. 











The hierarchical cluster analysis searches for similar groups of countries sequentially 
and combines them into clusters. Table 5.3 displays the groupings of the European 
economies based on their extent of similarity.  The table reports solutions ranging 
from 2-clusters to 11-clusters. The way to interpret the cluster membership is to look 
at the ‘number’ assigned to the country under each cluster. For instance, beginning 
with the right hand side of 2-clusters, one observes that Spain, Portugal and Italy had 
been assigned a number ‘2’, while the rest of the countries were assigned a number 
‘1’.  This indicates that Spain, Portugal and Italy had membership in Cluster ‘2’ while 
the remainder of the cases or countries formed the other Cluster (i.e. cluster ‘1’) for a 
2-clusters solution. 
 
Under a 3-clusters solution, Italy had been assigned a number ‘2’, Portugal and Spain 
designated a number ‘3’ and the remainder of the countries assigned a number ‘1’. 
This means that Italy belongs to Cluster ‘2’, Portugal and Spain belong to Cluster ‘3’ 
and the remainder of the countries belong to Cluster ‘1’. Similarly, the rest of the 
cluster allocations are interpreted in the same manner. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Cluster membership of EU countries 
 
Clusters 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 1
4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 5 4 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 6 5 4 4 3 2 2 2
8 7 6 5 5 4 3 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 8 7 6 6 5 4 3 2




























Selecting the Candidate Cluster Solutions 
The next logical question which arises is how to select the ‘optimal’ cluster solution 
(Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984; Everitt, 1993). Everitt (1993) indicates that 
analysis of the agglomeration schedule, specifically the change in the agglomeration 
coefficient, is the most commonly employed guide to halt clustering or in determining 
the optimal cluster solution. The agglomeration coefficient is the sum of the within-
group variance of the two clusters combined at each successive stage. Therefore, a 
marked increase in the value of the agglomeration coefficient between two stages 
indicates that heterogeneous clusters are being combined. The result is a large 
increase in total variance.  
 
Therefore, the decision rule for selecting the optimal cluster solution in this study is as 
follows:  when there is a marked increase in the slope statistics47 of the coefficient in 
the Agglomeration Schedule, the previous stage of the cluster solution is a candidate 
solution (see also  Hill and Brennan, 2000). In addition, this thesis also confirms the 
optimal cluster solution using the Discriminant Analysis. While Cluster Analysis is a 
mathematical approach that permits us to identify various groups of countries that 
share similar characteristics, the Discriminant Analysis is a statistical approach that 
tests the internal validity of each group, and sets forth what distinguishes the various 
clusters from one another. Therefore, combining both Cluster Analysis (through the 
slope and acceleration statistics of the agglomeration schedule) and Discriminant 
Analysis (through the hit ratio and test statistics) allows us to best determine the 
optimal cluster solution from the results. 
 
With reference to the results for the EU countries, the stages in which there are 
marked changes in the slope and acceleration statistics of the agglomeration 
coefficient are identified to be at 8, 2 and 5 clusters (represented in boldface in Table 
5.2). These are indicated by the relative substantial jumps in the agglomeration 
coefficient from the seventh to eighth stage, followed by that from the first to second 
stage, and that of fourth to fifth stage. These various candidate solutions in turn reflect 
the several tiers of EU economies based on their similarity in the EMU convergence 
characteristics.  
                                                 
47 Defined as the ratio of the coefficients value between 2 stages.  









Under a 2-clusters solution, Italy appeared to be a distinctive ‘outsider’ (or ‘runt’) 
among the EU countries. Italy was not joined to the group until the very last step. This 
implied that it could be more costly for Italy to join a monetary union, as there would 
be some relinquish of control over national policy and sovereignty. And Italy 
appeared an exception to the group.   
 
An intermediate candidate solution is that of 5-clusters. The respective members were 
namely: 1) Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands, 2) 
Finland, 3) Italy, 4) Luxembourg and 5) Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 
For another candidate solution, that of 8-clusters, the results coincidentally reflected a 
distinct inner core comprising: Germany, France, Austria and Netherlands. One 
observes that this inner core of economies had also appeared on the left hand side of 
the Dendogram map (Figure 5.1), since they were combined first as a cluster.  
 
 
Among the 2, 5 and 8 candidate solutions, the statistics unequivocally identifies the 8- 
clusters as the optimal solution. This is evident in the highest slope and acceleration 
statistics (see Table 5.2) for the 8-clusters solution. This result is also confirmed by  
the test statistics of the Discriminant Analysis (see Appendix 2). The test statistics (in 
order of priority) are that of the Hit ratio, the Eigenvalue48, and the Wilks’ lambda49. 
If a cluster has the largest Hit ratio, we may ignore the Eigenvalue and the Wilks’ 
lambda test statistics. In our case, the Hit ratio is 100% for all clusters, which 
indicates that there is no misclassified country that should had been assigned to 
another cluster. Therefore, we move on to the next factor(s) for consideration. The 
statistics indicate that the 8-clusters solution produces both the largest eigenvalue and 
the smallest Wilks’ lambda. Therefore, both the Cluster Analysis and the 
Discriminant Analysis confirm that the 8-clusters solution is the optimal cluster. 
 
                                                 
48 The eigenvalue is the ratio of the sum of the between-groups sum of squares to the within-groups 
sum of square. When we carry out discriminant analysis for multiple (more than 2) groups (clusters), 
we get multiple discriminant relationships. These relationships are called as functions. The eigenvalue 
shows the strength of the function. The higher the eigenvalue, better the discriminant function is. 
49 The Wilks' lambda is used in a test of group means difference in Discriminant Analysis. Wilks’ 
lambda ranges from 0 to 1; with 0 meaning group means differ, and 1 meaning all group means are the 
same.   









The optimal solution of 8-clusters comprised an inner core group of countries which 
had also exhibited a greater degree of similarity relative to the rest of the EMU 
members50. One notes from Table 5.4 that this sub-group has experienced a lower 
standard deviation in terms of the EMU convergence characteristics relative to the 
union as a whole. For example, the CPI inflation of the inner core group (i.e. 
Germany, France, Austria and Netherlands) was at a lower average rate of 2.565% 
with standard deviation (SD) 0.26, as compared to all countries in the EMU group. 
 
 
5.4.3. Core and peripheral 
 
These cluster results remind us that there exists a ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ group of 
countries among the EU countries even before the formation of the EMU. Therefore, 
on an economic basis, the support for at least a 2-speed EMU is justifiable. This 
means that the strategy towards monetary union should first limit to the inner core of 
more convergent countries and then extended to the rest of the prospective members 
later. The economic rationale being that the costs of monetary union decrease with the 
degree of similarity of its members, since this reduces the adjustment costs and the 
political strain of sustaining an asymmetric union. 
 
From Table 5.4, it is useful to note that the average value for the East Asian 
economies based on the same variables are on average higher than those for the entire 
EMU members. For instance, the average CPI inflation for the main East Asian 
economies is 5.8% with a SD of 3.26, as compared to the eleven EMU members of 
3.29% with a SD of 1.485. Furthermore, the average interest rate for the main East 
Asian economies is 8.87% with a SD of 4.97, versus 5.29 % with a SD of 2.29 for the 
eleven EMU members. On the other hand, the average government budget is lower, at 
1.69% of GDP, for the East Asian economies when compared to -4.27 % of GDP for 
the EMU members. 
 
                                                 
50 See Cova, P (2001) for discussions on Europe’s core characterized by smaller standard deviations as 
well as a the peripheral countries (Italy and Spain in particular) exhibit higher than core standard 
deviations.    






















% of GDP 
      
AUSTRIA 2.82 89.4 2.69 -4.68 62.9 
BELGIUM 2.42 90.5 5.02 -5.31 129.2 
FINLAND 2.35 96.5 4.76 -8.93 45.7 
FRANCE 2.21 93.1 4.27 -4.23 46.7 
GERMANY 2.7 89.4 5.35 -1.96 50.8 
IRELAND 2.37 99.2 2.59 -1.82 85.8 
ITALY 4.7 109.1 6.54 -8.71 114.9 
LUXEMBOURG 2.55 89.7 5.04 0.93 5.48 
NETHERLANDS 2.53 90 3.58 -2.62 77.6 
PORTUGAL 6.84 93.5 10.2 -4.54 63.6 
SPAIN 4.75 100.8 8.21 -5.19 57.4 
11 EMU members 3.294 (Av) 94.654 (Av) 5.2954 (Av) -4.278 (Av) 67.280 (Av) 
 1.485 (sd) 6.268 (sd) 2.294 (sd) 2.910 (sd) 34.149 (sd) 
      
4 Inner ‘Core’  2.565 (Av) 90.475 (Av) 3.9725 (Av) -3.373 (Av) 59.500 (Av) 
 0.2649 (sd) 1.772 (sd) 1.1232 (sd) 1.2918 (sd) 13.888 (sd) 
      
JAPAN 1.47 83.5 2.05 -0.28 n.a. 
KOREA 6.12 93.6 9.28 -0.35 n.a. 
SINGAPORE 2.45 90.8 3.48 12.4 n.a. 
MALAYSIA 3.8 93 6.73 1.18 n.a. 
INDONESIA 8.38 94.5 17.6 0.76 n.a. 
PHILIPPINES 9.81 89.8 12.6 -0.79 n.a. 
THAILAND 5.17 93.6 10.5 2.56 n.a. 
CHINA 9.97 101.4 8.73 -1.95 n.a. 
8 East Asia members 5.896 (Av) 92.525 (Av) 8.871 (Av) 1.691 (Av) n.a. 







                                                 
51 The real exchange rate index is calculated as: CPI(local)/(CPI(US)*Official ER, 1995=100, where 
ER refers to the exchange rate of local currency per U.S. dollar.   









Wyplosz, C (2001) also did a cross-regional comparison between Europe and Asia 
and noted that the Asian countries exhibit considerably more variability in economic 
development (specifically on per capita income) than the European Union. He added 
this variability reflects deep differences in terms of economic structure, which is a 
major obstacle in Asian monetary integration. This thesis uses the EMU convergence 
characteristics as a first basis of cross regional comparison between Europe and Asia. 




5.4. EAST ASIA’S CONVERGENCE    
 
The above clustering analysis helped to identify several sub-groupings of European 
economies, based on the convergence of their economic characteristics. It could also 
be interesting to extend this clustering analysis to the East Asian countries to 
determine the extent of their similarity with each other. This serves an economic 
precondition for forming a monetary union. In that connection, the following section 
applies first the main EMU convergence characteristics to the East Asian economies. 
It then extends the inclusion of other (real) variables beyond those stipulated in the 
EMU convergence criteria. 
 
The main East Asian economies included are: Japan, South Korea, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and China. It does not include Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and several other economies, as sufficient data is not available for these 
countries. In addition, it is useful to note that the Asia-Pacific economies of Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States of America (USA) are added to offer perspectives 
to the clustering analysis52. The period under study is that between 1990-97, which 
concludes just before the Asian financial crisis erupted. The 1990s also witnessed a 
rapid degree of market liberalization and integration among most East Asian 
economies. 
 
                                                 
52 Artis and Zhang (2001) have introduced the U.S.A, Canada and Japan as ‘controls’ in the clustering 
of European economies. In our case, we have introduced Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.A, given 









The data used in this section include: the CPI inflation, nominal interest rates, 
exchange rate index and the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. The government debt-to-
GDP ratio is excluded, as it is not relevant or existent for most of the regional 
countries. 
 
5.4.1. Clustering Outcomes 
 
Table 5.5: Proximity Matrix for Selected Asia-Pacific countries based on 
EMU characteristics  
 
.833 .862 .458 2.040 1.546 .835 2.194 1.063 .448 1.061
.833 1.028 .111 .367 .281 5.397E-02 .405 .318 .231 .273
.862 1.028 .612 1.920 1.822 .736 2.104 1.131 .571 1.349
.458 .111 .612 .788 .690 9.410E-02 .800 .216 4.030E-02 .232
2.040 .367 1.920 .788 .210 .367 .544 .988 .910 .904
1.546 .281 1.822 .690 .210 .406 .487 1.148 .929 1.020
.835 5.397E-02 .736 9.410E-02 .367 .406 .607 .326 .146 .335
2.194 .405 2.104 .800 .544 .487 .607 .716 1.102 .633
1.063 .318 1.131 .216 .988 1.148 .326 .716 .226 2.097E-02 
.448 .231 .571 4.030E-02 .910 .929 .146 1.102 .226 .265

















This is a dissimilarity matrix
 
 
Australia (country numbered ‘9’) and United States (country numbered ‘11’) were the 
most similar among the group of economies. They had the smallest pair-wise distance 
in the proximity matrix (see Table 5.5). Thus, they were combined first, as reflected 
in stage 1 of the Agglomeration Schedule (see Table 5.6). The next most similar 
groups of economies were Malaysia (country numbered ‘4’) and New Zealand 
(country numbered ‘10’), and South Korea (country numbered ‘2’) and Thailand 
(country numbered ‘7’). They were then combined as stages 2 and 3 in the 
Agglomeration Schedule. This was followed by South Korea and Malaysia and, 
Indonesia (country numbered ‘5’) and Philippines (country numbered ‘6’) at stages 4 
and 5. South Korea and Australia, Indonesia and China (country numbered ‘8’), and 
South Korea and Indonesia, were combined next as stages 6, 7 and 8 in the 
Agglomeration Schedule. Japan (country numbered ‘1’) and Singapore (country 
numbered ‘3’) were introduced only at stage 9. This could mean that Japan and 
Singapore were relatively dissimilar among the group of countries. 
                                                                                                                                            
that  Australia, New Zealand belong to Australasia; and the USA is a major economic partner of many 
countries of this region, in trade and investment linkages. 









Table 5.6: Agglomeration Schedule for Selected Asia-Pacific countries  
 based on EMU characteristics 
 
 
Cluster Membership  
 
 
Table 5.7 presents the country members for cluster solutions ranging from 2 to 10 
clusters.  
 
Table 5.7: Cluster membership of Selected Asia-Pacific’s economies 
 Clusters
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2
5 5 5 4 4 4 4 2 2
6 6 6 5 4 4 4 2 2
7 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
8 8 7 6 5 5 4 2 2
9 9 8 7 6 2 2 2 2
10 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2













10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
 
 
Selecting the candidate cluster solutions 
 
From the Agglomeration Schedule (see Table 5.6), the marked jumps in slope 
statistics occurred at candidate solutions of 10, 8 and 5 clusters53. These were 
represented by the large jumps in the agglomeration coefficient from the ninth to tenth 



























in slope Cluster  Cluster   
1 10 9 11 .021 - - 0 0 6 
2 9 4 10 .040 1.904 - 0 0 4 
3 8 2 7 .054 1.350 0.708 0 0 4 
4 7 2 4 .146 2.703 2.002 3 2 6 
5 6 5 6 .210 1.438 0.531 0 0 7 
6 5 2 9 .274 1.304 0.907 4 1 8 
7 4 5 8 .516 1.883 1.443 5 0 8 
8 3 2 5 .726 1.407 0.747 6 7 10 
9 2 1 3 .862 1.187 0.843 0 0 10 
10 1 1 2 1.208 1.401 1.180 9 8 0 









Among these candidate solutions, the slope statistics indicates that 8-clusters is the 
optimal solution. For this solution, the country members were : 1) Japan, 2) South 
Korea and Thailand, 3) Singapore, 4) Malaysia and New Zealand, 5) Indonesia, 6) 
Philippines, 7) China, and 8) Australia and the USA.   
 
 
Figure 5.2 presents the Dendrogram map, which shows how the countries were 








                                                                                                                                            
53 A few candidate cluster solutions are provided to offer decision-makers (e.g. policy makers) the 
option to consider a few choices. 









5.4.2. Implications of Cluster Results for Monetary Union Membership 
 
This study discovers that the EMU convergence characteristics might not be adequate 
in classifying the heterogeneous countries at distinct development stages (such as 
those in East Asia) for monetary union membership. For example, a developing 
economy like Malaysia had been lumped with New Zealand (a developed economy) 
based on their similarity in the EMU convergence characteristics. In the case of the 
EU countries, it appeared logical that Austria and Netherlands, and Germany and 
France, were formed to be alike as they were at similar development stages, and hence 
grouped to form clusters.  
 
The failure to appropriately assign the heterogeneous group of regional economies 
could be attributed to the exclusion of real and structural variables for relatively 
diverse regions such as East Asia. Comparing with the EU countries, the countries of 
Asia Pacific are even more dissimilar54. It is for these reasons that the next cluster 
analysis will include both real and nominal indicators. Countries at relatively similar 




5.5. BEYOND THE EMU CONVERGENCE CRITERIA 
 
The Maastricht Treaty had focused mainly on nominal convergence criteria, such as 
the stability of prices and exchange and interest rates, (even fiscal convergence is 
targeted at achieving price stability). It had however, ignored the real and structural 
criteria in convergence55. Underlying differences in real variables could produce 
policy conflicts in response and implementation.  
 
 
                                                 
54 European Commission (2002) reports that ‘Economic diversity is more pronounced in Asia, ranging 
from countries with highly modern economies to others that are still poor and with traditional, mostly 
rural, economic structures. In contrast, the European Union has become a much more homogenous 
economic grouping.’  
55 Real and structural convergence refer to indicators such as GDP growth, per capita income, 
investment trends, trade, factor mobility and economic structural indicators, while nominal 










In drawing policy lessons for Asia in light of European monetary unification, 
Wyplosz (2001) emphasized that the absence of real convergence (defined as the 
stage of development of a country) is Asia’s Achilles’ heel in forming a monetary 
union. The author also added that real convergence is what matters most in European 
monetary unification while the ‘optimum currency area’ principles played no practical 
role in identifying Europe’s best-suited groupings of countries for union.  
 
In view of these considerations and earlier discussions, this section accounts for 
convergence of real characteristics, which is pivotal for successful and lasting 
monetary integration.  
 
This section explains the variables used. The variables are: GDP per capita (PPP), real 
output growth, structural indicators such as value-added of services and agriculture to 
GDP56, investment-to-GDP ratio, CPI inflation, nominal interest rates, M2/GDP ratio, 
degree of openness and the urban population ratio.  
 
This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but is believed to cover the main 
characteristics of real and nominal convergence. In a later section, the degree of 
convergence in non-traditional factors, such as the index of economic freedom etc, 
will also be analysed.  
 
The economies57 included are: Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and China and also the major Asia-Pacific 
economies of Australia, New Zealand and the USA. Hong Kong, which was exlcuded 
earlier due to data inavailabiltiy is now included in the analysis. The following section 




                                                                                                                                            
convergence include variables such as inflation, interest rates, exchange rates etc. This section 
combines both real and nominal convergence characteristics. 
56 We selected the extreme economic sectors of services and agriculture, for their share of output 
contribution to output, to indicate the extent of the economic differences in terms of contribution. 










Real Per capita income  
The real per capita measure the level of real income per person58. The disparity in 
real income underlies the countries’ differences in living standards and developments. 
Thus, making the integration of currencies rather impractical. To equalize the 
purchasing power of one currency unit in each economy, and to reduce the gap in 
incomes between richer and poorer economies, we use the measure ‘GDP per capita, 
PPP’. Data are in constant 1995 international dollars. 
 
Real output growth 
Countries growing at different rates will require the flexibility of macroeconomic 
policy to manage its economy. In particular, the retention of monetary policy 
autonomy is useful due to the speed and ease of monetary policy management. The 
measure for ‘real output growth’ is represented by the change in real GDP. 
 
Sectoral Value Added to GDP 
Differences in production structures could lead to asymmetry in shocks or out-of-sync 
economic cycles, due to varying product demand. Therefore, we include the share of 
output accounted for by selected industries, namely the value added (VA) of the 
services and agriculture sectors to output respectively; reflecting the different nature 
of production contribution to GDP. The ratio of ‘Agriculture’ and ‘Services’ value 
added (VA) as percent of GDP are used59. 
 
Investment/GDP Ratio 
A country’s investment-to-GDP ratio reflects its orientation towards fixed capital 
formation, which has a long run impact on real economic growth.  The ‘Investment-
to-GDP’ ratio consists of gross capital formation relative to the GDP of an economy. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
57 In some cases, data limitations preclude our inclusion of East Asian economies such as Taiwan, 
Brunei and the former Communist Indo-China states.  
58 A most commonly used measure of economic welfare is GDP per capita (see Ramstetter, 2000, for 
instance). 
59 Agriculture’ refers to activities in forestry, hunting, fishing, as well as crops and livestock, and 
‘Services’ includes those services in wholesale, retail trade, transport, financial and personal services, 
such as education and health. 











Inflation differentials across countries often necessitate exchange rate adjustments; 
making the currency union less sustainable. The measure for inflation is represented 
by the CPI inflation. 
 
Nominal Interest Rates 
The level of interest rates in a country reflects its macro-financial conditions. 
Differing levels of interest rates in member countries will affect the stability of 
currency unions, as funds tend to move from lower to higher interest rates 
environments. The level of interest rate is represented by the deposit interest rate. 
 
M2/GDP Ratio 
The M2/GDP ratio reflects the monetary base and the amount of liquidity in a 
country. The monetary base has impact on the levels of interest and exchange rates, 
which could in turn affect the stability of a currency union. 
 
Degree of Country’s Openness  
To the extent that frequent variability in price involves costs, the value of the 
exchange rate instrument is likely to be higher in relatively open economies. Hence, 
the degree of openness indicator is considered in the analysis. 
 
Urbanization Index 
Finally, countries at varying stages of development and modernization can be inferred 
from their urbanization index. The ‘urban population ratio’ is measured as a percent 
















5.5.1. Convergence of Real and Nominal Characteristics60 
 
Table 5.8: Proximity Matrix on real and nominal indicators 
 
.00 1.58 1.63 2.01 2.20 3.88 3.24 2.45 4.41 .60 .63 .79
1.58 .00 2.46 1.58 .58 1.09 1.49 .73 1.62 1.21 1.43 1.96
1.63 2.46 .00 1.39 2.94 4.68 3.93 3.40 4.82 1.78 1.81 2.09
2.01 1.58 1.39 .00 1.48 4.12 4.45 2.58 4.42 2.12 2.37 2.83
2.20 .58 2.94 1.48 .00 1.18 1.97 .37 1.09 2.34 2.30 3.22
3.88 1.09 4.68 4.12 1.18 .00 .70 .69 .78 2.91 2.79 3.66
3.24 1.49 3.93 4.45 1.97 .70 .00 1.63 1.58 2.20 1.81 2.74
2.45 .73 3.40 2.58 .37 .69 1.63 .00 .85 2.44 2.46 3.22
4.41 1.62 4.82 4.42 1.09 .78 1.58 .85 .00 4.39 4.21 5.29
.60 1.21 1.78 2.12 2.34 2.91 2.20 2.44 4.39 .00 .14 .15
.63 1.43 1.81 2.37 2.30 2.79 1.81 2.46 4.21 .14 .00 .33


















8:Thailand 9:China 10:Australia 11:NeZealand 12:USA
 Squared Euclidean Distance
This is a dissimilarity matrix 
 
 
The proximity matrix (Table 5.8) indicates that Australia and New Zealand were the 
most similar and had the smallest pair-wise distance between them. Both Australia 
and New Zealand were combined as stage 1 in the Agglomeration Schedule. The pair-
wise distance between Australia and New Zealand (0.147) is displayed in the 
‘Coefficient’ column of the Agglomeration Schedule (Table 5.9). 
 
 




                                                 
60 The clustering of economies by categorical (i.e. nominal, real and structural) variables is found in 


























in slope Cluster  Cluster   
1 11 10 11 0.147 - - 0 0 2 
2 10 10 12 0.245 1.661 - 1 0 5 
3 9 5 8 0.372 1.520 0.915 0 0 4 
4 8 2 5 0.658 1.768 1.163 0 3 8 
5 7 1 10 0.676 1.028 0.581 0 2 10 
6 6 6 7 0.700 1.035 1.006 0 0 7 
7 5 6 9 1.182 1.688 1.630 6 0 8 
8 4 2 6 1.295 1.095 0.649 4 7 11 
9 3 3 4 1.393 1.076 0.982 0 0 10 
10 2 1 3 2.084 1.496 1.390 5 9 11 
11 1 1 2 3.038 1.457 0.974 10 8 0 









Australia and the USA were combined next, based on their rather close pair-wise 
distance of 0.153. The pair-wise distance between the USA and Australia (0.153) and 
the USA and New Zealand (0.337) is reflected as the average coefficient of 0.245 in 
stage 2 of the agglomeration schedule. 
 
Malaysia and Thailand were combined at Stage 3 of the agglomeration schedule. At 
stage 4, Japan was joined to the grouping of Australia, New Zealand and the USA. 
The coefficient of 0.658 in stage 4 of the agglomeration schedule represents the 
average of Japan’s pair-wise distance with Australia, New Zealand and the USA 
respectively.  Together, Australia, New Zealand, the USA and Japan form a cluster of 
matured developed economies. 
 
At stage 5, South Korea was joined with the grouping of Malaysia and Thailand. 
Indonesia was combined with Philippines at stage 6 of the agglomeration schedule. At 
stage 7, China joined the grouping with Indonesia and Philippines. 
 
At stage 9, Hong Kong and Singapore were being introduced in the grouping. This 
reflects that the two economies are relatively dissimilar with the rest of the group for 

























Figure 5.3: Dendrogram Map based on nominal and real convergence 
 
 
Cluster Membership  
 
The Cluster results based on the convergence or similarity of real and nominal 
variables are reported in Table 5.10. It shows the membership in which the countries 
belong to ranging from 2-clusters to 11-clusters solutions. 
 
 
Table 5.10: Cluster membership based on real and nominal indicators 
Cluster Membership
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 1
5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
6 6 6 5 5 5 5 2 2 2
7 7 7 6 6 5 5 2 2 2
8 8 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
9 9 8 7 7 6 5 2 2 2
10 10 9 8 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 10 9 8 1 1 1 1 1 1



























Selecting candidate cluster solutions 
 
We first identify 3 candidate solutions that produced the highest slope statistics of the 
agglomeration coefficient. The candidate solutions are 3, 6 and 9 clusters respectively. 
These were marked by the substantial jumps in the agglomeration coefficient from the 
second to third stage, from the fifth to sixth stage, and from the eighth to ninth stage 
respectively.  These three-candidate solutions are used to map the relationships that 
exist among the various groups of economies. 
 
The 3-clusters solution incidentally mapped: 1) the grouping of mature developed 
economies, including the USA, Japan, Australia and New Zealand; 2) the grouping of 
developing economies, including China, Indonesia and Malaysia; and 3) the grouping 
of small and open economies like Hong Kong and Singapore. The 6-clusters solution 
represented an “intermediate” of relatively similar economic clusters. The 9-clusters 
solution comprised a grouping of Australia, New Zealand and the USA; a grouping of 
Malaysia and Thailand; and the seven individual East Asian economies respectively 
(see Table 5.10).  
 
We now assess these candidate clusters under the test statistics of the Discriminant 




5.5.2. Discriminant Analysis 
 
The first test of the Discriminant Analysis is  the Hit ratio. The Hit ratio indicates the 
percentage of correct classifications in the cluster. The Hit ratio for all clusters are 
100% (see Appendix 4). This means that 100% of original grouped cases are 
correctly classified. In other words, there are no misclassified countries that should 
belong to another cluster.  Therefore, we move on to the next test statistics given that 
the Hit ratio are the same.  
  
The Discriminant statistics shows that the 9-clusters solution has the largest 
eigenvalue (see Appendix 4). This implies that the 9-clusters is optimal solution, 









followed by 6-clusters than 3-clusters. However, the 6-clsuters produces the smallest 
Wilks’ Lamba (and acceleration statistics). Hence, the 6-clusters solution61 is referred 
to, as it produces a meaningful grouping of economies.  
 
Based on the 6-clusters solution, the Canonical Discriminant plot (Figure 5.4) 
depicting the proximity (or distance) among the six clusters is presented. The 
Canonical Discriminate plot is derived from the all-groups scatterplot that relates the 
delineation of groups around centroids.  It can be seen that from the Discriminant plot 
that China is furthest from the Cluster 1 economies of Australia, New Zealand, Japan 
and the United States. 
Figure 5.4 




























where: ANUJ = Australia, New Zealand, USA and Japan 
            KMT  = Korea, Malaysia and Thailand  
            H      =  Hong Kong  
         S       = Singapore  
            IP     =  Indonesia and Philippines 
                    C       =  China  
                                                 
61 The 6-clusters solution is chosen over the 9 clusters; as it produces more meaningful clusters for 
discussion. The 9-clusters solution comprises mostly individual countries and the clusters of Australia, 
New Zealand and the U.S.A, and Malaysia and Thailand respectively. In addition, Gittleman and 









For a 6-cluster solution, the member countries in each groups and their characteristics 
are presented in Table 5.11. 
 
 
Table 5.11: Group Statistics for Clustered Asia-Pacific Economies   
 
Period 1990-97 Variable* Mean Std. Deviation
GDP Per Capita, PPP (US$) 21468 4560 Cluster 1: Australia, New  
Zealand, U.S.A. and Japan Real GDP growth (%) 2.737 0.414 
 CPI Aggregate Inflation (%) 2.810 0.873 
 Interest Rate (%) 6.734 3.130 
 M2 (% of GDP) 75.474 24.836 
 Investment to GDP 22.798 5.402 
 Services, VA (% of GDP) 66.812 5.964 
 Agriculture, VA (% of GDP) 3.689 2.631 
 Openness 33.811 17.822 
 Urbanization (% of population) 80.972 4.894 
GDP Per Capita, PPP (US$) 7192 2647 Cluster 2: Korea, Malaysia 
and Thailand Real GDP growth (%) 7.520 1.011 
 CPI Aggregate Inflation (%) 4.923 1.202 
 Interest Rate (%) 8.758 2.034 
 M2 (% of GDP) 60.247 19.560 
 Investment to GDP 38.141 1.376 
 Services, VA (% of GDP) 47.934 3.050 
 Agriculture, VA (% of GDP) 10.983 3.530 
 Openness 102.590 55.663 
 Urbanization (% of population) 49.876 29.347 
Cluster 3: Hong Kong  GDP Per Capita, PPP (US$) 20474 . 
 Real GDP growth (%) 4.686 . 
 CPI Aggregate Inflation (%) 8.337 . 
 Interest Rate (%) 4.655 . 
 M2 (% of GDP) 162.397 . 
 Investment to GDP 30.601 . 
 Services, VA (% of GDP) 80.423 . 
 Agriculture, VA (% of GDP) 0.187 . 
 Openness 277.281 . 
 Urbanization (% of population) 94.648 . 
Cluster 4: Singapore GDP Per Capita, PPP (US$) 15997 . 
 Real GDP growth (%) 8.928 . 
 CPI Aggregate Inflation (%) 2.444 . 
 Interest Rate (%) 3.450 . 
 M2 (% of GDP) 84.714 . 
 Investment to GDP 36.121 . 
 Services, VA (% of GDP) 65.099 . 
 Agriculture, VA (% of GDP) 0.209 . 
 Openness 360.627 . 
 Urbanization (% of population) 100.00 . 
                                                                                                                                            
Howell (1995) states that more compelling than any mechanical rule is the qualitative decision that the 
cluster analysis produces groups that are meaningful.   









Table 5.11: Group Statistics for Asia-Pacific Clustered Economies (continued) 
 
GDP Per Capita, PPP (US$) 3002 652.56 Cluster 5: Indonesia and  
Philippines Real GDP growth (%) 5.610 3.0289 
 CPI Aggregate Inflation (%) 9.076 1.2864 
 Interest Rate (%) 15.294 3.536 
 M2 (% of GDP) 39.784 .05278 
 Investment to GDP 26.990 5.707 
 Services, VA (% of GDP) 43.315 3.193 
 Agriculture, VA (% of GDP) 19.733 2.282 
 Openness 64.218 17.019 
 Urbanization (% of population) 42.677 12.997 
Cluster 6: China GDP Per Capita, PPP (US$) 2086 . 
 Real GDP growth (%) 9.653 . 
 CPI Aggregate Inflation (%) 10.901 . 
 Interest Rate (%) 9.020 . 
 M2 (% of GDP) 85.611 . 
 Investment to GDP 38.317 . 
 Services, VA (% of GDP) 31.929 . 
 Agriculture, VA (% of GDP) 22.041 . 
 Openness 38.051 . 





Cluster 1 comprised the matured economies of Australia, New Zealand, United States 
and Japan. For the period 1990-97, this cluster has had an average GDP per capita of 
US$21468, real GDP growth of 2.7% and CPI inflation rate of 2.8 %.    
 
Cluster 2 comprised South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Cluster 2 economies 
enjoyed the second highest average growth rate of 8.1%, moderate average inflation 
and interest rates of 4.9% and 8.7% respectively.   
 
Hong Kong and Singapore occupied Cluster 3 and Cluster 4 respectively. Both Hong 
Kong and Singapore enjoyed high per capita income, degree of urbanization and 
openness and an almost negligible agricultural sector. However, they differ in their 
rates of inflation and interest, and money supply policy. While Singapore experienced 
low rates of inflation and interest and monetary base62, Hong Kong recorded more 
than twice that of Singapore’s. 
 









Cluster 5 comprised the emerging “tiger” economies of Indonesia and Philippines. 
Cluster 5 has moderate average growth of 5.6%, lower average per capita income of 
US$3003 and higher inflation of 9.1% on average. 
 
Cluster 6 is only accounted for by China. Based on the set of economic variables, 
China appears to be relatively different from the rest of the Asian economies. It had 
the lowest per capita income of US$2086, highest real GDP growth of 9.6%, and high 
inflation of 10.9% for the period 1990-97. Therefore, it is not surprising that she 
stands alone as one cluster. 
 
The above cluster results reveal two exceptional observations; one relates to the 
cluster of South Korea with Malaysia and Thailand, and the other where Singapore 
and Hong Kong not being classified as one natural cluster. 
 
Cluster 2 is of interest to note. It comprised South Korea with the grouping of 
Malaysia and Thailand. Though South Korea was reclassified as a developed 
economy since the early 1990s, she has been grouped with Malaysia and Thailand in 
this case. South Korea has shared relative similarity to Malaysia and Thailand in the 
ratios of investment to GDP, structural indicators of services and agricultural share of 
GDP. To a lesser extent, indicators of CPI and degree of openness. On the other hand, 
South Korea differed in her relative per capita income and interest rates characteristics 
with Malaysia and Thailand. 
 
On the whole, however, South Korea has demonstrated greater relative proximity with 
dynamic "tiger" economies Malaysia and Thailand as compared with other regional 
economies for the period 1990-97.  Nevertheless, it is useful to note that Malaysia and 
Thailand were first grouped before South Korea later joined into this cluster for a 
solution of 7 clusters and below.  
 
 
This study also discovers that Hong Kong and Singapore did not appear to be 
compatible as a pair in the cluster analysis. On the prima facie, these two small and 
open economies looked similar in many aspects, however, they differ fundamentally 
                                                                                                                                            
62 i.e. M2/GDP ratio. 









in their policy orientation and preferences resulting in different cluster outcomes. 
Furthermore, this cluster analysis identifies Hong Kong and Singapore as the ‘runt’ or 
anomaly among the group of countries under study. This is so because Hong Kong 
and Singapore were usually the last to be joined to a cluster. This means that these 
two economies are simply unique. This implies that it would be more costly for these 
relatively dissimilar economies to join a monetary union, as it would involve the loss 
of an independent monetary policy and exchange rate. 
 
 
5.5.2. Economic and Geographic Classification of Clustered Economies 
 
The theory of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) does not state explicitly that there 
is a need to consider geographical locations when selecting partners for monetary 
unification. However, countries that are geographically close to each other tend to 
have a larger volume of trade between them (i.e. ‘gravity’ model) and also lower 
transaction costs than markets that are further away. In addition, factors of production 
are likely to be more flexible when geographical distance is close. Hence, it makes 
more economic sense to have monetary union between countries that are 
geographically close, given all else constant. 
 
Table 5.12 provides a typology of economic and geographic classifications of 
countries based on a 6-cluster solution. Take cluster 1, for instance, which reflects the 
grouping of matured industrialized economies, from three sub-regions namely: 
Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), America (USA) and Northeast Asia (Japan). 
From a proximity perspective, it does not make economic sense to form a monetary 
union among countries of different geographic regions.   
 
Cluster 2 comprised Northeast Asia’s South Korea, and Southeast Asia’s Malaysia 
and Thailand. Likewise, it seems less plausible to form monetary union between 
countries of more distant (sub) regions. 
  
In the case of Cluster 5, the grouping of Indonesia and Philippines, though both 
countries belong to Southeast Asia, however, bilateral trade does not yet provide an 
impetus for the formation of a monetary union at this current point in time. 










Table 5.12: Economic and Geographic Taxonomy of Asia Pacific Economies  
 
Clusters  Economic Classification Region 
Cluster 1    
Australia Matured developed economy  Australasia 
New Zealand  Matured developed economy Australasia 
United States Matured developed economy America 
Japan Matured developed economy NEA 
   
Cluster 2   
South Korea Developed economy NEA 
Malaysia NIE SEA 
Thailand NIE SEA 
   
Cluster 3   
Hong Kong Matured NIE NEA 
   
Cluster 4   
Singapore Matured NIE SEA 
   
Cluster 5   
Indonesia Emerging NIE SEA 
Philippines Emerging NIE SEA 
   
Cluster 6   
China Developing economy NEA 














5.6. TIME SENSITIVITY OF CLUSTER RESULTS  
  
The cluster results were subjected to a series of sensitivity tests, including the 
specification of different variables, as well as using different sub-periods of the data. 
The purpose is to get an insight into how cluster outcomes could change with time. 
Specifically, on how countries converged or diverged across the sub-periods. The data 
has been spilt into smaller sub-periods, namely: sub-periods 1989-91, 1992-94, and 
1995-97 respectively. For consistency, the same variables have been used63 across the 







Table 5.13: Sensitivity Analysis: 1989-91, Agglomeration Schedule 
 
 
Between sub-period 1989-91, Australia and New Zealand had the smallest pair-wise 
distance  (0.238) and were grouped as stage 1 of the Agglomeration Schedule. This 
was followed by the grouping of Australia and the USA, and the grouping of 
Malaysia and Thailand in stages 2 and 3 of the Agglomeration Schedule respectively. 
At stage 4, South Korea was joined with Malaysia. 
 
                                                 
63 In other words, GDP per capita (PPP), real output growth, aggregate price inflation, nominal interest 
rates, investment-to-GDP ratio, value-added of services and agriculture to GDP respectively, degree of 



























in slope Cluster  Cluster   
1 10 9 10 .238 - - 0 0 2 
2 9 9 11 .280 1.176 - 1 0 7 
3 8 4 7 .495 1.768 1.503 0 0 4 
4 7 2 4 .689 1.391 0.787 0 3 6 
5 6 5 8 .853 1.238 0.890 0 0 6 
6 5 2 5 .960 1.125 0.909 4 5 8 
7 4 1 9 1.238 1.290 1.146 0 2 9 
8 3 2 6 1.702 1.375 1.067 6 0 10 
9 2 1 3 2.211 1.299 0.945 7 0 10 
10 1 1 2 2.918 1.320 1.0159 9 8 0 









Indonesia was combined with China at stage 5, and South Korea considered with 
Indonesia at stage 6 of the Agglomeration Schedule. At stage 7, Japan was added to 
the grouping of Australia, New Zealand and USA.  
 
Singapore was only introduced at stage 9. Being the most dissimilar economy, 
Singapore became the last to be considered to a cluster. The cluster membership for 
respective cluster solutions is presented in Table 5.14. 
 
 
Table 5.14: Sub-period cluster membership (1989-91) 
Cluster Membership
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2
5 5 5 4 4 2 2 2 2
6 6 6 5 5 4 4 2 2
7 7 4 2 2 2 2 2 2
8 8 7 6 4 2 2 2 2
9 9 8 7 6 5 1 1 1
9 9 8 7 6 5 1 1 1

















































in slope Cluster  Cluster   
1 11 10 11 .137 - - 0 0 2 
2 10 10 12 .265 1.934 - 1 0 5 
3 9 5 8 .286 1.079 0.558 0 0 6 
4 8 6 7 .444 1.552 1.438 0 0 8 
5 7 1 10 .610 1.374 0.885 0 2 10 
6 6 2 5 .648 1.062 0.773 0 3 8 
7 5 3 4 .931 1.437 1.352 0 0 10 
8 4 2 6 1.113 1.195 0.832 6 4 9 
9 3 2 9 1.456 1.308 1.094 8 0 11 
10 2 1 3 1.803 1.238 0.947 5 7 11 
11 1 1 2 2.837 1.573 1.271 10 9 0 









Based on the relative ‘proximity’ for sub-period 1992-94, Australia and New Zealand 
were grouped in stage 1, and Australia and U.S.A. were grouped in stage 2 of the 
Agglomeration Schedule. Malaysia and Thailand, and Indonesia and Philippines were 
combined at stages 3 and 4 respectively. Japan joined Australia, New Zealand and the 
U.S.A. as a cluster in stage 5. South Korea and Malaysia, and Malaysia and Singapore 
were combined in stages 6 and 7 of the Agglomeration Schedule. South Korea and 
Indonesia and South Korea and China were considered in stages 8 and 9. Finally, 
Hong Kong was being joined to Japan in stage 10 of the Agglomeration Schedule. 
The cluster membership for various solutions is presented in Table 5.15. 
   
Table 5.16: Sub-period cluster membership (1992-94) 
Cluster Membership
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 1
5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2
6 6 6 6 6 5 4 2 2 2
7 7 7 6 6 5 4 2 2 2
8 8 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2
9 9 8 7 7 6 5 4 2 2
10 10 9 8 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 10 9 8 1 1 1 1 1 1

















































in slope Cluster  Cluster   
1 11 10 12 .138 - - 0 0 2 
2 10 10 11 .283 2.051 - 1 0 4 
3 9 6 7 .519 1.834 0.894 0 0 6 
4 8 1 10 .602 1.160 0.632 0 2 10 
5 7 2 5 .716 1.189 1.025 0 0 8 
6 6 6 8 .806 1.126 0.946 3 0 7 
7 5 6 9 1.107 1.374 1.220 6 0 8 
8 4 2 6 1.264 1.142 0.831 5 7 11 
9 3 3 4 1.272 1.006 0.881 0 0 10 
10 2 1 3 1.981 1.557 1.547 4 9 11 
11 1 1 2 2.826 1.426 0.916 10 8 0 









For the sub-period 1995-97, the proximity matrix indicates that Australia and the 
USA had the smallest pair-wise distance and were combined first in the 
Agglomeration Schedule. Australia and New Zealand were combined next. At stage 3, 
Indonesia and Philippines were joined. 
 
Japan was added to the cluster with Australia, New Zealand and the USA at stage 4. 
South Korea was joined with Malaysia at stage 5. Indonesia and Thailand were 
combined at stage 6, while Indonesia and China were combined at stage 7. South 
Korea was considered with Indonesia at stage 8. 
 
At stage 9, Hong Kong and Singapore were introduced. Being the most dissimilar 
among the group of economies under study, they were the last to be considered into a 
cluster. The cluster membership is reflected in Table 5.18. 
 
 
Table 5.18: Sub-period cluster membership (1995-97) 
Cluster Membership
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 1
5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
6 6 6 6 5 5 5 2 2 2
7 7 6 6 5 5 5 2 2 2
8 8 7 7 6 5 5 2 2 2
9 9 8 8 7 6 5 2 2 2
10 10 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 10 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1


















Overall, there appear no marked differences in the cluster membership across the sub-
periods. In other words, the cluster results had remained ‘robust’ or consistent. In 
particular, three clusters had stayed grouped throughout. They are namely: 1) 
Australia and New Zealand, 2) Malaysia and Thailand, and 3) Indonesia and 
Philippines.  
 
Australia and New Zealand had been a consistent cluster across the various sub-
periods. This cluster did not seem to diverge. On the other hand, between sub-periods 
1989-91 and 1992-94, Malaysia and Thailand remained a cluster. However, Malaysia 
and Thailand began to diverge as a cluster in sub-period 1995-97. This could indicate 









that relative economic realities of Malaysia and Thailand began to sunk in from this 
time forth (till the 1997 Asian financial crisis). In addition, the economic 
characteristics of Indonesia and Philippines began to converge as cluster from sub-
period 1992 onwards. Between sub-period 1989-91, Indonesia and Philippines 
seemed to relatively different in their economic outcomes to be considered as a 
cluster.  
 
From the above, one observes how the cluster results could change or remain over 
time. This in turn reflects the extent of convergence (divergence) among the countries. 





5.7. CLUSTER RESULTS AFTER ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
This section makes brief references to the cluster results after the Asian financial 
crisis. The sub-period 1998-2000 is assessed.  
 
Table 5.19: Post Crisis Proximity Matrix (1998-2000) 
 
Proximity Matrix
.000 .738 1.205 1.326 1.594 4.630 2.318 1.847 3.138 .386 .482
.738 .000 2.085 1.333 .687 2.773 .872 1.140 2.305 .539 .326
1.205 2.085 .000 .759 2.308 6.392 3.752 3.207 4.846 1.663 1.534
1.326 1.333 .759 .000 1.660 5.743 3.122 3.090 3.749 1.285 1.506
1.594 .687 2.308 1.660 .000 2.131 .472 .432 1.559 1.802 1.082
4.630 2.773 6.392 5.743 2.131 .000 1.619 1.865 3.583 4.803 3.806
2.318 .872 3.752 3.122 .472 1.619 .000 .529 1.777 2.079 1.159
1.847 1.140 3.207 3.090 .432 1.865 .529 .000 1.813 2.239 1.385
3.138 2.305 4.846 3.749 1.559 3.583 1.777 1.813 .000 3.366 2.991
.386 .539 1.663 1.285 1.802 4.803 2.079 2.239 3.366 .000 .289













1:Japan 2:S. Korea3:Hong Kong4:Singapore5:Malaysia 6:Indonesia 7:Philippines 8:Thailand 9:China 10:Australia
11:New
Zealand
 Squared Euclidean Distance
This is a dissimilarity matrix  
 
From Table 5.19, the most convergent pair of economies (based on the smallest pair-
wise distance) is still Australia and New Zealand. They were being combined as stage 
1 of the Agglomeration Schedule (see Table 5.20). The second cluster was that 
between Malaysia and Thailand. This is followed by South Korea and Australia. Both 
Malaysia and Thailand, and South Korea and Australia were therefore joined in stages 
2 and 3 of the Agglomeration Schedule. 










In stage 4 of the Agglomeration Schedule, the Philippines was merged to the cluster 
with Malaysia and Thailand. Japan and South Korea were joined in stage 5, while 
Hong Kong was combined with Singapore in stage 6. Japan was considered with 
Hong Kong at stage 7, and Malaysia with China at stage 8. Finally, Indonesia is being 
considered into a cluster with Malaysia at stage 9.  
 




In the earlier cluster results, Indonesia was joined with Philippines to form a cluster. 
But post-crisis (i.e. between 1998-2000), Indonesia has emerged the most divergent 
economy. She was last to be considered into a cluster. This result is not surprising. 
Indonesia’s economic characteristics had suffered a dramatic plunge since the launch 
of the Asian financial crisis. Therefore, the cluster results accurately reflected this 
economic reality. Besides Indonesia, China was the other exceptional economy, 
which was among the last to be joined to a cluster.  
 
The pre-1998 cluster results also indicated South Korea had formed a cluster with 
Malaysia and Thailand. But South Korea diverged from this sub-grouping and joined 
Australia and Japan to form clusters between the sub-period 1998-2000. In addition, 
Hong Kong and Singapore were also being considered into a cluster at a much earlier 




























in slope Cluster  Cluster   
1 10 10 11 0.289 - - 0 0 3 
2 9 5 8 0.432 1.492 - 0 0 4 
3 8 2 10 0.432 1.002 0.672 0 1 5 
4 7 5 7 0.500 1.157 1.154 2 0 8 
5 6 1 2 0.535 1.070 0.925 0 3 7 
6 5 3 4 0.759 1.419 1.326 0 0 7 
7 4 1 3 1.492 1.965 1.384 5 6 10 
8 3 5 9 1.716 1.150 0.585 4 0 9 
9 2 5 6 2.300 1.339 1.165 8 0 10 
10 1 1 5 2.796 1.216 0.907 7 9 0 









Table 5.21: Post-crisis period cluster membership  (1998-2000)  
Cluster Membership
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1
4 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 1
5 5 5 5 4 3 2 2 2
6 6 6 6 5 4 3 3 2
7 7 7 5 4 3 2 2 2
8 5 5 5 4 3 2 2 2
9 8 8 7 6 5 4 2 2
10 9 2 2 1 1 1 1 1

















The 5-clusters solution was identified as the optimum solution. For this solution, the 
cluster members are: 1) Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, 2) Hong 
Kong and Singapore, 3) Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, 4) Indonesia and 5) 




5.8. CONVERGENCE IN ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND POLICIES  
 
5.8.1. Degree of Economic Freedom  
 
One of the greatest challenges in a monetary union participation is the loss of certain 
policy autonomy in responding to asymmetric country shocks. Hence, countries with 
relatively similar policies and preferences are better poised in forming a monetary 
union, holding all else constant. Therefore, in assessing the prospects for monetary 
integration, we not only examine the extent to which the economies are similar in 
outcomes, but in their policies as well.  
 
Although countries can be similar in economic outcomes, they may differ in 
economic policy orientation, for instance, in monetary and fiscal policies, wage and 
price flexibility and market orientation. This study also includes “non-traditional 
factors” in the cluster analysis of economies. The notion of “Economic Freedom” is 
first introduced and followed by an explanation of the various tenets in the 
construction of this index. 









Economic freedom is defined as the absence of government coercion or constraint on 
the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent 
necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself. In essence, economically 
freer markets will rely more on markets and less on government to answer the basic 
economic questions of what and how goods are produced and who will consume them 
(Gwartney and Lawson, 1996). In an economically free society, the fundamental 
function of government is the protection of private property and the provision of a 
stable infrastructure for a voluntary exchange system. Governments promote 
economic freedom when they provide these structures. 
 
It is important to distinguish between economic freedom and political freedom. 
Countries with substantial economic freedom – freedom of exchange, freedom of 
resource use, protection of property rights, and consumer choice, could have limited 
political freedom. Hong Kong and Singapore64, for instance, illustrate this point 
(Rating Global Economic Freedom, p186). 
 
As such, a political less free country does not prelude it from being an economically 
free society, in the sense that the economic questions of what and how goods are 
produced and who will consume them is largely determined by the market.  
 
Therefore, the Index of Economic Freedom65 is a means to infer the extent of 
country’s similarity in market approach and orientation. This in turn has a bearing on 
the function of the market mechanism (e.g. wage and price flexibility) in 
macroeconomic adjustment, which affects the costs of monetary union participation. 
For instance, the costs of participating in a monetary union would be higher if the 
adjustments in wages and prices are made difficult with structural rigidities. The next 
section investigates the degree of economic freedom in the countries under study. 
                                                 
64 In the case of Singapore, although it has a relatively large government-linked sector compared to 
economically free countries like Hong Kong and the U.S.A, it is important to note that the answers to 
the questions of what and how to produce is largely determined by the market. In addition, the Index of 
Economic freedom measures the overall degree of economic freedom in ten areas: such as fiscal 
burden, trade policy, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investments, 
wages and prices, property rights etc. Therefore, in the overall, Singapore could fare relatively better in 
the aggregate degree of economic freedom, contrary to prima facie belief.  
65 The Economic freedom Index complies 10 policy measures of economic freedom covering 140 
countries. It is not easy to find a consistent Index that covers so many countries that can be used in the 









5.8.2. Components of Economic Freedom  
 
Several authors studied a number of independent economic variables to measure the 
Index of Economic Freedom. Among the more comprehensive studies were the ones 
by O’Driscoll, Holmes and O'Grady (2002). The authors identified and studied fifty 
independent economic variables in measuring the Index of Economic Freedom. These 
economic variables fall under ten broad categories of: (1) trade policy, (2) fiscal 
burden of government, (3) government intervention in the economy, (4) monetary 
policy, (5) capital flows and foreign investment, (6) banking and finance, (7) wages 
and prices, (8) property rights, (9) regulation, and (10) black market activity. 
 
O’Driscoll, Holmes and O'Grady (2002) ranked countries of the world in various 
areas of economic freedom. Based on these rankings, we cluster the Asia-Pacific 
economies to assess their degree of similarity in economic freedom.  
 
Table 5.22: Proximity Matrix in Economic Freedom, 1997 
 
.008 .087 .062 .116 .149 .132 .013 .496 .002 .013 .013
.008 .149 .116 .062 .087 .074 .001 .377 .002 .042 .042
.087 .149 .002 .405 .465 .434 .167 1.000 .116 .033 .033
.062 .116 .002 .349 .405 .377 .132 .911 .087 .019 .019
.116 .062 .405 .349 .002 .001 .052 .132 .087 .207 .207
.149 .087 .465 .405 .002 .001 .074 .101 .116 .250 .250
.132 .074 .434 .377 .001 .001 .063 .116 .101 .228 .228
.013 .001 .167 .132 .052 .074 .063 .349 .005 .052 .052
.496 .377 1.000 .911 .132 .101 .116 .349 .434 .669 .669
.002 .002 .116 .087 .087 .116 .101 .005 .434 .025 .025
.013 .042 .033 .019 .207 .250 .228 .052 .669 .025 .000














1:Japan 2:S. Korea 3:Hong Kong 4:Singapore 5:Malaysia 6:Indonesia 7:Philippines 8:Thailand 9:China 10:Australia 11:New Zealand 12:USA
Squared Euclidean Distance
This is a dissimilarity matrix
 
 
In 1997, New Zealand and the USA emerged the most similar pair of countries in 
overall measure of economic freedom, such as in aspects of trade policy, fiscal 
burden, government intervention and so forth (see Table 5.22). This was followed by 
South Korea and Thailand, and Philippines and Indonesia respectively. On the other 
hand, the outlying country in areas of economic freedom was China. This indicates 
that China differs with other countries in the extent of market freedom and in 
answering the basic questions of what and how to produce and for whom to produce.  
                                                                                                                                            
proxy of similarity in economic policies and orientation. Thus, the Index of Economic freedom acts as 
an useful indicator to compare degrees of economic freedom across countries.    










Table 5.23 reflects the stages of the Agglomeration Schedule in which the countries 
were merged, based on their relative similarities in economic freedom. New Zealand 
and USA were combined in stage 1, while South Korea and Thailand in stage 2. 
Indonesia and Philippines were joined at stage 3, and Malaysia and Indonesia were 
considered at stage 4. Japan and Australia joined in stage 5. Hong Kong was 
combined with Singapore at stage 6, and Japan with South Korea in stage 7 of the 
Agglomeration Schedule. Hong Kong was considered with New Zealand and Japan is 
in stages 8 and 9 respectively. 
 
 
Table 5.23: Agglomeration Schedule for Similarity in 1997 Economic Freedom 
 
 
The slope statistics indicates that 5-clusters is an optimal solution for 1997 economic 
freedom (see Table 5.23). Under a 5-clusters solution, the clusters are namely: 1) 
Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Australia; 2) Hong Kong and Singapore; 3) 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines; 4) China; and 5) New Zealand and the USA (see 
Table 5.24).  
 
 
Figure 5.5 reflected the graphic representation or tree diagram of how the countries 
were combined in forming clusters. Basically, the information for combining the 


























in slope Cluster  Cluster   
1 11 11 12 .000 - - 0 0 8 
2 10 2 8 .001 - - 0 0 7 
3 9 6 7 .001 1 - 0 0 4 
4 8 5 6 .001 1 1 0 3 10 
5 7 1 10 .002 2 2 0 0 7 
6 6 3 4 .002 1 0.5 0 0 8 
7 5 1 2 .007 3.5 3.5 5 2 9 
8 4 3 11 .026 3.71 1.06 6 1 9 
9 3 1 3 .074 2.85 0.77 7 8 11 
10 2 5 9 .117 1.58 0.55 4 0 11 
11 1 1 5 .307 2.62 1.66 9 10 0 










Table 5.24: Cluster membership for similarity in Economic Freedom, 1997 
 Clusters
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1
4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 1
5 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 2 2
6 6 6 5 5 4 3 3 2 2
7 7 6 5 5 4 3 3 2 2
8 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
9 8 7 6 6 5 4 4 3 2
10 9 8 7 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 10 9 8 7 6 5 2 1 1




















Dendrogram Map in Similarity of Economic Freedom, 1997 
 
 










5.8.3. Combining Economic Freedom and Nominal, Real and Structural Variables 
 
In Section 5.5.1, the nominal, real and structural variables were used in the clustering 
of countries. In Section 5.8.2, the clustering analysis was based on the degree of 
economic freedom.  In this section, we conduct a cluster analysis combining all the 
variables, i.e. real, nominal, structural variables together with the degree of economic 
freedom. 
 
Table 5.25: Proximity Matrix of Combined Variables 
Proximity Matrix
.000 1.590 1.718 2.076 2.319 4.030 3.381 2.470 4.913 .605 .643 .810
1.590 .000 2.614 1.704 .646 1.186 1.571 .732 1.997 1.212 1.479 2.006
1.718 2.614 .000 1.395 3.348 5.149 4.372 3.574 5.820 1.904 1.849 2.131
2.076 1.704 1.395 .000 1.832 4.528 4.829 2.716 5.333 2.207 2.396 2.852
2.319 .646 3.348 1.832 .000 1.190 1.973 .424 1.227 2.436 2.515 3.430
4.030 1.186 5.149 4.528 1.190 .000 .701 .770 .885 3.036 3.047 3.910
3.381 1.571 4.372 4.829 1.973 .701 .000 1.696 1.696 2.302 2.044 2.975
2.470 .732 3.574 2.716 .424 .770 1.696 .000 1.201 2.451 2.517 3.279
4.913 1.997 5.820 5.333 1.227 .885 1.696 1.201 .000 4.828 4.882 5.964
.605 1.212 1.904 2.207 2.436 3.036 2.302 2.451 4.828 .000 .173 .178
.643 1.479 1.849 2.396 2.515 3.047 2.044 2.517 4.882 .173 .000 .337














1:Japan 2:S. Korea3:Hong Kong4:Singapore5:Malaysia6:Indonesia7:Philippines8:Thailand 9:China 10:Australia
11:New
Zealand 12:USA
 Squared Euclidean Distance
This is a dissimilarity matrix  
 
 
The proximity matrix shows that Australia and New Zealand were most similar (see 
Table 5.25) and merged as a cluster in stage 1 of the Agglomeration Schedule. This is 
followed by Australia and the U.S.A in stage 2, and Malaysia and Thailand in stage 3. 
In stage 4, Japan is joined with the grouping of Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.A. 
The countries’ order of merging is not different from the results found in Table 5.9, 
although the Agglomeration coefficients are different. This is because the addition of 
the Economic Freedom variable to the existing 10 variables of nominal, real and 
structural indicators, makes no significant difference to the clustering order, given that 
all variables are equally weighted for a start. Hence, the variable of Economic Freedom 

















Table 5.26: Agglomeration Schedule of Combined Variables 
 
 
The slope and acceleration statistics of the Agglomeration coefficients show that the 6-
clusters is unequivocally the best solution. This is represented by the following clusters:  
1)  Australia, New Zealand, United States and Japan; 2) South Korea, Malaysia and 




Table 5.27: Cluster Membership of Combined Variables 
Cluster Membership
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 1
5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
6 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 2 2
7 7 7 7 6 5 5 4 2 2
8 8 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
9 9 8 8 7 6 5 4 2 2
10 10 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 10 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1












































in slope Cluster  Cluster   
1 11 10 11 .173 - - 0 0 2 
2 10 10 12 .257 1.486 - 1 0 4 
3 9 5 8 .424 1.645 1.111 0 0 5 
4 8 1 10 .686 1.618 0.981 0 2 10 
5 7 2 5 .689 1.004 0.621 0 3 9 
6 6 6 7 .701 1.017 1.013 0 0 7 
7 5 6 9 1.291 1.842 1.810 6 0 9 
8 4 3 4 1.395 1.081 0.587 0 0 10 
9 3 2 6 1.423 1.020 0.944 5 7 11 
10 2 1 3 2.142 1.505 1.476 4 8 11 
11 1 1 2 3.301 1.541 1.024 10 9 0 









5.8.4. 2001 Economic Freedom Similarity  
 
In 2001, the most similar pair of countries in economic freedom was China and 
Indonesia (see Table 5.28). This was followed by South Korea and Thailand and 
Malaysia and Philippines, and so forth. (see Table 5.29). On the other hand, the most 
exceptional country was Hong Kong. Hence, she was last to be joined into a cluster. 
The mapping is presented in Figure 5.6. 
 
One observes from the above that country groupings in economic freedom can vary 
with time. This is especially evident during times of rapid market liberalizations and 
reforms. This only goes to show that the countries are dynamic and their pace of 
economic liberalization and market orientation differs. Eventually, countries’ 
synchronization in economic policy reduces the conflict of policy divergence and 
increases their likelihood for monetary union suitability.   
 
Table 5.28: Proximity Matrix in Economic Freedom, 2001 
 
.008 .111 .049 .178 .444 .198 .004 .444 .004 .024 .018
.008 .178 .097 .111 .334 .126 .000 .334 .024 .060 .049
.111 .178 .012 .571 1.000 .605 .160 1.000 .071 .032 .040
.049 .097 .012 .415 .790 .444 .083 .790 .024 .004 .008
.178 .111 .571 .415 .060 .000 .126 .060 .239 .334 .309
.444 .334 1.000 .790 .060 .049 .360 .000 .538 .676 .640
.198 .126 .605 .444 .000 .049 .143 .049 .261 .360 .334
.004 .000 .160 .083 .126 .360 .143 .360 .018 .049 .040
.444 .334 1.000 .790 .060 .000 .049 .360 .538 .676 .640
.004 .024 .071 .024 .239 .538 .261 .018 .538 .008 .004
.024 .060 .032 .004 .334 .676 .360 .049 .676 .008 .000














1:Japan 2:S. Korea 3:Hong Kong 4:Singapore 5:Malaysia 6:Indonesia 7:Philippines 8:Thailand 9:China 10:Australia 11:New Zealand 12:USA
 Squared Euclidean Distance
This is a dissimilarity matrix  
 
 


























in slope Cluster  Cluster   
1 11 6 9 .000 - - 0 0 9 
2 10 2 8 .000 - - 0 0 7 
3 9 5 7 .000 - - 0 0 9 
4 8 11 12 .000 - - 0 0 6 
5 7 1 10 .004 - - 0 0 7 
6 6 4 11 .006 1.5 - 0 4 8 
7 5 1 2 .014 2.33 1.56 5 2 10 
8 4 3 4 .028 2 0.86 0 6 10 
9 3 5 6 .055 1.96 0.98 3 1 11 
10 2 1 3 .064 1.16 0.60 7 8 11 
11 1 1 5 .447 6.98 6.00 10 9 0 









The slope statistics indicates that 2-clusters is an optimal solution for 2001 economic 
freedom (see Table 5.29). Under a 2-clusters solution, the clusters are namely: 1) 
Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and the 
USA; and 2) Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and China (see Table 5.30). 
 
 
Table 5.30: Cluster Membership for Similarity in Economic Freedom, 2001 
 Clusters 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1
4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 1
5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 2
6 6 6 6 6 6 5 4 3 2
7 7 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 2
8 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
6 6 6 6 6 6 5 4 3 2
9 8 7 7 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 9 8 8 7 4 3 2 2 1




















Dendrogram Map in Similarity of Economic Freedom, 2001 
 
 









5.9. An Overall Evaluation - Implications for Regional Monetary Integration 
 
This chapter serves to identify regional convergent clusters across Europe and Asia-
Pacific, as a fundamental economic basis for successful monetary unification. The 
chapter provided an application of the Cluster Analysis to segregate regional 
economies into relatively convergent (similar) sub-groupings based on a set of 
economic characteristics. The convergence or divergence of countries’ economic 
characteristics would act as a catalyst or impediment to the process of regional 
monetary integration. Fundamentally, the move towards European monetary union 
was based on several pre-selected convergence characteristics.  
 
In using the Agglomerative Cluster technique, this chapter allowed a joint assessment 
of macroeconomic indicators in a novel way. The existing empirical literature, 
notably based on the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory, only allowed one 
criterion (for e.g. the symmetry of economic shocks, extent of labor mobility, 
examination of economic structure) to be examined at one point in time, which limits 
its practical utility. This led many authors to conclude that the OCA empirics based 
on a single criterion (or the separate assessment of criteria) give rise to a somewhat 
disjointed feel.  
 
The Cluster Analysis methodology displays innovativeness in simultaneously 
assessing all criteria, and hence overcomes the limitations of existing empirical 
approaches. Furthermore, the cluster technique allowed complex information to be 
synthesized for creating a typology of countries with similar patterns without 
imposing any restrictions ex-ante. The economic data in the study has been 
standardized, for which the ‘distance’ measure was computed and the clusters 
identified.  
 
Based on the Maastricht Treaty convergence characteristics of inflation, interest and 
exchange rates, government deficit and indebtedness, the chapter first identified 
groups of similar EU members for monetary union. In terms of these convergence 
characteristics, the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of European (EU) members were 
determined. This study found the existence of a natural ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ group 
of economies even before the formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). 









The core group of EU economies comprised: Germany, France, Austria and 
Netherlands. 
 
As a logical extension, this study assessed the Asia-Pacific region based on the EMU 
convergence criteria; as a first basis of selection. However, the sufficiency of the 
EMU convergence characteristics was put into question. This study discovered that 
the Maastricht Treaty convergence characteristics were insufficient in delineating 
prospective monetary union members because countries with fundamentally different 
development stages were lumped together (for instance, Malaysia and New Zealand). 
This suggested that convergence criteria would have to go beyond the Maastricht 
Treaty convergence criteria for successful and lasting monetary union to take place. 
This is especially so for diverse regions such as Asia. These findings have 
implications for the selection of prospective members for monetary union. If the 
EMU criteria were deemed insufficient, what other criteria would be sufficient? 
 
 
This study included the real and structural variables, beyond the EMU convergence 
criteria, where several clusters were statistically identified. Among the exceptional 
observations were: South Korea joined to Malaysia and Thailand as a group for cluster 
solutions of six and below, and that of Hong Kong and Singapore not being a natural 
cluster.  
 
Overall, three preliminary clusters in the Asia-Pacific region appeared better poised for 
monetary integration on the basis of their economic similarity. These clusters are 
namely: 1) Australia and New Zealand, 2) Malaysia and Thailand, and 3) Indonesia and 
the Philippines. These three groupings had remained clustered throughout most of the 
analysis. However, when assessed on the similarity of economic and regulatory 
policies, the identified clusters did not match the earlier mentioned clusters. For 
example, although Australia and New Zealand appeared similar in their economic 
characteristics and have high bilateral trade intensity, however they did not ‘matched’ 
in their areas of economic freedom and policy preferences. 
 
In Chapter 4, we observed that the high trade intensity pairs were 1) Hong Kong and 
China, 2) Singapore and Malaysia, and 3) Australia and New Zealand. When 









comparing the high trade clusters and the economically similar clusters, 1) Hong Kong 
and China, and 2) Singapore and Malaysia did not also seem to be compatible in their 
economic characteristics and areas of economic freedom. Therefore, no ‘champion’ 
cluster has emerged that were consistently similar in their economic characteristics, 
policies of economic freedom as well as enjoy high trade intensity.   
 
Given East Asia’s case, it is definitely justifiable that prospective monetary union 
should at least be based on a two-speed approach. This argument is consonant with the 
cost of successful monetary union being reduced with the degree of members’ 
similarity. The policy implication is that regional economies should concentrate on 
greater economic linkages and integration preceding monetary union. Although some 
authors (e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1996 and 1998) have attempted to downplay the 
importance of a country’s initial position prior to entry into a monetary union, by 
arguing that ideally, the ex-post would take care of itself, this argument is naïve in the 
presence of structural rigidities and the economic costs and political strain of sustaining 
a largely asymmetric union.  








CHAPTER 6:  
 
EMPIRICAL STUDY - PART II 
TESTS OF OCA CRITERIA 
 
 
This chapter empirically assesses the suitability of East Asia for a regional monetary 
union, using the theory of the Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) as a framework for 
preliminary discussions. In addition, it extends the existing OCA literature in various 
ways, particularly in the section on the nature of economic shocks, and in providing 
additional perspectives to the other sections as well. The theory of the OCA seeks to 
determine the optimal domains of a currency area, based on several key criteria. 
However, much of the empirical OCA literature has focused a great deal on the 
symmetry of shocks, as an argument in favor (disfavor) of monetary union. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that this is only a sufficient condition in the 
decision towards monetary union, which would also depend on other crucial factors, 
such as the convergence of economic policies and outcomes, geographic proximity, 
historical ties, as well as the political will behind such integration. In order to be 
comprehensive, this chapter also provides a section in analyzing the nature of 
economic shocks in East Asia, as part fulfillment of an examination of the OCA 
conditions. In particular, the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) approach has 
been used to assess the nature of the underlying shocks. This chapter also provides 
alternative insights based on existing findings, and their resulting implications for 
future studies. In addition, this chapter conducts related tests along the key aspects of 
the OCA theory to examine the extent to which these criteria are met in Asia.  
 
 
6.1. IS EAST ASIA AN OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA? 
 
The traditional theory of the optimum currency areas focuses on a set of factors that 
should make monetary union among any groups of countries more or less desirable. 
These factors include: the extent of intra-regional factor (notably, labor) mobility, the 
openness of economies to international trade, diversification in trade and the 
symmetry/ asymmetries of macroeconomic shocks (see e.g. Mundell, 1961; 








Mckinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969). This chapter shall examine these factors in turn. The 
extent of intra-region labor mobility is first examined.  
 
 
6.1.1. Intra-Labor Mobility  
 
Mundell (1961) views the availability of (perfect) labor mobility as a means to replace 
the flexibility of exchange rates in cushioning idiosyncratic shocks and in promoting 
external or balance of payments adjustments. The comprehensiveness of data in 
relation to the extent of labor mobility in East Asia is relatively limited (see also Goto 
and Hamada, 1994). But one could use the dispersion (variability) in unemployment 
rates as an indicator of labor mobility; a lower dispersion is taken to mean a higher 
degree of labor mobility and adjustment, and vice versa. In addition, the kinds of 
labor policy with regards to minimum wage and migration could also be used to infer 




Unemployment Dispersion in East Asia, 1992-1997 (percent) 
 
 Japan Korea Hong Kong Singapore Malaysia Philippines Thailand China 
Average  2.90 2.38   2.35  2.68  2.90  8.27  1.22  2.77 
Median  3.05  2.40  2.10  2.70  2.85  8.40  1.20  2.85 
 Maximum  3.40  2.80  3.20  3.00  3.70  8.90  1.50  3.00 
 Minimum  2.20  2.00  1.90  2.40  2.50  7.40  0.90  2.30 
 Std. Dev.  0.47  0.34  0.53  0.19  0.44  0.54  0.22  0.28 
Min. Wage 
Policy 
Yes Yes No No No* Yes Yes No 
  Source: World Development Indicators, 2000. 
*Country has sectoral minimum wage but no minimum wage. This implies that a minimum wage policy 
exists in some sectors of the economy.   
 
 
In the aspect of unemployment rate, Thailand seemed to have experienced the lowest 
rate over the recent period 1992-97. The low average unemployment rate in Thailand 
could be due to the rapid expansion of the Thai economy before the commencement 
of the Asian crisis in mid-97. On the other hand, Singapore seemed to exhibit the 
lowest variability in unemployment rates. The low variability of unemployment rates 
could reflect the relative ease (or flexibility) of labor market adjustment, which is 
facilitated also by the absence of a minimum wage policy in the country.  










Table 6.2:  
Immigration Policy 
 
Country Permanent Admission of Admission of 
 Settlementa migrant workersb dependents of migrantsc 
Indonesia Lower n.a. n.a. 
Malaysia Lower Maintain n.a. 
Philippines Lower n.a. n.a. 
Singapore Higher n.a. n.a. 
Thailand Lower n.a. n.a. 
Hong Kong  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
China              Maintain Maintain Maintain 
Japan              Maintain Higher Maintain 
 Korea            Lower Lower Lower 
Source: International Migration Policies, 1995  
Notes: a) Immigration policy on permanent settlement refers to Government policies 
regarding non-nationals who are permitted to enter for permanent residence, 
generally with a view to eventual citizenship. 
b) Immigration policy on admission of migrant workers refers to Government 
policies concerning those migrants who have been granted temporary work 
permits and are authorized to enter for the purpose of employment. 
 c) Immigration policy on admission of dependants of migrant workers concerns 
Government policies related to the entry of dependants (i.e., nuclear or extended 
family members accompanying or joining a primary migrant) of migrants who 
have been granted work permits. 
d) The status of Lower, Maintain or Higher refer to that particular aspect (e.g. 
permanent settlement) of immigration policy in 1995 relative to that in 1990, or 




With regards to the labor policies pertaining to immigration and emigration, it can be 
inferred from Table 6.2 that Singapore adopts a relatively open policy towards 
encouraging permanent settlement, while other regional economies are limiting 
immigration into their countries. Nevertheless, one observes from Table 6.3 that most 
of the regional economies do not intervene much in the emigration of their population.  








Table 6.3:  
Emigration Policy  
 
Country Emigration Policy encouraging Policies favoring the 
 Policya Return of nationalsb integration of  non-nationalsc
Indonesia No intervention n.a. n.a. 
Malaysia No intervention No Yes 
Philippines No intervention No No 
Singapore No intervention No No 
Thailand Maintain n.a. n.a. 
China Maintain No No 
Japan  No intervention No No 
Korea             Higher No No 
Source: International Migration Policies, 1995  
Notes: a) Emigration policy refers to Government policies towards nationals leaving for 
residence outside the country. 
b) Policy encouraging the return of nationals refers to Government policies encouraging 
the return of nationals who have emigrated. 
 c) Policy favoring the integration of non-nationals reflects the existence of Government 
policies specifically aimed at facilitating the integration of migrants and non-nationals 
into the host society. 
d) The status of Maintain or Higher refer to that particular aspect of emigration policy in 




Another way to examine the extent of labor mobility within Asia is to look at the 
proportion of migrant stock in these countries66. As the Asian economies progress 
economically, they begin to face tight labor market conditions and start to import 
more labor to aid economic development. It is commonly recognized that many 
successful economies in Asia, such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan have been 
hosts to a pool of foreign workers from all over Asia. Thus, it is not surprising that 
Singapore for instance, adopts a relatively open policy towards labor immigration.  
 
Abella (1998) reveals that in 1998 there were some 5 million foreign workers in seven 
Asian economies: Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Korea (Table 4). The author also notes that in recent years, the fastest or highest 
growth is in the flows to Malaysia (from Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and 
Thailand); to Thailand (from Burma and Indo-China); to Taiwan (from Thailand, the 
Philippines, and China); to South Korea (from China, the Philippines, Nepal, and 
Bangladesh); and to Singapore (from Hong Kong, China, Indonesia and Sri Lanka).  
 
                                                 
66 See also Goto, J and Hamada, K (1994). 









Estimated Stocks of Foreign Workers in Some East Asian Economies    
       Origin Countries     
Host Labor  Force Total 
Foreign 
workers  Indonesia Philippines Thailand China 
Other 
Asia 
  Country (mil., 1997) 
(including 
illegals, mil.)










            
Malaysia 9.038 1.7   18.8 405 203 60 n.a. n.a. 
           
Thailand 33.56 0.84 2.5 n.a. 2  60 780* 
           
Singapore 1.876 0.45 24.0 50 60 15 46 n.a. 
           
Japan 67.87 1.35 2.0 n.a. 125 50 272 768**
           
Hong    
Kong 3.220 0.368 11.4 20 120 24 29 39 
           
Taiwan 9.432 0.297 3.15 9 84 185 21 n.a.  
           
Korea 21.60 0.210 0.97 10 19 17 77 76 
                 
  Source: Abella (1998) and labour force data from ADB 
  Note: n.a. = not available; * = mostly Burmese; ** = mostly Koreans 
 
 
In addition, the United Nations 1998 Report on International Migration Policies 
records that Singapore and Hong Kong are the largest labour importer in East Asia 
while the Philippines and Indonesia are the primary labour exporters. It is also 
realized from the United Nations 1998 Report that “Hong Kong and Singapore import 
temporary foreign labour as a counter-cyclical measure to mitigate the impact of 




Labour Migration in East Asia, 1997 
Description Countries  GDP per capita, PPP 
  (current international $) 
Labor receiving countries Singapore  28460 
 Hong Kong 24350 
Countries in transition Malaysia 8140 
 Thailand 6690 
Labor sending countries Philippines 3520 
 Indonesia 3490 
 
 








At this juncture, it is noteworthy to mention that despite the apparent mobility of labor 
in East Asia, this flow is largely one-directional; mainly from the less developed to 
the more developed Asian economies. The reverse flow of labor is not prevalent. In 
addition, the flow of labor within Asia also involves mainly unskilled workers. For 
instance, Goto and Hamada (1994) highlights that approximately two-third of the 
foreign workforce into Singapore is unskilled; which is mainly into the construction 
industry or foreign workers as domestic help. This explains the case where lower-
skilled jobs are avoided by the local population in several higher income economies, 
such as in Singapore and Hong Kong.  
 
Another factor that affects the mobility of labor is non-economic, such as, the extent 
of language and cultural barriers. The inability to communicate effectively in foreign 
languages or to adapt to local cultures are sufficient obstacles to labor mobility, even 
with legally and administratively unrestricted cross-border labor mobility. What more 
when languages, dialects and culture are so diverse in Asia, which in turn inhibits the 
willingness to move across the region. In sum, the perfect and free mobility of labor 
across a region, as postulated by Mundell (1961), does not seem to apply to Asia at 




6.1.2. Degree of country openness and size  
 
Mckinnon (1963) recognizes that a country’s degree of openness is another important 
criterion which determines the value of a currency union. Open economies tend to 
prefer fixed currency regimes, since exchange rate changes in such countries are not 
likely to have substantial effects on real competitiveness.  
 
From Table 6.6, it is realized that East Asian countries are generally open economies. 
The exceptionally very open economies of the region are Singapore and Hong Kong; 
with the ratio of trade to GDP of more than twice. Therefore, both these very open 
and also small economies are most likely to benefit from stable exchange rates with 
their major trading partners.  









Table 6.6:  
Openness of East Asian economies, Trade as percent of GDP 
 
Year China Hong Kong Indonesia Japan S. Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
1990 31.85 260.07 49.06 19.81 59.35 146.96 60.80 396.67 75.78 
1991 35.51 270.72 49.89 18.28 57.712 159.31 62.18 375.74 78.47 
1992 37.46 280.62 52.84 17.47 56.79 150.61 63.15 359.76 77.95 
1993 35.67 274.16 50.52 15.91 55.02 157.94 71.16 354.66 79.37 
1994 48.76 277.89 51.87 15.99 56.78 179.90 73.95 331.36 82.35 
1995 45.67 303.24 53.95 16.77 61.88 192.11 80.53 339.98 90.16 
1996 39.90 285.67 52.26 18.90 63.11 181.76 89.80 328.05 84.44 
1997 41.37 268.44 55.99 20.38 70.47 185.66 108.25 316.95 94.19 
1998 39.20 257.51 96.18 19.51 85.98 209.49 110.93 293.78 101.55 
1999 41.18 261.38 62.36 18.41 77.81 218.25 102.77 313.59 104.30 
2000 49.09 295.25 69.24 n.a. 87.17 229.84 106.47 341.35 126.00 
Ave. 40.51 275.90 58.56 18.14 66.55 182.89 84.54 341.08 90.41 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-Rom, 2002 
*Trade refers to imports and exports. 
 
 
In addition, chapter 4 points out that the East Asian economies are relatively open in 
trade to each other. For instance, the share of exports (imports) to (from) the region 
accounts for more than 50% of trade of the respective economies, and this averages 
close to 60% for the region as a whole in the mid-1990s. Therefore, the high degree of 
trade integration in East Asia also provides a good economic justification to stabilize 




6.1.3. Degree of product and trade diversification  
 
Kenen (1969) points out that the impact of asymmetric shocks on the economy 
depends very much on the degree of diversification of the country’s production and 
trade structures. This is to be seen in the context where a diversified economy is less 
likely to be affected by exchange rate changes, since independent shocks hitting the 
different economic sectors tend to cancel each other out.   
 








Table 6.7: Exports Shares by SITIC Section (%) 
 
Country Year  Machinery   Other  Agricultural Minerals  Others* 
    Manufactures Manufactures  products Fuels    
Japan 1992 71.45 19.76 0.57 0.51 1.59 
  1995 70.15 19.30 0.49 0.62 2.14 
  1998 69.02 19.33 0.53 0.38 3.20 
 2001 66.91 19.54 0.76 0.44 12.35 
 Ave. 69.38 19.48 0.58 0.48 4.82 
Korea 1992 42.46 44.91 2.85 2.27 0.31 
  1995 52.48 32.81 2.25 1.98 1.95 
  1998 49.15 31.12 1.99 3.47 5.47 
 2001 57.43 25.59 1.68 5.34 9.96 
 Ave. 50.38 33.60 2.19 3.26 4.42 
Hong Kong 1992 6.64 16.31 0.62 0.23 75.16 
  1995 5.07 10.49 0.45 0.05 83.07 
  1998 3.45 9.42 0.27 0.05 86.21 
 2001 2.20 7.35 0.17 0.06 90.22 
 Ave. 4.34 10.89 0.37 0.09 83.66 
Taiwan 1992 41.02 48.05 3.85 0.65 0.15 
  1995 48.14 39.08 3.44 0.70 0.08 
  1998 54.11 36.54 1.47 0.71 0.12 
 2001 56.54 31.93 1.41 1.46 8.66 
 Ave. 49.95 38.90 2.54 0.88 2.25 
Singapore 1992 37.10 7.18 2.14 12.97 36.13 
 1995 40.44 4.93 1.20 8.19 41.53 
  1998 39.41 5.21 1.06 7.33 42.79 
 2001 31.35 5.83 0.88 9.96 51.98 
 Ave. 37.07 5.78 1.32 9.61 43.10 
Malaysia 1992 43.73 19.47 10.40 12.94 0.78 
 1995 55.14 17.55 9.49 6.99 1.31 
 1998 59.21 16.99 9.94 6.16 0.95 
 2001 60.62 15.99 6.05 9.72 7.62 
 Ave. 54.67 17.50 8.97 8.95 2.66 
Indonesia 1992 3.88 43.45 10.14 33.19 0.47 
 1995 8.43 40.32 11.37 25.34 0.10 
  1998 9.53 31.59 11.25 19.30 16.42 
 2001 16.17 36.38 8.87 25.34 13.24 
 Ave. 9.50 37.93 10.40 25.79 7.55 
Philippines 1992 17.00 23.85 17.11 2.42 31.89 
 1995 22.12 19. 62 12.75 1.51 39.29 
  1998 72.10 17.20 6.87 0.41 51.09 
 2001 74.25 16.83 5.56 0.85 2.51 
 Ave. 46.36 19.29 10.57 1.29 31.19 
Thailand 1992 26.69 38.15 26.04 0.98 1.27 
  1995 33.81 36.28 19.26 0.72 1.08 
  1998 40.24 28.46 18.05 1.56 4.34 
 2000** 41.98 26.95 15.34 2.79 12.94 
 Ave. 35.68 32.46 19.67 1.51 4.90 
Source: Key indicators of Developing Asian & Pacific Countries (2003) 
*Re-exports share & unclassified goods. ** Data for 2001 not available. 










It is observed that the East Asian economies have a relatively small primary sector 
(agriculture and extractive industries such as oil and coal mining). Primary industries 
tend to be subject to particularly severe supply shocks and are very directly affected 
by changes in world prices. In contrast, the East Asian economies, with the exception 
of Hong Kong, are heavily concentrated in manufacturing exports, reflecting the 
largely manufacturing export-driven nature of the East Asian economies. The 
manufacturing exports range from the lower value-added, such as textiles, apparel, 
leather, and footwear, to the higher value-added, such as, telecommunications and 
electric machinery and more recently office and computing machinery respectively.  
 
Hong Kong sticks out again as being markedly different from all the other economies 
in the region. She is typically characterised as an entrepot and services center, due in 
large part to very low levels of trade protection and a well-developed financial and 
commercial infrastructure that supports trading and services. The important role of 
entrepot trade is further highlighted with the proportion at 87 percent of national 
output in 1999. 
 
On the whole, the East Asia economies do not appear to be particularly well-
diversified in trade and production structure, as one would desire from the optimum 
currency area perspective. In general, the economies’ external trade, specifically, the 
exports are particularly dominated by machinery manufactures. Furthermore, the 
dominance of manufacturing exports in several key industries, such as 
telecommunications and electric machinery, could subject these economies 
particularly vulnerable to the vast changes in global demand for these products. 
Likewise, on the other spectrum of external trade, the imports of the East Asian 
economies, including Hong Kong, are predominated by manufacturing commodities 
















Table 6.8: Imports Shares by SITIC Section (%) 
 
Country Year  Machinery   Other  Agricultural Minerals  Others* 
    Manufactures Manufactures Products Fuels    
Japan 1992 16.15 23.85 16.16 22.78 21.06 
  1995 22.53 26.45 15.33 16.06 19.63 
  1998 26.62 25.57 14.95 15.44 17.42 
 2001 27.24 24.67 12.49 20.16 15.44 
 Ave. 23.13 25.13 14.73 18.61 18.38 
Korea 1992 35.41 20.92 5.64 18.02 20.01 
  1995 36.56 23.88 5.07 14.17 20.32 
  1998 33.45 18.61 5.57 19.62 22.75 
 2001 33.93 19.88 5.39 24.23 16.57 
 Ave. 34.83 20.82 5.41 19.01 19.91 
Hong Kong 1992 31.12 48.19 6.49 1.93 12.27 
  1995 36.49 44.84 5.35 1.90 11.42 
  1998 38.87 44.54 5.32 1.73 9.54 
 2001 43.64 42.60 4.31 2.02 7.43 
 Ave. 37.53 45.04 5.36 1.89 10.16 
Taiwan 1992 39.32 23.58 4.97 7.79 24.34 
  1995 40.17 25.37 4.76 6.89 22.81 
  1998 46.11 21.58 4.11 6.41 21.79 
 2001 47.94 19.87 3.89 11.01 17.29 
 Ave. 43.38 22.60 4.43 8.02 21.55 
Singapore 1992 47.93 22.77 6.07 12.75 10.48 
 1995 57.88 20.75 4.53 8.06 8.78 
  1998 60.46 18.85 4.32 8.03 8.34 
 2001 59.67 16.26 3.63 12.58 7.86 
 Ave. 56.48 19.65 4.63 10.35 8.86 
Malaysia 1992 54.39 21.36 6.08 5.24 12.93 
 1995 60.05 18.76 4.54 3.06 13.59 
 1998 63.05 16.19 5.33 2.24 13.19 
 2001 60.55 16.27 5.00 4.18 14.00 
 Ave. 59.51 18.14 5.23 3.68 13.42 
Indonesia 1992 42.85 21.93 5.54 7.71 21.97 
 1995 39.36 18.57 7.58 6.90 27.59 
  1998 28.97 15.97 8.03 7.84 39.19 
 2001 22.19 12.33 6.80 13.54 45.14 
 Ave. 33.34 17.20 6.98 8.99 33.47 
Philippines 1992 28.56 18.18 8.30 13.99 30.97 
 1995 32.43 17.61 8.14 9.23 32.59 
  1998 57.47 15.86 8.54 7.10 11.03 
 2001 52.14 16.26 8.20 11.46 11.94 
 Ave. 42.65 16.97 8.29 10.44 21.63 
Thailand 1992 41.83 25.26 5.41 8.28 19.22 
  1995 47.40 25.08 3.65 6.84 17.03 
  1998 43.64 25.23 5.16 8.21 17.76 
 2001 45.10 21.87 4.49 12.13 16.41 
 Ave. 44.49 24.36 4.67 8.86 17.60 
Source: Key indicators of Developing Asian & Pacific Countries (2003)   
*Re-exports share & unclassified goods   









7.1.4. Similarity in Production and Industrial Structure 
 
The industrial and production structure is an important aspect in the decision to form a 
monetary union. Countries with similar production and industrial structures are 
thought to be less prone to sector-specific asymmetric shocks, thus negating the need 
for the exchange rate as an adjustment tool between the countries. On the other hand, 
when the composition of production differs extensively between the countries, 
idiosyncratic shocks are likely to affect them more frequently and hence, place a 
premium on retaining the exchange rate as a policy instrument. As such, it is desirable 
that the prospective members of a monetary union exhibit production and industrial 
structures that are relatively similar.  
 
 
Table 6.9:  
Production by broad industry, 1997 
 
Activity \ Country  Japan HongKong Korea Singapore Taiwan Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Primary Activities 1.95 0.13 5.77 0.21 3.21 29.94 16.44 19.4 11.67 
Manufacturing 24.23 6.11 28.89 23.86 27.67 26.79 29.91 22.31 29.64 
Public Utilities 2.9 2.17 2.12 1.84 2.39 1.25 3.09 2.73 2.35 
Construction 9.7 5.44 11.65 8.88 4.39 7.44 4.83 6.45 5.73 
Trade, Hotels & 
Restaurants 12.20 24.42 11.43 19.22 16.64 15.86 14.96 13.10 17.41 
Transport & 
Communication 6.53 8.67 6.56 11.51 6.73 6.14 7.48 4.91 7.75 
Finance & Business 
Services 18.50 24.80 19.13 28.91 20.87 8.66 12.20 4.73 6.69 
Public 
Administration 23.98 28.25 14.46 5.57 18.10 8.92 11.09 26.37 18.76 
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
Notes:  a).  Primary activity refers to agriculture and mining. 
      b). Public Utilities refers to electricity, gas and water. 
      c). Comprehensive data for China is unavailable. 
 
 
An index indicating the degree of similarity or difference in the production and 
industrial structure between countries is next constructed. The Finger-Kreinin 
index is used as a way to calculate the extent of similarity of between the 
production and industrial structures of two countries, a and b respectively, 
according to which the index is defined as:  












{Minimum [sia, sib]} 
 
where sia is the production share of industrial activity of country a and sib is the 
production share of industrial activity of country b. The index selects the lower of 
the two values and sums all the values obtained for each of the activity. An index 
of one indicates perfect similarity between the two economies, and an index of 0 
represents no overlap at all in the production structure of the two countries67.  
 
The index is next calculated on the basis of production activity by broad industrial 
sectors (i.e. agriculture, mining, manufacturing, electricity, construction, trade, 
transport, finance, and public administration services).  
 
Table 6.10:  
Similarity of Production and Industrial Structure 
Country  Japan Hong Kong Korea Singapore Taiwan Indonesia Malaysia Philippines
Hong Kong 0.751        
Korea 0.889 0.654       
Singapore 0.776 0.718 0.775      
Taiwan 0.883 0.751 0.890 0.801     
Indonesia 0.708 0.521 0.764 0.699 0.752    
Malaysia 0.711 0.590 0.829 0.710 0.827 0.867   
Philippines 0.793 0.630 0.772 0.591 0.731 0.811 0.801  
Thailand 0.784 0.645 0.817 0.691 0.858 0.831 0.887 0.778 
Source: Data from ADB Database 
 
 
From Table 6.10, one observes that the lowest degree of production and industrial 
similarity is that between Hong Kong and Indonesia (i.e. least similar), while the 
highest (i.e. least dissimilar) pair consists of Korea and Taiwan, and is followed by 
Malaysia and Thailand respectively. At the same time, the lowest similarity indexes 
are those involving Hong Kong and another country. The city-state of Hong Kong 
sticks out predominantly as a financial and trade sector center. In addition, Taiwan 





                                                 
67  See also Nicolas, F (1999).  








6.2. SIMILARITY IN ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND STRUCTURES 
 
Much of the empirical OCA literature has focused a great deal on the symmetry of 
underlying shocks across countries of a region. Many people tend to think Mundell’s 
(1961) original theory of the OCA stresses the importance of symmetry of shocks as 
the delimiting factor in the ‘optimum’ domain of a currency area. However, Mundell 
(1999) clarifies that underlying his original message is: flexible exchange rates create 
more problems and hence, it is better to rid of them altogether (Economist, Oct 16, 
1999). As such, it is no surprise that these days Mundell (1999) tends to say “he has 
been misunderstood”. 
 
The symmetry of economic shocks among countries of a region is only a sufficient 
condition68. It should therefore not be viewed as the sole condition for forming a 
monetary union. Even if countries experience similar shocks (due perhaps to close 
geographic proximity); there are costs to monetary integration if they all start from 
very different initial positions or structures. There are other important considerations 
that affect the decision towards monetary union formation (besides the symmetry of 
shocks) that will be addressed later.  
 
To be comprehensive, this study also provides a section on the analysis of economic 
shocks across countries of the East Asian region, based on a structural VAR model. 
The next section considers the theoretical framework behind the identification and 
interpretation of the structural shocks. This is followed by an estimation of the types 
of economic shocks affecting regional countries, using the Structural VAR approach. 
 
In addition, this study examines the Variance decomposition results, which provide 
information on the relative importance of each shock in explaining changes in the 
variables. The rationale for so doing is to infer the extent of structural differences in 
countries and possibly underlying policy preferences, which can produce conflicts in 
response to even similar economic shocks. This consideration is especially crucial in 
the absence of sufficient factor mobility or structural flexibility in countries as well as 
the time required for alternative adjustment mechanism to be operational. In this 








regard, it is not only sufficient to assess the symmetry of economic shocks, which has 
been the main focus of some studies (e.g. Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994, 2000), 
while neglecting the underlying structural differences in the economies. The final 
section of this chapter will also deal with the issue of regional adjustment mechanism, 
specifically the flexibility of wages and prices.  
 
 
6.2.1.  Theoretical Framework 
 
The IS-LM and AD-AS frameworks are used to identify and interpret the underlying 
structural shocks. In the IS-LM framework, shocks are divided into goods market (IS), 
money market (LM) and supply (AS) shocks respectively. The IS and LM shocks form 
aggregate demand (AD) shocks. Both AD and AS shocks impact prices and output in 
the AD-AS framework. The intersection of the AD curve and AS (long run) curve give 
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Figure 6.1: AD-AS Equilibrium Framework  
 
The distinguishing feature between AD shocks and AS shocks is their long run impact 
on the natural rate of output. AD shocks are deemed to be transitory in nature and 
have no long run impact on the natural rate of output. AD shocks include IS shocks 
such as changes in consumption and investment expenditure, and LM shocks such as 
changes in prices and money supply. On the other hand, AS shocks are deemed to be 
permanent and have long run impact on the natural rate of output. AS shocks include 
factors such as changes in productivity, technology and etc. 
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         Figure 6.2: Changes in demand factors 
 
Changes in demand (i.e. IS and LM) factors shift the AD curve to the right or left (i.e. 
AD’ and AD”); thus affecting prices and output in the short run. In the long run, 
demand side factors have no impact on the natural rate of output (Y*), except on 
prices, from P* to either P’ or P’’. Conversely, changes in supply factors shift long 
run supply curve (LRAS) to either the right or left and creating a new equilibrium 






As stated earlier, the basic econometric tool used here is a structural VAR model that 
requires theory-based restrictions on the contemporaneous links for the purpose of 
model identification. The IS-LM and AD-AS frameworks provide a theoretical basis 
for identifying the structural (i.e. supply, demand and nominal) shocks. 
 
Identification of Economic Shocks 
 
Consider three structural shocks, IS (real demand), LM (nominal) and supply shocks, 
as sources of variation in the levels of real output, real demand and prices. Let the 
vector X∆  be made up of the change in real output ( ts∆ ), the change in real demand 
( tb∆ ) and the change in price level ( tn∆ ). Each element of X∆  can be expressed as a 
linear combination of current and past structural shocks. Assume that the variables in 
                                                                                                                                            
the suitability of countries for monetary union. 













logarithms are unit root processes, the vector is stationary and can be written as an 
infinite moving average process of the form: 
 
tt LAX εµ )(+=∆    (1) 
 
where µ is a vector of constant terms and  Ai are matrices in the lag operator L. The 
time paths of the effects of the structural shocks on the growth of real output and price 
level are given by the coefficients of the polynomials aij(L) and ε = [εs, εd, εn] is the 
vector of serially uncorrelated structural (supply, real demand and nominal) shocks 
which are serially uncorrelated and have a variance covariance matrix normalized to 
the identity matrix. 
 
In order to identify this model, we first estimate a finite order VAR.  
 
  tktktt eXBXBX +∆++=∆ −− ...11     (2)  
 
where the maximum lag length is chosen such that residuals ite  approximate white 
noise. Since the elements of tX∆  are stationary, the system can be inverted to obtain 
the moving average representation:  
 
tt eLCX )(+µ=∆      (3) 
 
The relationship between the pure and composite innovation is: 
 
tt Ae ε= 0       (4) 
 
 
Using (3) and (4) we can derive (1): 
 
tt eLCX )(+µ=∆  = tt LAALC ε+µ=ε+µ )()( 0   (5) 
 








where 0)()( ALCLA = . The following relationship exists between the variance-
covariance matrices:  
 
Σ=′)( tt eeE        (6) 
 
and from (4) we can derive (7):  
 
  Σ=′=′ε′ε=′ 0000 )()( AAAEAeeE tttt     (7) 
 
 
Since Σ  is a symmetric matrix with known elements (or can be estimated 
consistently), it imposes six restrictions on the matrix of contemporaneous effects 0A , 
which has nine elements. Identifying 0A  requires three additional restrictions so that 
the orthogonal shocks in (4) can be recovered.  
 
The three additional restrictions are based on the long-run neutrality assumptions of 
the IS-LM and AD-AS frameworks. The identifying schemes are that: real demand (IS) 
and nominal (LM) shocks have no long-run impact on changes in real output69, and 
that LM shocks have no long-run impact on changes in real demand70. On the other 
hand, both supply shocks and IS shocks have long run impact on changes in prices.  
 



















































.   (8) 
 
  
Impose the three additional restrictions imply that 0231312 === AAA . From (5), 
)1()1( 0 AAC = and with the triangular structure imposed on )1(A  in (8), we can 
recover the elements of 0A .  
                                                 
69 This is because long-run changes in real output are determined only by supply side factors. 
70 This is because real interest rates are unchanged. Therefore, nominal or LM shocks have no long-run 
impact on changes in real demand. 








6.2.3. Estimation  
 
This section estimates a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) system to distinguish 
the separate contributions of structural shocks, i.e. supply, IS and LM shocks. This 
section considers the identification schemes of Dibooglu and Horvath (1997)71. The 
authors estimated a structural VAR to identify the effects of supply, real fiscal and 
nominal shocks on the variability of real output, real government spending and prices. 
However, this study replaces the ‘government spending’ component with ‘real 
domestic demand’72 and treats shocks to the goods market as IS shocks, rather than 
solely a fiscal shock. 
 
The economic variables considered in recovering the three structural (supply, IS and 
LM) shocks are: real output ( )ts , real domestic demand ( )tb  and price level ( )tn .  The 
measure for real output is real GDP, while the GDP deflator is the measure for the 
price level73. Real domestic demand, which encompasses consumption (C), 
investment (I) and government (G), i.e. C+I+G, is used rather than a particular 
component of demand. In addition, the log differences of the variables are taken, since 
it is the growth rates or changes in the variables that we are referring to. 
 
The countries74 of the East Asian region include: Japan, the NIEs- Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, Asean 4 - Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and 
China. The Australasia countries of Australia and New Zealand are also added to give 
perspectives to the analysis as in Chapter 5. The data are drawn from The World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-ROM. The sample period covers 1967-
199775. It is to be mentioned that annual data is considered in this analysis, as for 
supply shocks to have permanent effects on long run output, a ‘reasonable’ time frame 
would at least be a year. The data is next examined. 
                                                 
71 Basically, the authors appropriately identified supply shocks, real fiscal shocks and nominal shocks 
within a Structural VAR model, and studied the correlations of underlying shocks among the EU 
economies, so as to examine the costs of European monetary unification from an OCA perspective. 
While the authors chose the variable of ‘government spending’ to study the impact of fiscal shocks, this 
study selects the variable of ‘real absorption’ to study the impact of real demand shocks.  
72 This is due to the lesser importance of government spending in the East Asian economies, relative to 
the EU countries. 
73 The base year of the GDP deflator is taken to be 1990. However, for some countries, due to data 
unavailability, other base years have been used. 
74 The inclusion of countries in the study is subject to data availability. 









We have investigated the time series properties of the variables and found that most 
variables in logarithms are I(1) based on the result of the Phillips-Perron and KPSS 
tests76.  For the purpose of uniformity, this study specifies a first-difference, i.e. I(1) 
VAR system, so as to ensure comparable results across the countries and the various 
studies77. In addition, the primary purpose of this section is to derive economic insight 
and content based on a consistent model specification, rather than a focus on technical 
rigor based on different model specifications for forecasting and other purposes.  
Therefore, in order to preserve the symmetry of specification, lags were set at two, as 
the residual diagnostics78 indicate that it is optimal to capture the dynamics for most 
countries.  
 
As a final result of estimation, we recover the underlying (i.e. demand, supply and 
nominal) structural shocks79 and the correlations of these shocks among the countries 
are computed (see also Horvath and Grabowski, 1997). The correlation coefficients of 
the structural shocks are then assessed. First, the Pearson correlation statistic is used 
to test whether the pair-wise correlation is statistically significant at 5% (*) and 1% 
(**) respectively. Second, in assessing the symmetry and asymmetry of correlations 
of structural shocks, this study assumes that if the correlation is positive, the shocks 
are categorized as symmetric and, if the correlation is negative or not statistically 
different from zero, the shocks are categorized as asymmetric80. It is useful to note 
that we focus on positively correlated shocks as in other studies, since the symmetry 
of shocks make candidates more suited for monetary union. The empirical results 
from this methodology are the subject of the next section. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
75 The estimation period ends in 1997 before the Asian financial crisis began, which could skew the 
results.  
76 The results are available upon request. 
77 See studies by Bayoumi, T and Eichengreen, B (1993), 1994) and Horvath, J and Grabowski, R 
(1997) for instance. 
78  The diagnostics tests include the AIC and SBC test statistics. 
79 To verify that the estimated shocks are indeed orthogonal, the expected mean and variances, and co-
variances of the exogenous shocks, were found to be zero, one and zero respectively (results available 
upon request). 
80 Bayoumi, T and Eichengreen, B (1994, 1999), for instance, have used the correlation of the G-3 
nations as a reference value for their correlation of underlying shocks, which is arbitrary. 








6.2.4. Empirical Results 
 
This section presents a preliminary insight into the extent of symmetry of economic 
shocks among countries of this region. Tables 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13 present the 
correlation coefficients of macroeconomic shocks across the East Asian economies, 
with significant positive correlations highlighted81. This study focuses on supply 





Correlations of supply disturbances 
 J SK H S M I P T C A N 
J 1           
SK  0.455** 1          
H 0.018 0.204 1         
S -0.028 0.002 0.107 1        
M -0.158 -0.26 0.264 0.495** 1       
I -0.053 -0.168 0.243 0.388* 0.456** 1      
P 0.167 0.016 0.222 -0.209 0.03 -0.144 1     
T 0.379* 0.083 0.141 0.236 0.169 0.118 0.125 1    
C 0.262 0.196 -0.073 -0.119 -0.283 -0.129 -0.208 0.216 1   
A 0.048 0.107 0.046 0.141 -0.085 -0.066 -0.023 0.187 0.065 1  
N -0.36 -0.365 -0.095 0.056 0.085 -0.002 0.021 -0.325 -0.165 -0.064 1 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 




Correlations of supply disturbances 
 
Comparing with the earlier findings of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994, 1999)82, 
only some of the identified countries in their “Southeast Asian bloc” (i.e. Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia) and “Northeast Asian bloc” (i.e. Japan, South 




                                                 
81 See also Hazel Yuen (2001), “Optimum Currency Areas in East Asia: A Structural VAR Approach” 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin Volume 18(2), Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
82 Based on a bi-variate VAR model. 









This study finds two significant positive correlations within the Southeast Asian bloc, 
namely those between Singapore and Malaysia (0.50), and between Malaysia and 
Indonesia (0.46). In addition, an overlapping sub-group, comprising of Singapore, 
Malaysia and Indonesia had also displayed positively correlated supply disturbances.  
As for the North East bloc, Japan and South Korea continue to display significant 
positive correlations of supply disturbances with each other. At the same time, this 
study discovers that China, Australia and New Zealand, economies excluded in 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994, 1999), had experienced mainly idiosyncratic shocks 
or insignificant correlations with the rest of the East Asian economies. 
 
 
Correlation of real demand (IS) disturbances 
 
In Table 6.12, it is found that real demand shocks continued to be correlated between 
Japan and South Korea and Singapore and Malaysia, the two sub-groupings earlier 
identified under the symmetry of supply shocks. For the rest of East Asia, there 
appeared to be no distinct geographic patterns of symmetric shocks. 
 
 
Table 6.12:  
Correlations of real demand (IS) disturbances 
 J SK H S M I P T C A N 
J 1           
SK  0.371* 1          
H 0.319 0.117 1         
S -0.05 -0.17 0.022 1        
M -0.12 0.016 0.18 0.371* 1       
I -0.01 0.191 -0.19 -0.14 0.199 1      
P 0.474** 0.327* 0.081 0.228 0.087 0.194 1     
T -0.38 0.122 -0.146 -0.29 -0.06 0.31 -0.052 1    
C -0.47 -0.22 -0.283 0.32* -0.09 0.052 -0.081 0.405* 1   
A -0.26 0.09 0.151 -0.28 0.037 0.232 -0.094 0.38 0.021 1  
N 0.364 0.258 -0.025 0.066 -0.03 0.306 0.063 -0.013 0.014 -0.034 1 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 














Correlations of nominal demand (LM) disturbances 
It is observed from Table 6.13 that the nominal shocks of East Asia tend to be more 
symmetric than the supply shocks. In particular, the Asean region, especially 
Malaysia and Singapore, had displayed a more coherent pattern of symmetric nominal 
shocks. At the same time, the nominal shocks of Japan and South Korea and, 
Singapore and Malaysia respectively are also significantly correlated, the groupings 
similar to that identified by the supply disturbances.    
 
Table 6.13: 
Correlations of nominal demand (LM) disturbances 
 J SK H S M I P T C A N 
J 1           
SK  0.428* 1          
H -0.141 0.062 1         
S -0.046 0.041 0.274 1        
M 0.212 0.293 0.413* 0.338* 1       
I 0.2 0.072 0.294 0.496** 0.503** 1      
P 0.163 0.211 0.439** 0.306 0.531** 0.385* 1     
T 0.16 -0.021 0.27 0.375* 0.122 0.151 -0.097 1    
C -0.118 0.138 0.27 0.331* 0.204 0.125 0.248 0.167 1   
A 0.279 0.404* -0.032 0.198 0.187 0.072 0.198 0.086 -0.108 1  
N 0.028 -0.112 0.159 0.103 0.048 -0.021 0.174 0.032 -0.042 0.284 1 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Overall, the results pointed two sub-regional groupings of countries that had 
demonstrated greater symmetry in economic disturbances. These groupings are 
namely: Singapore and Malaysia and, Japan and South Korea. Incidentally, these sub-
groups also represent the Southeast Asian region and the Northeast Asian sub-region 
respectively.  
 
Nevertheless, the results from the symmetry of shocks are suggestive rather than 
definitive, since the symmetry of shocks is only a sufficient condition in the decision 
to form a monetary union.  There are a number of important factors that affect the 
process towards monetary union. Therefore, even if countries face similar shocks, 
they may require different responses arising from differences in starting positions, and 
will face adjustment costs in joining a currency union. Examining the variance 
decompositions results provides a good way to understand the fundamental structural 
differences, and possibly policy preferences and strategies in each of the economies. 











Variance Decomposition Results 
         
 Percentage of Real Output due to Percentage of Real absorption due to Percentage of Price Level due to 
 Supply Shock  IS Shock LM Shock Supply Shock IS Shock  LM Shock Supply Shock  IS Shock LM Shock 
 1 4  1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4  1 4 1 4  1 4 1 4 
JAP 93.2 86.7  2.97 3.56 3.87 9.74 87.6 84.22 0.01 2.64  12.4 13.1 32.0 28.2  32.7 25.2 35.4 46.6 
KOR 13.5 17.7  15.6 27.3 70.8 55 0.35 6.422 65.7 58.8  34 34.7 73.7 45.6  9.92 5.73 16.4 48.7 
HK 88.2 79.6  6.59 13.2 5.21 7.23 73.7 68.19 19.2 23.6  7.03 8.22 0.33 13.3  17.8 25.7 81.9 61.1 
SIN 77.7 70.0  16.0 17.8 6.21 12.2 77.9 79.85 7.35 7.51  14.7 12.6 1.38 7.01  14.7 26.7 83.9 66.3 
MAL 56.7 53.1  6.06 10.2 37.3 36.7 75.9 62.91 6.18 7.53  18 29.6 1.99 7.11  0.05 12.5 98.0 80.4 
IND 80.9 63.9  14.8 15.5 4.34 20.7 0.21 20.4 72.3 49.3  27.5 30.3 6.64 14.0  21.5 18.8 71.9 67.2 
PHI 95.0 79.6  0.65 6.44 4.40 14.0 52.1 63.58 44.5 30.4  3.39 6.02 29.6 28.3  2.65 8.20 67.8 63.5 
THA 97.1 90.6  2.76 6.88 0.1 2.57 58.9 49.99 35.3 30.7  5.83 19.3 14.5 8.24  20.4 23.9 65.1 67.9 
CHI 85.7 82.5  3.88 5.47 10.4 12.1 72.6 74.1 24.3 22.8  3.09 3.14 13.4 49.4  0.87 4.47 85.8 46.1 
AUS 72.2 56.5  17.0 26.0 11.0 17.4 30.7 24.7 68.8 63.1  0.54 12.2 44.0 17.1  2.40 4.90 53.6 78.0 
NZ 87.6 85.2  3.10 4.10 9.40 10.8 93.2 91.5 3.94 3.97  2.85 4.57 37.0 27.0  2.50 3.30 60.5 69.7 
                       









For which shocks are exchange rate adjustments appropriate? 
 
Variance Decomposition Results 
 
 The Variance Decomposition results is a good way to understand the relative 
importance of each shock in explaining the changes in the respective variables, and to 
infer the extent of structural and transmission differences, and policy preferences of 
the economies. The Variance Decomposition results indicate the relative importance 
of each shock in explaining the variability of each indicator. They provide useful 
information on the role played by different structural shocks in explaining the 
variability of the three series at different time horizons. Table 6.14 displays the 
variance decompositions results. The percentage change in real output and price level 
are decomposed to that part attributable to economic shocks at one-year and four-year 
forecast horizons respectively.   
 
How Important are structural disturbances in explaining changes in economic 
activity? 
 
1.Changes in real output 
 
Looking at Table 6.14, supply shocks seem to explain the preponderance of short-run 
(one-year forecast horizon) output movements in most of the East Asian economies. 
On the other hand, supply shocks appear to play a less substantial role in explaining 
output changes in the case of Malaysia, while in the case of South Korea, supply 
shocks account for a relatively limited role in explaining output changes in both the 
short and long run, which are mainly accounted for by nominal shocks. To the extent 
that changes in output are largely driven by supply and real demand (IS) shocks, some 
degree of exchange rate flexibility is desirable. 
 
In addition, the share of supply shocks in explaining output variability in the longer 
run (four-year forecast horizon) seems to vary across countries. For instance, in 
Australia and Indonesia, there appear to be a reasonable shift in the relative weight of 
supply shocks in explaining output fluctuation  (see Table 6.14).  
 









2.Changes in domestic demand 
 
Variance decompositions of changes in domestic demand (absorption) indicate that 
supply shocks explain a large fraction of output movements in Japan, Singapore and 
New Zealand, in both the short and long run. On the other hand, the variance 
decomposition results suggest that IS shocks are important in explaining changes in 
real absorption in South Korea and Australia, over both the short and longer run 
forecast horizons.  
 
3.Changes in price level 
 
It is interesting to note that the variance decompositions of the price level indicate 
substantial differences in the fractions of the structural shocks in explaining price 
variability across the economies. Nominal (LM) shocks appear to explain the bulk of 
short run price movements in China, Singapore and Malaysia. However, the relative 
importance of supply shocks in explaining price variability seem to have reduced at 
the longer forecast horizon, especially in China (see Table 6.14). Conversely, the 
relative importance of supply shocks in explaining longer run price movements in 
China appears to have increased over the longer-run forecast horizon. On the other 
hand, nominal shocks seem to play a relatively important role in explaining short run 
price fluctuation in Australia, however, the relative importance of nominal shocks in 
explaining price variability appear to have increased significantly over the longer run. 
Finally, in the case of Japan, the forecast error variance decompositions for the 
change in price indicate that all three structural innovations (i.e. εs, εd and εn) 
contribute in comparable quantities in explaining the variance of relative inflation.  
 
 
Economic Shocks and Structure 
 
There is a need to distinguish between the symmetry of shocks and symmetry of 
structure. Even if countries are confronted with common shocks, individual nations 
may require different responses arising from differences in starting positions, and 








hence will face adjustment costs in joining a currency union. Examining the variance 
decompositions results provides a good way to understand the underlying structural 
differences, and possibly policy preferences and strategies in each of the economies.  
 
At first sight, although some countries might have displayed symmetry in their 
underlying shocks, but an examination of the variance decomposition results indicate 
shocks affect them asymmetrically. The variance decomposition results indicate that 
structural shocks affect output and price movements in the East Asian economies in 
fundamentally different ways. This could reflect the underlying differences in the 
transmission mechanism and policy strategies of the East Asian economies83, which 
would remain as obstacles to regional monetary integration. In this context, the results 
derived from the preliminary assessment of shocks suggest various groupings of 
economies, notably that of Singapore and Malaysia and, Japan and Korea 
respectively, have displayed symmetric patterns of economic disturbances. However, 
an examination of their variance decomposition results indicates that structural 
differences exist in these economies. 
 
One potential explanation for the apparent display of positive shocks among the 
respective groups of countries could be due to strong trade linkages countries. This 
allows disturbances to be transmitted to another and be absorbed on the domestic 
economy. Frankel and Rose (1996) point out that symmetric shocks could come from 
the marginal propensities to import from each other as well as productivity shocks 
spilling over through trade. Therefore, strong trade ties (not to mention close 
geographic distances) could potentially lead to closely intertwined linkages, such that 
the shocks experienced by one country be transmitted to another and these shocks 
would effectively become common shocks84. Hence, it is no surprise that structurally 
different (particularly neighboring) economies can experience common shocks.  
 
At the same time, the high trade intensity and symmetry of economic shocks among 
regional economies could also be attributed to the geographical proximity among 
close neighbors. Shocks tend to be transmitted first to geographical closer countries 
than those further away.  The theory of OCA does not mention the need to consider 
                                                 
83 See for instance, Bashar, K and Moller, W, eds. (2000). 








geographical location or distance of potential members when considering monetary 
unification. Countries that are geographically closer to each other tend to experience 
lower transaction costs, and hence a larger percentage of trade between them than 
countries which are further away (‘gravity’ model). In addition, the mobility of factor 
(e.g. labor) is likely to be even greater between geographically closer neighbors, for 
example, Singapore and Malaysia, and Hong Kong and China or Taiwan, than 
countries further away. As such, it would be less pragmatic to form a monetary union 
with a prospective partner that is far away, when taking into account the factors of 
geographic distance and transaction costs. 
 
Therefore, the observed symmetry of shocks within the sub-regional groupings is not 
only the result of strong trade linkages, but also the outcome of close geographic 
contiguity. This in turn highlights the point that geographical consideration is implicit 
in the criteria for OCA since close geographical distance would likely to imply closer 
trade links.  
 
 
In sum, the analysis in this section illustrates that an over-reliance on the symmetry of 
shocks in selecting union members could be misleading in some cases. The early 
literature of the OCA suggests that an important criterion for the desirability of 
joining monetary union would be that countries face similar types of shocks. 
Nevertheless, even if countries experience symmetric shocks, if they have very 
different initial positions, as implied by their variance decompositions results, there 
are high costs to monetary integration, especially in the absence of alternative 
adjustment mechanism, such as wage and price flexibility and factor mobility. The 
next section deals with the issue of alternative adjustment mechanism, which would 
also influence the costs of forgoing monetary policy for currency unification.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
84 See Bergman, M (1999) and Sweeney, R, et al. (1999). 








6.3. AVAILABILITY OF ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM  
 
The costs of monetary integration also hinges on the availability of alternative shock 
absorbers, such as wages and prices flexibility and fiscal transfers, in response to 
country specific shocks. Mundell (1961), for instance, highlighted the (perfect) 
mobility of labor across a region as an effective substitute for exchange rate 
flexibility. Nevertheless, given the expediency of managing the exchange rate as a 
policy tool, not to mention the lower political costs, the option of retaining the 
exchange rate in economic adjustment and stabilization might be preferred. Therefore, 
the crucial question is whether the availability of alternative adjustment mechanism 
exists in East Asia.   
 
This section covers the availability of other non-monetary adjustment mechanism 
affecting the costs of regional monetary integration. Specifically, it will consider the 
degree of wage and price flexibility, as the extent of factor (notably labor) mobility 
has been tackled in the first part of this chapter. 
 
Degree of wage and price flexibility 
 
A way to infer the flexibility of alternative mechanism to adjust is to look at the 
degree of wage and price flexibility. The absence of such flexibility could signify the 
inability of the marketplace to adjust to changing market conditions or in response to 
country-specific shocks. For instance, the existence of minimum wage law and 
powerful trade unions prevents wages to respond to changing market (demand and 
supply) conditions, thus contributing to downward rigidity of wages. Price controls by 
the government on goods and services as well as the freedom of private enterprises to 
compete in the market also affect price flexibility. If there is significant price controls, 
prices will not be a true reflection of the market. Hence, does sufficient market 
flexibility exist in East Asia to allow factor prices and wages to adjust to changing 
market conditions?  
 








It is difficult to ascertain the degree of price and wage flexibility. Nevertheless, 
Johnson and Sheehy (1997)85 ranked economies of the world by compiling an index 
of economic freedom for 140 countries based on various factors like trade policy, 
foreign investments etc. Wages and prices is also a factor used by them to evaluate 
whether a country has a high or low degree of economic freedom. The table below 
shows the score of the Asian nations under the wages and prices criteria. The lower 
the score, the higher the market plays in setting prices or wages and the lower the 
interference by government. 
 
Table 6.15: 
Ranking of wage and price flexibility 1996 
Country Rank Level of control Comments 
1:Japan 2 
Low Most prices determined by market, May have 
minimum wage 
2:S. Korea 2 Low As Above 
3:Hong Kong 2 Low As Above 
4:Singapore 1 Very Low Wages/prices determined by market, No minimum wage 
5:Malaysia 3 Moderate Mixture of market forces and government control 
6:Indonesia 3 Moderate As Above 
7:Philippines 2 Low As Above 
8:Thailand 3 Moderate As Above 
9:China 3 Moderate As Above 
10:Australia 2 Low As Above 
11:New Zealand 2 Low As Above 
12:USA 2 Low As Above 
   Source: Johnson and Sheehy 
   * Scale of 1-10, where 1 is the most flexible. 
 
 
It is observed that from Table 6.15 that the developed economies of this region, 
especially Singapore, have a low degree of price control in the market. On the other 
hand, the regional developing countries, such as Indonesia and China, have moderate 
degrees of price control and regulation. Hence, countries with a higher level of market 
control imply that the availability of other adjustment mechanism, such as labor 
mobility and fiscal transfers, would be more crucial in the adjustment to economic 
imbalances.  
                                                 
85 Latest Index of Economic Freedom dated 1996. 








6.4. AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE OCA RESULTS FOR EAST  
            ASIA 
 
The first part of this chapter asks the question: Is East Asia an OCA? Are the East 
Asia countries or some subsets of them appropriate groupings for some form of 
currency union? How do the East Asian economies ‘measure up’ against the OCA 
checklist of intra-factor (notably, labor) mobility, openness of economies, production 
diversification and symmetry of economic shocks? This section summarizes the main 
OCA findings. 
 
First, the degree of intra-region labor mobility appears to be relatively limited and 
one-directional; from less developed to more developed Asian economies. Second, in 
terms of the degree of country openness, only Singapore and Hong Kong are very 
open economies, with trade to GDP ratio, at above 200%, while bigger economies like 
Japan and China remained relatively less open. Third, with respect to the degree of 
product diversification, most of the East Asian economies are relatively concentrated 
in manufacturing production, especially the more industrialized economies. Fourth, in 
terms of production structure similarity, the results vary across the region. Fifth, 
assessments based on symmetry of economic disturbances might suggest several 
potential groupings of economies better poised for currency union. However, an 
examination of their variance decomposition results indicates that structural 
differences exist among the economies; which would pose obstacles to the formation 
of monetary union. Finally, there is a lack of convincing evidence that East Asia is 
able to adjust rapidly to disturbances via the wage and price mechanism.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that East Asia does not appear to be an Optimum 
Currency Area. However, Frankel and Rose (1996, 1998) had argued an ‘endogeneity’ 
assumption that more international trade will produce more highly correlated business 
cycles, which implies that the correlation of underlying (supply) shocks is likely to 
increase as trade integration progresses. We provide a critical assessment of the 
‘endogeneity’ assumption in light of monetary union formation as well as other policy 
issues and implications in Chapter 7.  
 









POLICY ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
7.1. ENDOGENEITY OF THE OCA CRITERIA? 
 
The previous chapter has considered the theory of the optimum currency areas, as a 
tentative framework for discussion. It would appear that no clear-cut inferences could 
be made, since there is no pre-eminent OCA criterion that can be used to judge the 
desirability of monetary union among any group of countries. However, the OCA 
criteria may be endogenous, as proposed by Frankel and Rose (1996, 1998). If that is 
to be so, an examination based on the OCA criteria could be indicative. Nevertheless, 
this thesis warns of an undiscriminating acceptance of the ‘endogeneity’ proposition 
based on several grounds. The Frankel and Rose (1996, 1998) hypothesis was 
conjectured based on a proposed set of industrialized nations at relatively similar 
stages of development. As such, it is not surprising to find that their sample of 
countries having more symmetric business cycles. Furthermore, the countries in 
Frankel and Rose (1996, 1998) sample were not already existing currency unions. As 
such, the ‘endogeneity’ argument would be at best a hypothesis. Therefore, this thesis 
uses a real-life example to illustrate the complex issues underlying a currency union, 
beyond a naïve ‘endogeneity’ assumption.  The other less explicit but important 
factors in the working of a currency union are also addressed. The chapter is 
organized as follows: section 7.2 reviews the ‘endogeneity’ proposition, section 7.3 
examines a case-study of an Asian currency union and provides qualifications to the 
‘endogeneity’ argument, and section 7.4 discuses pertinent issues for a prospective 
formation of a regional currency area.  
 








7.2. THE ‘ENDOGENEITY’ ARGUMENT RE-EXAMINED 
 
Even if countries of a region do not satisfy the OCA criteria ex-ante, they might fulfill 
it ex-post. The ‘endogeneity’ of the OCA criteria has been tackled by Frankel and 
Rose (1996, 1998)86. Their basic message is that entry into a currency union may raise 
international trade linkages and in not joining a currency union, there are benefits 
foregone. More importantly, currency union entry per se, for whatever reason, may 
provide a substantial impetus for trade expansion, leading to tighter international trade 
ties which are likely to give rise to highly correlated business cycles. Frankel and 
Rose (1997) argument implied that conditions would likely change in response to the 
choice of the exchange rate regime.  In this sense, a country is more likely to satisfy 
the criteria for entry into a currency union ex-post than ex-ante! 
 
The ‘endogeneity’ argument is often raised, but much misunderstood. This could lead 
to incomplete analysis and hence a misleading guide to policy. The formation of a 
currency union per se would not lead to ‘endogeneity’. There are other preconditions 
that exist in real life currency unions leading to the stability of currencies, and hence 
increased trade flows.  
 
 
7.3. DOES CURRENCY UNION MAKE ECONOMIC SENSE?  
 
Popular propositions as to what constitutes a successful currency union are being 
examined by looking at a form of currency union formed between Brunei and 
Singapore. Applying a frequently used indicator to assess the symmetry of structural 
shocks across countries, it was found that country-specific shocks between Brunei and 
Singapore were not symmetric. It is worthy to note the economic structure between 
Singapore and Brunei also differs substantially. As such, Brunei and Singapore would 
not make ‘natural’ partners for forming a currency union. Nonetheless, the currency 
union between Brunei and Singapore (due to historical reasons) has benefited both 
countries in different ways (and magnitude). But to reap these benefits, there are some 
                                                 
86 Further information on the ‘endogeneity’ hypothesis can also be found in Chapters 3 and 4. 








necessary conditions in practical operations of a currency union that would not 
otherwise be understood or captured by a hypothesis (of ‘endogeneity’ in this case).  
 
More importantly, beyond the fixing of exchange rates, there ought to be a 
predominant partner, especially for an asymmetric currency union, and the ready 
availability of alternative shock absorbing mechanism. Only then would the existence 
of currency unions be sustainable and stable. In the case of Brunei and Singapore, the 
active partner in the union’s monetary policy was Singapore, and perfect capital 
mobility was the ready mechanism to dissipate exchange rate misalignments as well 
as economic imbalances due to the asymmetric structure of the two countries. These 
factors were crucial in ensuring the viability of the currency union than perhaps their 
initial country characteristics. The stability of currencies in turn produce greater trade 
and investment flows, and as such, a conclusion of ‘endogeneity’. Very often, another 
neglected aspect of currency union participation is the net cost (besides benefits), 
especially to the secondary partner(s).  This aspect will be pointed out in the chapter 
later. 
 
The next section clarifies the ‘endogeneity’ hypothesis proposed by Frankel and Rose 
(1996, 1998) by examining the currency union formed between Brunei and Singapore. 
In so doing, this section contributes in understanding the more important but less 




7.3.1. Perspectives from the Brunei- Singapore Currency Union  
 
This section gives an overview on the features, workings and outcomes of the 
currency union formed between Brunei and Singapore (for more details, refer to 




                                                 
87 ‘Monetary Co-operation In East Asia: A Way Forward’, Singapore Economic Review, Vol. 46(2), p211. 








Institutional Features   
 
Between 1786-1903, the states of Brunei and Singapore were using a common 
currency as a medium of exchange for international trade. By 1953, the currency 
union spanned Malaysia, Singapore and Borneo territories (Duraman, 2000). In June 
1967, Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore adopted a system of free interchangeability of 
their respective currencies, in order to maintain strong economic and trade ties. This 
tripartite arrangement allowed for the Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore dollars to be 
used in the three countries. Under this system, each country issued it own currency 
that was legal tender domestically but “customary tender” in the other two countries.  
The banks in each country were obliged to accept, at par and without charge, the notes 
and coins of the other countries.  In other words, the exchange rates of the three 
currencies were fixed one-to-one. The respective currency boards of the three 
countries in turn accepted the currencies of the other countries from banks and 
exchange it at par without charge for its own currency.  The currency union continued 
till 1969, when a tripartite arrangement was implemented, which allowed the “new” 
national currency of any one country customary tender and accepted at par with the 
other country’s own currency. However, Malaysia opted out of this system in 1973, 
while Singapore and Brunei continued the currency arrangement.  
 
The Brunei and Singapore currency union allows the Brunei dollar and the Singapore 
dollar to be customary tender in each other’s territory.  It also allows the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS) to conduct an active exchange rate policy on behalf of 
both countries by managing the Singapore dollar against an undisclosed basket of 
currencies.  Brunei operates a currency board system by fixing its exchange rate one-
to-one to the Singapore dollar and by providing 100 percent backing of its currency in 
circulation.    
 
The currency union between Brunei and Singapore is a binding agreement to 
immutably fix their bilateral exchange rate with each other. Under this binding 
agreement, Brunei and Singapore are inclined to help each other in times of financial 
stress than if otherwise.   
 
 









The Brunei-Singapore currency union has existed for a long time due to historical 




Structure of Economies 
 
 
Table 7.1: Export Composition of Singapore and Brunei 
 
Selected Product Category Singapore Brunei 
 (% of Total) (% of Total) 
Mineral Fuels 8.7 91.1 
   
Chemicals 6.0 0.1 
   
Machines, Transport 66.0 4.5 
   
Other Products 6.0 0.7 
Source: Duraman (2000) 
 
 
Table 7.1 shows that Singapore has a more diversified export structure, with 
machines and transport equipment leading total exports. On the other hand, the 
mineral fuels sector dominates the Brunei economy as its largest export share. Brunei 
is predominantly a resource based economy with a heavy reliance on the oil and gas 
sector. She is also a relatively closed economy. In contrast, Singapore is an 
industrialized country where manufacturing is her main sector, particularly in 
electronics manufacturing. Singapore is also a very open economy with a high degree 
of trade and financial integration with the global economy.  
 
The divergent state of economic development suggests that these two countries are 
likely to face asymmetric shocks. To verify if the shocks are indeed asymmetrical, the 













Structural shocks and their effects 
 
This section estimates a Structural VAR model to examine the nature of economic 
shocks facing the two economies. It serves to provide an insight on the pattern of 
shocks between the two currency union members88.  
 
 
Table 7.2: Components generated by supply shocks and demand shocks 
 
Notes: a. Data for Brunei begins from 1974 
             b. Correlation figure above represent demand correlation coefficient, while that below is the  
  supply correlation figure. 
 
 
From Table 7.2, one observes that both supply and demand shocks between Brunei 
and Singapore were not correlated nor significant. Therefore, on the basis of 
symmetry of shocks, these two countries would not be particularly identified as 
suitable candidates for a monetary union. This conclusion is also supported by clear-
cut differences in their economic structures.  
 
 
Volume of Trade Flows 
 
Bilateral trade flows between Brunei and Singapore have risen by approximately four 
folds over the past two decades from 1977 to 1997 (see Table 7.3). Singapore was 
also the main supplier of imports to Brunei, accounting for 26 percent of its total 
import outlay (Duraman, 2000). The greater trade flows between Brunei and 
Singapore, fostered by stability of currencies, seems to give rise to an appearance of 
‘endogeneity’. In addition, the currency union has conferred monetary benefits to 




                                                 
88 Due to limited data availability for Brunei, the estimation period is between 1974-97. 
 Singapore Brunei 
   
Singapore 1 0.27 
Brunei -0.09 1 









Table 7.3: Brunei's Exports and Imports by Destinations  
 
 Total Trade 
(Exports and Imports, B$ Million) 
 
      
    Year  1977 1987 1997 1998 2000 
       
Japan 3,207 2,667 2,461 1763 2272 
USA 509 228 413 576 904 
Singapore 278 595 1,072 1422 1201 
Thailand 44 528 570 131 869 
Malaysia 154 158 539 441 564 
Rest of World 488 1180 2072 3111 1874 
       
Total 4,680 5,356 7,127 7444 7684 
Sources: Brunei’s Statistical Yearbooks, figures found in Duraman (2000) 






Domestic price stability89 brought about by monetary discipline under the currency 
union is evident from Table 7.4.  There has been a clear reduction and convergence of 
Brunei’s inflation rates to that of Singapore since 1987. Between the period 1977-
1987, Brunei experienced a higher rate of inflation of 4.2 percent compared to that of 
Singapore at 3.3 percent. Brunei’s inflation rates declined to 2.4 percent in the 
subsequent 1987-1997 period. This means that the inflation differential between 
Brunei and Singapore dropped from 0.9 percent in 1997-1987 to zero percent in 1987-
1997, implying some form of nominal convergence. Currency union formation 
attributes central importance to the criterion of nominal convergence between 
participating countries. The above suggests that the currency union with a low 
inflation country has imposed credibility on Brunei’s monetary policy and hence 





                                                 
89 The average inflation rates, measured in terms of the changes in the CPI. 









Table 7.4: CPI Inflation rates (%)  
 
Country 1977-87 1987-97 1977-97 
    
Brunei  4.2 2.4 3.3 
Singapore 3.3 2.4 2.8 





Lack of Real Convergence 
 
On the other hand, there seems to be an absence of real convergence in economic 
performance of the two economies. Between the period 1974-1997, Brunei’s real 
GDP grew at a modest 1.7 percent, with a greater variability to growth rates90. In 
contrast, Singapore’s real GDP grew a robust 8.3 percent during the same period. 
Therefore, it is not surprising there had been a zero correlation between the output 




Table 7.5: Correlation of output and growth, 1974-1997 
 
 Singapore Brunei Mean (%) S.D. (%) 
     
Singapore 1  8.33 3.26 
Brunei -0.01 1 1.67 8.35 
Notes: Data for Brunei begins 1974. 
 
 
Underlying the lack of real convergence is the structural differences inherent in the 
two economies. The countries are at different stages of development, with Singapore 
having a more diversified production and export structure. Brunei has a structural 
weakness in that its production base shows heavy dependence on the oil and gas 
sector. The transformation of Brunei’s oil based economy to a more broad based 
economic structure could arguably be helped by an active exchange rate rather than a 
passive policy under the present currency union (Duraman, 2000, p144). 









The above assessment indicates that there has been nominal but not real convergence. 
Although Brunei has gained in monetary converging by pegging with low-inflation 
anchor Singapore, she has however lost an independent monetary and exchange rate 
policy for macroeconomic adjustment and stabilization in response to changing 
external competitiveness. Under the present arrangement, a depreciation of the 
exchange rate to make Brunei’s exports more competitive or the use of the exchange 
rate to encourage economic diversification, is not possible. This to a certain extent, is 
an inhibiting factor for growth in Brunei (Duraman, 2000, p137).     
 
Therefore, the benefits from a currency union seems to be less than optimal on 
Brunei’s sustainable development from a long-term perspective, due to initial 
underlying structural differences.  
 
On the prima facie, the increased trade flows fostered by the stability of currencies 
between Brunei and Singapore could lead one to conclude ‘endogeneity’, despite their 
initial differences, and as such the benefits conferred to the formation of currency 
union. However, this argument is not complete without looking at the more 
complicated but less explicit preconditions in place. Only then would the stability of 
currencies fostered by the union lead to enhanced trade and investment flows.  A 
closer examination reveals the existence of a ready shock absorbing mechanism as 
well as the role of an active partner in the currency union.  
 
The mobility of factors helps mitigate potential misalignments in the exchange rate as 
well as alleviate economic imbalances. A fixed exchange rate regime between diverse 
countries can create enormous pressures for the economies.  
 
The role of international capital flows had been instrumental in financing the 
temporary decline in balance of payments between Singapore and Brunei. The free 
mobility of capital between the two countries had helped to cushion asymmetric 
shocks. According to the advocates of monetary union, stabilizing capital flows 
                                                                                                                                            
90 This could be due to the variability of international prices and demand for mineral fuels, for which 
the Brunei economy is reliant.  








operate more powerfully in the presence of a common currency or irrevocably fixed 
exchange rates  (Eichengreen, 1990). 
 
Furthermore, unemployment as a result of exchange rate misalignments and economic 
imbalances is not a primary issue for Brunei and Singapore. The two countries 
employ a relatively large pool of foreign workers. As such, unemployment could be 
minimized through adjustments in the number of foreign workers who may be 
allowed to work in the countries.  
 
In addition, Singapore has also been the active partner in the management of the 
union’s monetary policy. On the other hand, Brunei plays a passive role in conducting 
the joint exchange rate and monetary policy. As such, the cost to Brunei is its loss to 
monetary autonomy.  
 
The success of currency union and hence its ‘endogeneity’ will depend on the 
preconditions as discussed. Only then will greater trade and investment flows result 
from the stability of currencies fostered by the union. This would in turn lead one to 
come to the ‘endogeneity’ conclusion, despite countries not satisfying the OCA 
criteria ex-ante.   
 
 
7.3.2. Caveat emptor an ‘Endogeneity’ argument 
 
Frankel and Rose (1996, 1998) concluded their hypothesis of ‘endogeneity’ based on 
a sample of only industrialized countries, which were not even existing currency 
unions. Furthermore, currency union participation would not necessarily led to 
symmetry of business cycles due to the initial underlying differences in economic 
structures and development91.  
 
Based on an argument of ‘endogeneity’, countries are more likely to join a currency 
union. However, the formation of a currency union per se would not lead to 
‘endogeneity’. There are other criteria in place that led to the stability of currencies 
and increased trade flows For instance, in the Brunei-Singapore currency union, it was 








the ready availability of alternative shock absorbing mechanism that helped cushion 
temporary misalignments in exchange rates, besides the conduct of monetary policy 
by an active partner.  
 
Therefore, this section aimed to shed light on the so-called ‘endogeneity’ hypothesis.  
It completes the picture by providing a balanced view to the costs and benefits of 
currency union participation. This will affect the analysis of the economics of 
currency union. The upshot is that countries should not take the  ‘endogeneity’ 
argument at face value, and rush into a currency union formation. The cost for a 
periphery country is likely to be higher, since it forgoes its exchange rate, although 
there are benefits conferred to the currency union. A currency union forfeits the 
exchange rate as a ‘safety vale’ for adjustments to compensate for any structural 
weakness in the economy.  The costs are higher the greater the differences in 
economic structure and development of the countries.   
 
Finally, the hypothesis of ‘endogeneity’ has its qualifications. As such, the argument 
of ‘endogeneity’ of currency union is not generalizable, as there remain exclusions 
and exceptions (see also Francois, 1999).  
 
These include the ready availability of shock absorbing mechanism, the consideration 
of an active member to conduct external monetary policy as well as costs of forming 
the currency union (particularly to asymmetric members) besides the purported 
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7.4. IS AN EAST ASIAN CURRENCY AREA APPROPRIATE AT PRESENT? 
 
East Asia as a whole does not seem to justify the criteria for forming a currency area. 
The question arises as to whether there are meaningful reasons for having a currency 
area at present? The next section addresses these issues. 
 
 
7.4.1. An external agency of monetary restraint? 
 
An important reason for a country to join a monetary union with a low-inflation 
country is to enhance the anti-inflationary credibility of its own monetary policy, 
despite the absence of the traditional OCA conditions. This approach relies on the 
credibility gains that a monetary union can provide for inflation prone economies. 
While, in principle, other domestic commitment mechanisms to contain inflation can 
be devised (e.g. the announcement of monetary growth targets), many countries have 
not been able to create domestic monetary institutions with a credible commitment to 
price stability.  
 
Therefore, if some countries had found it difficult in the past to pursue credible 
monetary and fiscal policies, then by entering a currency union with a low inflation 
country, the higher inflation countries can import the credibility of the low inflation 
anchor. The weaker the reputation of the central bank, the stronger the case for 
pegging the exchange rate to build confidence that inflation will be controlled. Indeed, 
in the cases of the CFA franc zone and the East Caribbean currency union, the size of 
intra-regional trade has not been the main motivation for currency union. More 
importantly had been the objective of enhanced monetary stability through a supra-
national monetary institution92.  
 
The advocates of an East Asian currency area could see the rationale stemming from 
the potential credibility gains in the conduit of monetary policy with a low-inflation 
country, despite the absence of the traditional OCA conditions. In our context, the 
monetary union between Brunei and Singapore could be seen as a way for Brunei to 
                                                 
92 See also Chapter 2.  








borrow Singapore’s credibility in much the same way that France and Italy have 
borrowed German credibility under the European Monetary system.  Brunei had also 
gained by linking itself with Singapore, which has the credibility of maintaining a 
conservative monetary policy and a low inflation rate. It was evident through the 
inflation convergence of Brunei to that of Singapore’s inflation.  
 
 
The question is whether there is a desperate need to import monetary and financial 
stability in East Asia?   
 
This question could be more applicable to the exceptionally high inflation prone 
countries, such as the Latin America countries, which suggest a strong case for the 
‘delegation’ of monetary policy. Asia is not usually characterized as a region with a 
record of hyperinflation. Only then, will it make sense to “outsource” monetary policy 
as one possible resolution to the search for agencies of restraint (Collier, 1991).  
 
Although high inflation countries may import the credibility of the low inflation 
country, but the option of pegging to an external anchor is not without its costs or 
difficulties. It would involve the loss of sovereignty to a supranational monetary agent 
and could even require some degree of political integration, if it is to be accepted as 
democratically accountable.  
 
Furthermore, to gain in terms of anti-inflationary credibility, at least one of the 
member countries should provide this reputation. In the East Asian context, the low 
inflation countries include Singapore and Japan. However, the dilemma could be 
faced by these countries, who already had success in maintaining price stability, as to 
why they may wish to participate in a currency area. It becomes apparent that a 
proposed regional monetary union suffers from an incentive asymmetry problem: 
some countries could probably have a good reason for wanting to join today, but 
others do not. Therefore, there are no natural and obvious candidates for a currency 













7.4.2. Bulwark against international speculators? 
 
It is also important to consider regional linkages. If Asia is regarded as a cluster on 
world financial markets, it follows that there is a strong interdependence between 
their individual monetary and exchange rate policies. For instance, a devaluation by 
one country may spark speculative attacks on other regional members of the same 
financial cluster. 
 
Why might Asian countries be clustered together by international investors?  
 
The patterns of contagion that have been identified in recent years admit multiple 
interpretations, but Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) find that a financial chain is the 
dominant mechanism. How does a financial cluster operate? First, if countries share a 
common creditor, a non-performing loan in country A hurts the balance sheet of the 
creditor, who in turn may call in or refuse to rollover a loan to country B. (This effect 
is strongest if the creditor has a weak initial position, so that it cannot absorb bad 
loans). Second, countries may be linked by cross-market hedging: based on historical 
correlations, if A falls, the trading program instructs the trader to exit B. Third, 
redemption or margin calls may force an investor to sell B in the wake of a decline in 
A in order to restore liquidity. Fourth, herding may occur: if A and B are superficially 
similar (e.g. neighboring countries), uninformed investors will exit B if A declines. In 
the presence of such an externality, it is inefficient to set non-cooperative policies. 
 
 
Is the financial cluster story relevant to Asia?  
 
One of the major lessons to be derived from the recent crisis is that such crisis are 
contagion in nature and the lack of exchange rate cooperation among interdependent 
regional economies could prove costly. The currency crisis which started in Thailand 
soon spread to other neighboring economies, even for fundamentally sound 
economies, like Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia.  
 
 








In the post-crisis era, a clear priority is to escape from a rigid dollar-pegged regime. A 
shaky currency peg may make it more difficult to support, in the presence of large and 
liquid international capital markets, which far outstrip the reserves of even the most 
well-endowed central banks and governments. Furthermore, the revolution of 
information and communications technologies also made it much more difficult to 
stop capital flows at the border.  
 
Some monetary economists, such as Dornbusch (2001) and Eichengreen (1999), even 
suggested that small open economies adopt the currency of larger nations. This is 
because small open economies are likely to be more vulnerable to speculative 
currencies attacks. These economists view the participation of small economies in an 
integrated and stable monetary zone as helping them shield from exchange-rate 
instability. For example, the solidification of the EMS and the drive for EMU are 
designed to shield smaller European economies from the instability of international 
financial markets, as much as Arizona or New Hampshire have been shielded from 
the Asian financial crisis by virtue of their participation in an integrated and stable 
monetary zone, namely, the United States of America. 
  
 
7.4.3. Financial fragility as source of market instability, regardless of size 
 
The heart of the matter in financial markets instability lies in the fragility of its 
system. Though “size" matters, the trigger of currency crisis boils down to the 
soundness of a country’s economic fundamentals. When a monetary regime is 
unrealistic and unsustainable, it will be vulnerable to speculative attacks, regardless of 
its size. Hence, bigger countries like Argentina or Brazil would not ward off 
speculative attacks on its currency if fundamentally, its monetary regime is unrealistic 
and unsustainable. A weak financial system will not prevent fresh turmoil. The 
fragility of the banking system and the rigid dollar peg sharply eroded the 
competitiveness of Asian economies, and act as contributing factors that triggered the 
crisis. As such, the establishment of a regional currency arrangement is no panacea 
for domestic economic ills. The structural weakness that had contributed to the Asian 
financial crisis should first be tackled even before external monetary cooperation, not 
to mention monetary unification, should be considered. 









The diversity in both economic systems and political structures among Asian 
countries makes a common currency area not practical for the time being. As such, a 
more practical approach towards a common currency goal would be through the 
"clustering" of smaller currency areas first, and the enlargement of such clusters later. 
While it may be true that transaction cost savings with a large currency area may be 
greater, these gains may provide little incentive for forming a monetary union, if the 
principal reason for having the monetary union is in securing the macroeconomic 
credibility gains. For this reason, there is no need to have a large area at the outset! 
Even though with a larger currency area, the argument continues, the transactions or 
credibility benefits from having a common currency will be greater. However, the 
incentive asymmetry problem can be used to explain why the emphasis on a monetary 
union in East Asia will effectively be established among a subset or pockets of 
eligible countries first. This is to ensure a sufficient robustness and sustainability of 
the monetary union area. Nevertheless, there are also potential trade-offs between 
gaining price stability and the longer-term costs in terms of structural development for 












What do the study’s results suggest about the scope for an East Asia monetary union? 
 
 
The results in this study suggest that the scope for forming a monetary union in East 
Asia (or a subset of it) is rather limited. There appears to be no distinct pairs or 
groupings of candidates that seem more suitable for currency union at this stage. 
Therefore, the policy implication is that regional countries should first focus on the 
economics of real integration, i.e. trade and investment liberalization, as the basis for 
fostering monetary integration. In the meantime, countries should aim to tackle the 
underlying structural weakness that led to the Asian crisis, even before external 
monetary cooperation, not to mention monetary unification, should be considered. 
Only in the very long term should a common monetary arrangement be considered 
once a sufficient high degree of convergence and real economic integration have been 
attained in the region.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
In sum, the preconditions for forming a currency area in East Asia are far from being 
satisfied at present93. Without these necessary preconditions, the move to a regional 
monetary arrangement would be risky. Therefore, this thesis emphasizes a multi-
speed approach to East Asian monetary integration through clustering and staging, i.e. 
monetary union should begin with clusters of economies and take place in stages, 
when a sufficient degree of convergence is achieved. In this way, the underlying 
divergence in the region can be overcome in a step-by-step approach. 
  
Given that the approach to regional monetary integration should be gradualism, 
Chapter 8 looks ahead to several practical approaches East Asia can consider in a 
prospective move to regional monetary integration. The next chapter draws attention 
to the design of a possible East Asian monetary roadmap as well as the policy options 
for consideration in each stage of monetary integration. 
 
 
                                                 
93 This message became clear through the various ‘compatibility’ tests found in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Furthermore, the region lacks a currency anchor as well as the necessary political will for monetary 
integration, which will be further discussed in Chapter 8.  










MONETARY INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA: 





This final chapter suggests a prospective strategy towards the process of East Asian 
monetary integration. The strategy is divided into varying term goals, as East Asia 
currently does not possess the necessary solidarity and conditions for forming a 
monetary union. These issues working against an East Asian monetary union, include 
disparities in regional income as well as divergence in national political ideologies. 
The political ideologies of this region range from Communism, such as Chinese 
communism, to coalition government such as in Malaysia to parliamentary democracy 
in Singapore and pluralist democracy in the Philippines and to countries with even a 
constitutional monarchy such as in Thailand and Japan. Without a fundamental 
agreement on political ideologies, it would be difficult to move on in common 
decisions of monetary union.  
 
Given that the practical approach to regionalism is gradualism, the next question is 
how? Neither the European experience or any other regional experience of monetary 
integration offers a direct blueprint completely applicable to East Asia. Nonetheless, 
useful lessons from the experiences of regional monetary integration in other parts of 
the world can be drawn as a perspective for East Asia. In particular, adapting from the 
European experience of monetary integration, this chapter explores relevant 
implications and possibilities in staging an East Asian monetary integration process. 
The chapter also considers key policy issues and options at each stage. But first, the 
main approaches towards monetary integration is reviewed. 
 
                                                 
94 This chapter is an updated and fuller version of the paper by Yuen, Hazel and Ngiam, K J (1999), 
which suggested practical steps towards regional monetary integration, including monetary cooperation 
beginning with several clusters first. Since the paper by Yuen, Hazel and Ngiam, K J (1999), other 
subsequent papers have also advocated ideas along similar lines.  













Monetary integration could be paced as a gradual process through transition, 
preparation and economic convergence leading up to integration or adopted all at one 




8.1.1. ‘Gradual’ Approach towards Monetary Integration 
 
When countries lack a commitment or preconditions towards monetary unification, a 
gradual approach or process is considered. The belief is that monetary unification 
should proceed in stages, especially if the participating economies are less than 
homogenous. For instance, steps are taken to ensure that economic convergence exist 
before the lead-up to final monetary union. While relevant transnational institutions 
are formed to help move the countries towards monetary union as well as the 
coordination and management of regional monetary affairs post unification. Though 
there are benefits to the gradual approach, as it allows countries to adjust, but the 
transition period of economic convergence and harmonization could risk the problem 
of sustainability, in light of overly rigid and unrealistic policies formulated.  For 
instance, though the process of European monetary unification was gradual, the 
unification risked several periods of turbulence (e.g. during the EMS crisis) due to the 
economic realities of member countries versus the rigid band of exchange rate 
coordination. Therefore, a gradualist approach will require that countries and 

















8.1.2 ‘Shock’ Approach towards Monetary Integration  
 
The monetary unification of East and West Germany in 1990 was an example of a 
‘shock’ approach. The East German mark was instantaneously replaced by the West 
German mark following the reunification of Germany. The West German mark began 
legal tender and was in circulation in the whole of Germany. For a ‘shock’ approach 
to work, there must be strong political will as well as a transfer mechanism (e.g. 
through a unified fiscal system) created for the union. In the case of Germany’s 
reunification, due to a ‘shock’ approach, wages in East Germany (a former 
Communist state) had risen much faster, and unemployment higher than in West 
Germany. It appears that East Germany had sacrificed more in the reunification 
process, at least in the short term and during the adjustment stage. Though a ‘shock’ 
approach could provide the speed to immediate realization of monetary unification, it 
could cost more to the secondary members in the absence of proper price and wage 
convergence as well as structural rigidities (e.g. wage contracts) in the existing 





8.2. CHARTING AN EAST ASIAN MONETARY FRAMEWORK 
  
Given the diversity in East Asian economies, a gradual process towards monetary 
union seems pertinent. There would be great risks to sustainability if an East Asian 
monetary union begins with a position of substantial divergence among its members, 
which makes it susceptible to speculative attacks in light of rigid monetary 
arrangements. Furthermore, it is also vital that participating countries pursue 
macroeconomic discipline and structural flexibility in the lead-up to monetary union, 
so as to lower adjustment costs.   
 








Just as the Delors Report95 has served an essential role in providing the broad 
framework for staging and implementing European monetary union, this section 
suggests a roadmap towards regional monetary integration. It offers possibilities for 
considerations in each process towards monetary union. The plan can be defined in 
varying term goals. The short-term goal is to achieve external monetary stability, the 
medium term goal is to attain greater monetary and economic convergence, which 
serves the preconditions for integration, and the long-term goal is to move towards 




8.3. STAGE ONE: INCOMPLETE MONETARY INTEGRATION 
 
The Asian financial crisis has renewed calls for greater monetary cooperation and 
integration. The growing intra-Asian economic interdependence will mean that large 
fluctuations in regional exchange rates will become increasingly disruptive96. This 
could lead to efforts to coordinate policies so as to create a zone of external monetary 
stability97. The following are the various options that could be explored. 
 
 
8.3.1. Exploring the possibilities: 
 
Option 1: Generalized move to a common basket peg with a fluctuation band  
 
Williamson (1996, 1999) proposed a common basket peg, where East Asian 
economies jointly peg to a common currency basket. The logic is that if the countries 
peg to a single currency, then their effective exchange rate will swing about as a result 
of changes in exchange rates among third countries (e.g. the dollar-yen rate). If they 
overcome that by each pegging to a basket that reflects their own trade pattern, then 
they will find their relative competitive positions vary as a result of the third currency 
                                                 
95 As early as 1971, the European Community Council endorsed a three- stage plan for the achievement 
of economic and monetary. The Delors Report (1989) set out in detail the conditions to be met in order 
to establish economic and monetary union, proposing a three- stage plan for its achievement 
96 Approximately 50% of East Asian trade is intra-region (see Chapter 4). 








exchange rate. A solution for all the regional countries is to use a common basket peg, 
which reflects the average trade pattern. Granted that East Asian economies might not 
be ready for an ERM type system, Williamson (1996, 1999) thinks that the common 
basket peg might be the best solution (for now) to control excessive intra-region 
exchange rate volatility. Pegging each of the Asian currencies to a common currency 
basket could be a way of reducing the problem of intra-Asian exchange-rate 
variability, through an external numerie. 
 
Our assessment98 of a common currency basket peg is that it can combine the 
advantages of both fixed (to a common basket peg) and floating (within a band) 
exchange rates. In order for the common basket peg to be more readily accepted by 
member countries, there ought to be some flexibility in the choice of exchange rate 
regimes. As such, Hong Kong could still run a currency board, simply replacing the 
dollar by the basket as its anchor, and China could still operate a rigid peg, while 
other countries could have much looser policies to the basket, including wide bands. 
In addition, national currencies should be allowed to move within an exchange-rate 
band (10% either side of a central value, say) against an appropriate basket of 
currencies. This is to accommodate members’ varying levels of economic 
development and their readiness of participation. The economically stronger 
economies could maintain a more rigid peg against the common basket, while weaker 
economies may be allowed a wider fluctuation band around the common currency 
basket. In this way, members with varying degrees of readiness in monetary 
participation can retain some form of monetary independence (through the pre-
announced fluctuation bands on the common basket peg), while achieving intra-Asian 
external monetary (exchange rate) stability.    
 
However, the option of a common basket peg will also have to address the question of 
the choice of the external numeraire; should the common currency basket be based 
upon the average trade pattern of the Asian economies, or should it be based upon an 
approximate weighted average of the tri-polar currencies? Furthermore, how should 
the fluctuation band be established and how wide should the band be? We do not have 
                                                                                                                                            
97 Currency stability reduces the costs of uncontrolled intra-regional exchange rate variability and is 
needed for trade integration. 
98 See Yuen, Hazel and Ngiam, K J (1999). 








the answers now, but unless these questions are sufficiently addressed, then should 
this option be adopted. Nevertheless, this option may also begin with a small group of 
members ready to participate in a common currency basket against which their 
currencies should move in certain bands. 
 
In addition, Brouwer (2000) thinks the desirability of a common basket peg would 
premise on whether export similarity between (non-Japan) East Asia members is 
greater than that between the region and its major trading partners of Japan, USA and 
EU. Therefore, it is whether reducing intra-regional (non-Japan) exchange rate 
variability is more important than reducing exchange rate variability between main 
export partners of Japan, USA and EU. Brouwer (2000) showed that while intra-East 
Asia trade may be becoming more important, the region’s export structure is also 
becoming more similar to the industrialized countries of the world in recent years and 
not less. Furthermore, the robustness of a regional exchange rate system would also 
depend on important factors, such as, how common are individual country’s economic 
structure, policies and shocks. To the extent that outcomes under a common basket 
peg conflict with national objectives and policy interests, the regime would be 
vulnerable to speculative attacks. Moreover, without very firm political commitment, 
Brouwer (2000) concludes that formally pegging to a common basket might not be 
very feasible for the region at this stage. Finally, even if Williamson (1996, 1999) 
idea of a common basket peg might not be preferable for this region for the time 














Option 2: Regional Exchange Rate System – fixing of exchange rates without giving       
               up national money 
 
 
A fixed exchange-rate area, known also as an incomplete monetary union, embodies 
agreements among participating countries to contain their bilateral exchange rates 
within narrow bands (defined in respect of agreed central rates) with some form of 
policy coordination99. A currency area of this sort provides the benefits of a stable 
currency and reduces the chances of competitive devaluations among countries of the 
region. The European Monetary System (EMS) and its Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM)100 were examples of a currency area where member countries agreed to keep 
their exchange rates fixed within narrow bands. 
 
The EMS and ERM introduced in the late 1970s entailed the adoption of fluctuation 
margins (which at plus or minus 2.25 percent) alongside a provision for changes in 
central rates when policy differences produced balance-of-payments disequilibria. 
These narrow fluctuation margins were adopted initially by Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands, with Italy opting for a wider margin of 
plus or minus 6 percent. Three new participants entered the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism after its launch in March 1979; Spain entered in June 1989, the UK in 
October 1990 and Portugal in April 1992. 
 
In the initial stages, controls on capital account transactions were retained, inhibiting 
the speculative capital movements that otherwise would occur if countries are seen to 
follow different economic policies. These capital controls101 took various forms, 
including regulations on the accepted uses of foreign currency as well as taxes on 
holdings of foreign currency assets. They allowed national authorities some degree of 




                                                 
99 See also Chapter 3 for more explanations.  
100 The EMS and ERM were briefly mentioned in Chapter 5 and elaborated here. 
101 Some economists (such as Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989) argued that the system would collapse if 
the capital controls were removed before tight economic policy co-ordination was achieved.  








Though the EMS had helped to create a zone of monetary stability among the EC 
countries, there were also periods of turbulence and altogether 17 realignments102. In 
particular, the removal of capital controls in 1990 led to speculative attacks due to 
diverging performances among the currency area members. In this case, the EMS 
crisis of 1992-93 was as a result of exchange rate misalignments, interest rates 
differentials and the desire to maintain stable exchange rates in the presence of capital 
mobility. No country in the currency area can enjoy stable exchange rates, free capital 
mobility and uncoordinated monetary policy, without jeopardizing agreed exchange 
rate pegs, i.e. there is high monetary interdependency among member countries103. 
Therefore, the fixing of parities, without convergence conditions is harmful and 
unstable. In this present day of internationally mobile capital and the revolution of 
information and communication technologies, periodic realignments could be 
problematic and prompt a speculative attack.  
 
One important policy lesson that can be learned from the European monetary 
experience is the selection of members based on economic rather than non-economic 
reasons, besides the proper coordination of policies in line with economic 
performance. If market participants perceive fixed parities among divergent members 
as unlikely to be sustainable, the monetary system would be vulnerable to speculative 
attacks, unless the system is defended at political will. 
 
 
In addition, the option of a currency area entails the issue of an anchor currency. 
While the DM has served as the anchor currency in the EMS, the question remains as 
to which Asian currency should be assigned this role. The Japanese yen, the Chinese 
yuan or Singapore dollar, or some form of composite currency similar to the ECU as 
potential candidates?  
 
If there is to be an anchor in East Asia, it is likely to be the yen. The yuan is not even 
a convertible currency, and any other economy is too small to carry the weight of 
                                                 
102 The realignments were due mainly to the asymmetric nature and performance of its members, as the 
EMS provided for changes in central rates when policy differences produced balance-of-payments 
disequilibria (see also Gros and Thygesen, 1998). 
103 Similarly, under the Bretton Woods System, no country could let its inflation rate exceed the U.S. 
inflation rate persistently; otherwise, it would have to devalue eventually. 








becoming the region’s anchor. But despite Japan’s strong commercial and financial 
influence, the yen has failed to play a major role as an anchor. Several authors such as 
Kwan (1998), Benassy-quere (1999) and Frankel and Shih (1994) concluded that a 
yen bloc does not exist in Asia. Moreover, with Japan’s present economic and 
financial problems, the yen's potential to rise to such a position any time soon is 
limited. Therefore, the region as a whole lacks a viable exchange rate anchor (despite 
the pre-eminence of the U.S. dollar). 
 
Instead of pegging to a single Asian currency, member countries may consider 
pegging to a composite currency or an ACU analogous to the ECU or in Europe. The 
European Currency Unit (ECU) is defined as a basket of currencies of the EC 
countries. The ECU serves as an accounting unit for the ERM; for operations in the 
intervention system and in the credit mechanism, as a basis for the divergence 
indicator, and as an instrument for settling balances among the EMS monetary 
authorities. 
 
Mr Joseph Yam, the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, floated 
the idea of an Asian Currency – something like an Asian Currency Unit (ACU) - 
which would form an anchor currency (or a common numeraire) for our region.   
However, his idea of an ACU was not elaborated. The interesting questions are: 
Should the ACU be a basket of currencies?  If it is, should the basket comprise only 
the currencies of the region (as in the case of ECU which consists of only currencies 
of the EU members) or should it include “outside” currencies like the U.S. dollar and 
the Euro?  What would be the role of Japan and the yen?   Assuming that Japan is part 
of the region and only the currencies of the region are included in the ACU, then 















Option 3: Enlargement of Brunei-Singapore Currency Arrangement        
               
 
If monetary co-operation104 in Asia is geared towards strengthening the defense 
mechanism against currency attacks, then regional countries could consider the 
Singapore and Brunei experience in building a credible and binding form of monetary 
cooperation.   
 
One significant benefit of the exchange rate union between Brunei and Singapore is 
that it had made both currencies stronger than would otherwise be. This is partly 
because Singapore (or Brunei) can have access to the foreign reserves of the other 
country.  A country that has substantial international liquidity through ready source of 
foreign currency funds is less likely to be the object of a currency attack as its 
credibility in defending the exchange rate is enhanced.  
 
Suppose that the Singapore dollar is under speculative pressures and Singapore needs 
additional international reserves to defend the exchange rate. It has two ways of 
obtaining Brunei’s international reserves105.  One is simply to borrow Brunei’s 
international reserves without any collateral.  Brunei has the incentive to lend as the 
collapse of the Singapore dollar will drag down the Brunei dollar as well.  The other 
is to exchange Singapore dollars for Brunei dollars under the agreement and sell the 
Brunei dollar for international reserves106.  This is tantamount to a collateralized 
credit (or a swap) facilities in which the Singapore authorities swap Singapore dollars 
for international reserves.  Singapore’s success in warding off speculative attacks of 
its currency in September 1985 and in avoiding the worst effects of the Asian 
financial crisis could be due partly to the combined financial strength of two countries 
rather than its own reserves. As the Asian financial crisis has demonstrated, liquidity 
is the key to ward off currency speculators.    
    
                                                 
104 Monetary cooperation can simply be defined as working together to the same (monetary) end. 
105 Although the exchange rate union between Singapore and Brunei does not specify that both 
countries will support each other in times of crises, it had allowed them to indirectly support each 
other’s currency. 
106 This can work only if Brunei holds on to the Singapore dollars as reserves and not sell them off 
subsequently for other currencies.    








However, for the currency union to be credible, there are other binding agreements as 
well. Otherwise, diverging performance could potentially destabilize the system in 
wake of exchange rate and economic misalignments. As was demonstrated during the 
1992-93 EMS crisis, the monetary arrangements, in a context of an ever-increasing 
degree of liberalization of capital movements, were not effective, essentially because 
they were not sufficiently backed by coordinated macroeconomic policy and 
sufficient structural reforms. This implies that there ought to be a predominant partner 
who takes on an active role in conducting monetary policy for the union as a whole. 
This will however, involve potential trade-offs for the secondary partner(s), as it 
relinquishes the exchange rate as a policy instrument for managing its external 
competitiveness and economic adjustment. In this way, will fixed currency 
arrangement provide stability to the region as a whole, as was in the case of the 














A Supplementary Option: ‘Asian Monetary Fund’ 
 
East Asian countries could consider establishing a regional monetary fund as a useful 
first step to enhance cooperation in currency stabilization. Before Europe adopted the 
goal of a single currency, it put in place various arrangements for closer monetary 
cooperation. These included short-term swap arrangements, long-term balance of 
payments support as well as the creation of a new institution, the European Monetary 
Co-operation Fund107.  
 
The establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund would act as a complementary vehicle 
to the process of monetary integration. During the start of the crisis, had a regional 
monetary fund provided Thailand with prompt and sufficient aid to buoy investor 
confidence, the crisis could have been averted. The Asian financial crisis 
demonstrated that such crisis is contagious and regional in nature (the financial 
turmoil which had began in Thailand soon spread to neighboring economies).  
 
An Asian Monetary Fund would reflect the shared thinking on currencies and the 
provision for mutual assistance in crisis management. If the Asian governments are 
able to cooperate at the level of regional surveillance and pooling of funds, it may act 
as a prelude to a gradual and evolutionary process towards greater monetary 
coordination and possibly even integration108. 
 
An Asian Monetary Fund 
 
As early as 1997 during the Asian financial crisis, Japan had proposed to establish a 
regional institution, the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), to implement surveillance and 
regional self-helping practices in the face of financial turmoil. However, this proposal 
was rejected by the United States and the IMF, on the ground that such an 
organization would just overlap the IMF's tasks in this region. In addition, an AMF 
may cause "moral hazard" of profligacy in individual governments since regional 
bailouts would be more easily available through the AMF. 
                                                 
107 In addition, with the establishment of the European Monetary System in 1979, co-operation was 
strengthened significantly and financial assistance instruments were reinforced. 
108 See also “Experts outline roadmap for Asian financial cooperation”, Business Times, Singapore 
Press Holdings, 10 Nov 2003. 








However recently, the discussion of an AMF regained some new strength, partially 
because IMF's bailouts to some countries have failed to achieve the presumed results. 
Proponents of the AMF argue that the former rejection it gets may be due to some 
political factors, such as unwillingness of the United States to reinforce the economic 
power of Japan and the organization's inevitable involvement in the China-Taiwan 
issue. In their opinion, an AMF would have sufficient resources for rescue and would 
possess better expertise of regional surveillance than IMF does. Since the European 
monetary fund coexists smoothly with IMF, there is no compelling reason for 
declining an AMF outright. 
 
Furthermore, there also exist regional monetary organizations, whose objectives and 
scope of activities would not differ much from what a proposed Asian Monetary Fund 
might do. Two of such organizations are the Arab Monetary Fund and the Latin 
American Reserve Fund109.  
 
The Arab Monetary Fund (ARMF) was set up by the Economic Council of the League 
of Arab States in 1976110. Its principal aims are to: promote the stability of exchange 
rates among Arab currencies and render them mutually convertible; correct 
disequilibria in the balance of payments of member states, e.g. by providing loans; 
coordinate the monetary policies of member countries and the liberalization and 
promotion of trade and payments, as well as the encouragement of capital flows 
among member countries. The eventual aim of the ARMF appears to be the 
promotion of the use of a common currency, the Arab Dinar, and the economic 
integration of its members. 
 
The Latin American Reserve Fund (LARF) was established in 1991 as the successor 
to the Andean Reserve Fund (ARF). LARF’s aims are to assist in correcting payments 
imbalances through loans with terms of up to four years and guarantees extended to 
members; to coordinate their monetary, exchange, and financial policies and to 
promote the liberalization of trade and payments in the Andean sub-region111. 
 
                                                 
109 See Sussangkarn, C (2000a). 
110 There are 22 members of the AMF: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of Yemen. 
111 There are five members of the LARF: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela. 








The presence of other regional monetary organizations that have been in operations 
for many years should also calm fears that somehow having a similar organization for 
East Asia will create serious chaos for the world’s monetary system. The experiences 
of other regional monetary organization show that their modes of operations can 
complement the international role of the IMF.  
 
 
An Asian monetary Fund should undertake functions112 such as:  
 Surveillance and dialogues on policy coordination supported by technical 
analyses at the country and regional level. 
 Regional framework on the monitoring and management of short-term capital 
flows.  
 Promotion of regional currencies or indices of regional currencies for trade and 
investment within the region, including currency settlement systems. (This 
should redress the situation where most of the trade and investment within the 
region actually relies on currencies from outside the region, particularly the U.S. 
dollar. A Bilateral Payment Arrangement (BPA) helps protect bilateral trade 
from extraneous exchange rate fluctuations. A suggestion113 has been made for 
the establishment of Clearing Houses for countries in ASEAN to carry out net 
settlements made only in local currencies for trade with each other. This will 
considerably lessen the demand for international currencies compared to the 
normal gross settlement of trade at the present time.)  
 Technical and cooperative work on the promotion of intra-regional long-term 
financing for development. (The aim is to recycle the large saving surplus 
within the region in the form of long-term investment financing for countries 
with saving deficits. For example, the development of regional stock and bond 
markets as well as the promotion of regional credit rating capabilities and 
standards. These will lessen the reliance of saving deficit countries on short-




                                                 
112 See also Sussangkarn, C (2000b). 
113 See Vichyanond, P, et al. (2000).   









In the most immediate future, progress made in the Chiang Mai Initiative is expected 
to continue the momentum towards nurturing regional monetary cooperation. To 
strengthen the region’s monetary cooperative framework, it is also necessary that 
commitments are made to include policy actions over a range of matters - not only in 
basic macro policy issues, but also financial sector and other structural policies in 
overall peer reviews. This is likely to form the platform towards reducing economic 
and financial instabilities as well. 
 
Asean already has in place a surveillance mechanism as part of the 1998 Hanoi plan 
of action. The surveillance mechanism should be expanded to include Japan, South 
Korea and China. This process will form the basis for building greater 
macroeconomic policy coordination and regional surveillance in order to enhance the 














8.4. STAGE TWO: TRANSITION TO MONETARY UNION 
 
Moving to a full monetary union without first creating the conditions for its success is 
like putting the cart before the horse; a major asymmetric shock would result in 
substantial pressure within the union especially with limited labor mobility and 
inadequate fiscal redistribution. A transition period is needed to build supporting 
institutions, harmonize statistical and regulatory frameworks and to promote 
macroeconomic policy convergence under a regional stability pact.  
 
 
8.4.1. Convergence and Coordination of Monetary and Economic Policies  
 
In practice, economists stress the importance of convergence in monetary union 
formations. Reaching lasting macroeconomic and financial sector stability in a group 
of countries requires convergence. Convergence reduces the costs of joining a 
monetary union, by reducing the need for exchange rate adjustment or a differentiated 
monetary policy as far as possible. Apart from meeting the economic entry 
requirements, countries would also have to adjust their national legislation to be 
compatible with the rules in the Treaty on such things as the independent status of 
central bank in relation to other state bodies. In addition, there should be coordination 
of national policies towards regional goals so that the former will not run counter to 
the latter.  
 
 
Europe’s interim stage to monetary union 
 
A key support for the eventual success of full Economic and Monetary Union and the 
introduction of the Single Currency in Europe was the pursuit of both nominal and 
real convergence. 
 
During the negotiations for monetay union, the EU member states agreed on the 
establishment of certain economic convergence requirements and  a stability pact for 
countries participating in the Monetary Union. The EMU convergence criteria act as 
qualifying limits for participants and was aimed towards co-opting a group of 








relatively similar countries. As such, divergence performances would not create 
unnecessary tensions to the stability of the monetary union. Examinations of the EU 
countries were carried out to establish which countries met the convergence criteria 
for EMU accession. The European Monetary Institute (EMI) was set up. Together 
with the Commission it had a crucial role in assessing the member states' progress in 
convergency efforts.  
 
In May 1998 it was decided which countries would form part of the Monetary Union 
when it was set up in the transition to the final stage in 1999. Those countries that 
failed to meet all the criteria were granted a derogation. Subsequently, new 
examinations of the countries with derogations were carried out by the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank at the request of the country. If a country 
is considered to meet the criteria, the derogation is lifted. In conjunction with the 
second stage leading to full monetary union, it was also forbidden for member states 
to finance deficits in the public sector by using their central banks. Member states 
were also obliged to endeavor to avoid deficits in public sector finances, and the EC 
treaty rules on common surveillance of the public finances of member states began to 
be applied.  
 
 








8.4.2. Application to East Asia 
 
If it took Europe 30 years to achieve a single market integration and monetary union 
with a common central bank, it could take even longer for Asia to arrive at highly 
integrated economic and financial markets and infrastructures under one 
administrative command simply because the Asian nations lack a history of political 
and social unions that had been the case of Europe114.  
 
The prospect of monetary union in Asia was placed on the regional agenda for the 
first time in 1998 during the Hanoi Summit of Asean states. Policymakers, hungry for 
stability, began a serious examination of certain more extreme ideas, like monetary 
union. The rapid pace of regional integration, the experience of major financial crises 
and the emergence of the Euro have also caused policymakers to seriously consider 
the idea of an Asian monetary union. 
   
But policy makers also recognize that East Asia cannot have monetary union without 
convergence115. Reaching lasting macroeconomic and financial sector stability in a 
group of countries as diverse as ASEAN plus three implies by necessity to focus on 
convergence. Diverse socio-economic, institutional and political frameworks, growth 
priorities as well as unresolved territorial disputes and cultural animosities will 
frustrate efforts to advance regional cooperation to even the minimal level necessary 
for monetary union. Therefore, the implementation of a grandiose plan for monetary 
union would require substantial effort and time. 
 
Nevertheless, the proposal for a monetary union should form part of a wider agenda 
for regional trade and economic integration. Since the early 1990s, intra-regional 
trade and direct investment has increased dramatically. In particular free trade areas, 
such as the implementation of the Asean Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) since 1992, 
and the proposed Asean-China FTA to be completed by 2010116. 
  
 
                                                 
114 Chaipravat, O (2003). 
115 “Prospects for Regional Monetary Cooperation”, World Economic Forum- East Asia Economic 
Summit 2001, October.  








Therefore, regional economic integration could provide the catalyst towards monetary 
integration. The former Secretary General of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, Mr Severino (1999)117 noted "because of the degree of economic integration 
that has been achieved, the idea of an Asean currency, like a customs union and a 
common market, has at least become thinkable". Regional leaders such as Mr Joseph 
Yam, Mr Joseph Estrada and Dr Mahathir have even broached the idea of forming a 
regional currency bloc. The feasibility of a monetary union in East Asia is likely to 
increase as the integration of regional (e.g. financial) markets take place. Because of 
this new cohesion, ideas that once seemed far-fetched, for e.g. a currency union, have 
now entered the realm of possibility. 
 
However, instead of a region-wide monetary arrangement, a more practical option 
towards a common currency area or monetary union would be to begin with smaller 
clusters (or sub-sets) first and the enlargement of these clusters (to include other 
countries) later118. The purpose is to achieve harmonization within clusters before 
harmonization between clusters. Eventually, the several clusters would integrate to 
form a full currency area or monetary union. 
 
 
Clustering Approach towards Asian Monetary Union 
 
Having smaller clusters of economies to start monetary integration is a practical 
approach. The countries that have more in common would converge and integrate 
first. The way clusters are formed or its members identified depend on the underlying 
objectives, for example, economic, political, geographical (enlargement) or goals. The 
following suggests two practical approaches to identify prospective clusters.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
116 Japan and South Korea is also exploring possibilities for free trade areas with Asean. Currently, 
Japan only has a FTA agreement with Singapore.  
117‘An Emerging East Asian Community Reality or Mirage?’ Keynote address made at the regional 
conference on Common Currency for East Asia: Dream or Reality?  
118 The clustering concept has been mentioned in other parts of the thesis and elaborated here. 








1) Economic Clusters 
 
Chapter 5 provided a guide on the selection of clusters based on economic 
convergence. For instance, for a 3-clusters selection based on nominal and real 
criteria, the groupings are 1) Japan, the USA, Australia and New Zealand; 2) 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, China and South Korea; and 3) Hong 
Kong and Singapore (see Table 5.10) and so forth.   
 
Apart from Australia and New Zealand, which make good potential for greater 
integration and harmonization, the other hopeful clusters include Thailand and 
Malaysia, and Japan and South Korea (post 1997) and to a lesser extent, Indonesia 
and Philippines119. China should be allowed time to develop into a more market 
oriented economy with greater economic reforms. On the other hand, Hong Kong 
could form a cluster with China (or parts of China, e.g. Shenzhen and Guangzhou) in 
promoting greater economic integration and harmonization. While Singapore did not 
match with any particular economy, in which it is more compatible on the economic 
as well as policy fronts. 
 
 
2) Sub-regional (geographic) clusters 
 
Increasing attention has also been focused on the selection of clusters based on 
geographic regions (since economic and cultural ties run deeper among countries 
which are closer). These sub-regions include 1) all or part of Asean; 2) Greater China 
(i.e. mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) and 3) Japan and South Korea.  
 
As a most probable first stage towards an Asian currency goal is the enlargement of 
the existing Brunei-Singapore currency arrangement as suggested by a number of 
analysts120. Brunei already pegs its currency one-for-one to the Singapore dollar. 
Under the interchangeability arrangement, the currency of each country is allowed to 
                                                 
119 The later section will discuss other measures for greater intra-cluster integration after they have been 
decided. 
120 Such as Ngiam, K J (2000), Bashar, K and Moller, W (2000), Castellano, M (2000). 








circulate in the other121. Other than proximity, however, few complementarities exist 
between the two that justify the currency agreement. Analysts suggest, that other 
Asean nations conceivably could replicate the Brunei-Singapore example (as it had 
proven resilient to speculative attacks). The Brunei-Singapore example has also been 
hailed as a good confidence building measure and could form the basis for a higher 
degree of monetary cooperation in the region. In fact, suggestions have also been 
made that other Asean nations (conceivably Malaysia) could replicate the Brunei-
Singapore example. Other Asean countries can be included in the currency 
arrangement at a later date when they have attained a sufficient degree of 
harmonization and convergence with the existing members.   
 
The pertinent question is whether Singapore is willing to be part of a monetary union 
with the other Asean countries. Singapore has yet to make any statement in favour or 
against the idea of an Asian common currency arrangement. However, the 
government has always emphasized that it not wish to see the Singapore dollar being 
used outside the country.  
 
A second possible monetary union could spring up within Greater China. Since 
economic and cultural ties among the mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan run deep, 
sufficient preconditions seem to be in place. Politically, however, the three entities are 
worlds apart. Although Hong Kong officially is part of China, the city-state maintains 
its own monetary authority and system. Moreover, the booming metropolis allows, by 
special arrangement, many more freedoms than its much-larger parent government. 
Taiwan is seen as a renegade province by China and continues to threaten a military 
takeover. Yet, if cross-straits relations were normalized and the three economies were 
united under one political force, a monetary union would be an easy, almost natural 
step122. 
 
A third possible sub-regional arrangement would involve Japan and South Korea. The 
two enjoy geographic proximity and recently have made substantial progress in 
strengthening economic ties. Trade barriers have been toppled and cultural tensions 
have been eased. Currently, bilateral discussions about concluding an investment 
                                                 
121 Further elaboration to the Brunei-Singapore currency union is made in other parts of the thesis. 








agreement and a free-trade area also are underway. However, although Japan and 
South Korea are growing closer in many respects, monetary union is a long way off. 
Long-held animosities run deep and neither country is ready to subordinate monetary 
policy to the other. Nevertheless, because the two nations are close neighbors, are 
more alike economically than most other East Asian nations and are working to 
integrate commercial relations, a future monetary union may be proposed. 
 
These scenarios are considered the most likely beginning steps toward the eventual 
development of a greater East Asian monetary union.  
 
 
In addition to intra-cluster harmonization and convergence, focus should also be made 
to promote greater regional trade flows as well as the liberalization of investments 
(i.e. restrictions on inward investment will have to come down and changing national 
limits on share ownership to regional limits). Greater emphasis should also be placed 
on the integration of goods, services and factor markets, for instance, the freer 
movement of labor resources (i.e. immigration and labor laws will have to be 
loosened). A large, integrated capital market should be established to mobilize 
regional savings for regional investment.  
 
To initiate realistic planning, governments will have to create a set of convergence 
criteria that will bring economic variables, such as interest and inflation rates, in line 
with regional standards. Firm deadlines will have to be established for each objective. 
These bring us to our next point on the need to create new institutions, establish 
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8.4.3. Institution Formation: Organizing Transition to Monetary Union 
 
On the institutional plane, the creation of transnational organs and institutions is 
inevitable and crucial in the interim stage123. The transition to a regional monetary 
union would entail the coordination and harmonization of national policies to achieve 
the ultimate objectives of the Community. Therefore, relevant institutions navigate the 
process of regional monetary integration, without which, the move towards a regional 
currency area would be risky.  
 
 
Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for European Monetary Union 
 
Strong institutions played a pivotal role in Europe's continuing integration, and 
cooperation effective when backed by independent and respected institutions. The 
European Council, Commission and Parliament as well as the European Central Bank 
were instrumental institutions in European integration. They move the debate from the 
purely political sphere to the technical level, allowing for professional assessments 
and blueprints for collective undertakings. For instance, the European Council was 
responsible for the coordination of economic policies. It fixed the medium term 
objectives and worked out annual framework within the timeframe. 
 
At critical points, the European Union also created new institutions or re-engineered 
existing institutions to enable Europe to continue to achieve its goals. For instance, in 
1998, the European Central Bank (ECB) replaced the European Monetary Institute 
(EMI). The main tasks of the ECB included strengthening cooperation between the 
national central banks and coordinating monetary policies necessary for the 
introduction of a single currency – the Euro. It also took over the responsibility for 
creating an effective system of payments. The ECB was set up along with the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 
 
 
                                                 
123 See also Yuen, Hazel (2000b). 








Lack of Relevant Institutions in East Asia  
 
East Asia lacks an overarching institutional framework that can be responsible for 
regional integration and coordination. Formal and functional institutions such as those 
in Europe do not yet exist in East Asia. In view of the absence of institutional 
structures or the political consensus needed for regional economic integration, 
including integration of monetary and exchange rate policies, formal arrangements to 
coordinate monetary and exchange rate policies as in the European example and limit 
intra-regional exchange rate fluctuations do not seem to be immediately applicable to 
ASEAN (what more East Asia)124. 
 
 
Therefore, if the region decides to move towards a monetary union, it would also need 
to consider establishing relevant institutions as a regional agenda. The regional 
institutions (including the Council, Commission, Parliament and Central Bank) while 
having effective decision-making power of its own, should also work with national 
governments to realize the objectives of the Community as a whole. Ultimately, there 
will be eventual transfer of power and policy autonomy from the national to the 
regional governing authorities in charge of taking care of the Community’s policy 
setting and coordinating and implementing the steps, including the convergence 
criteria and the stability pact125, towards a full monetary union.  
 
Considering that changes in exchange rates could no longer absorb external shocks 
under a common currency system126, macroeconomic policy coordination would be 
essential. Therefore, the union’s authorities will also ensure compliance of guidelines 
by member states aim towards achieving the Community’s goals. For instance, 
member states with an economic excess (e.g. fiscal deficit) are given a specified time-
limit with a view to eliminating it.  
 
                                                 
124 The International Monetary Fund (2003). 
125 There should also be provisions made for stability and growth required by member states to 
maintain economic balances even after the beginning of the third stage. This is so as not to jeopardize 
the stability of the union, and to help member states grow economically at the same time.  
126 On the monetary side, participating countries would have to give up independent monetary policy 
and be subject to a single authority. On the fiscal side, participating countries would have some leeway 
in fiscal policy, but within certain limits. 









With increasing policy harmonization and convergence and the creation of regional 
institutions, the move towards monetary union is into the final stages. It will be 
necessary to progressively make the definition and guidelines of economic policy 
more defined and binding to ensure a sufficient degree of harmonization and 
convergence among participating economies to monetary union. Member states who 
meet the stipulated requirements and with significant degrees of convergence will 













8.5. STAGE THREE: TOWARDS FULL MONETARY UNIFICATION  
 
The third stage will constitute a final state of affairs in which the transition to a 
common currency is complete and irrevocable. A full monetary union implies a 
common central bank and  monetary policy and even the use of a single currency. The 
use of a single regional currency avoids the jumpiness of money as an unit of account. 
It also represents a symbolic value for the political cohesion of the region and people.  
 
 
Europe’s Final stages to monetary union 
 
Most countries in Europe participated in a bold economic experiment in which 
national currencies were replaced by a common currency (the Euro) by 2002. The 
introduction of the Euro was a signal that economic and monetary union was 
complete after two interim stages starting in 1990 and 1994. 
 
In May 1998, decisions were made on which countries were eligible for participation 
in the European Monetary Union. Since January 1, 1999, the Euro has been used for 
all foreign exchange operations in the participating countries. Euro banknotes and 
coins began circulating on January 1, 2002 and completely replaced national 
currencies by July 1, 2002 (existing national currencies ceased to be legal tender in 
the participating countries on or before this date). 
 
The third stage - and completion - of EMU meant not only the launch of the Euro, but 
also that the disciplines of the Stability and Growth Pact took effect for all Member 
States, and that the European Central Bank (ECB) took over from euro-area national 
central banks full responsibility for monetary policy and for holding the foreign 
exchange reserves of the euro area. 
 
 










"The only guarantee there will be a parallel between economic and monetary policy is 
a political union’  
- Jacques Delors, 1971 
 
Among one of one the historical lessons from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is 
that monetary unions of large sovereign nations which do not have political union 
eventually fail sometimes after a long time. These examples include the collapse of 
the Soviet system, another is the failure of the nineteenth century German Monetary 
Union. Once the political system binding it together collapses the monetary union 
could fail127. 
 
The Werner Report (1970) also warns that ‘unless a monetary union is embedded in a 
political union, the former will probably be doomed to failure’. Monetary union 
represents a significant constitutional and political change; touching the core of 
national sovereignty. The parallel unification proposition contends that fiscal 
unification is a necessary complement to economic and monetary union, and requires 
a pooling of political will and solidarity.  
 
It is recognized that politics had been the main driving force behind the formation of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU). But in order for the EMU to survive, it would 
eventually need to become a political union.  
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Asia has traversed a long way from monetary cooperation since the 1950s to greater 
regional integration in the 1990s. However, a common currency and exchange rate 
system in East Asia is still unlikely within the next decade, owing to diverse 
economic, social, political and financial structures. But given growing intra-regional 
trade, acceleration of information and communication technology, on-going banking 
and financial restructuring and implications of the Euro on other parts of the world, 
the move towards an Asian monetary area may perhaps be faster than anticipated. 
Nevertheless, monetary and economic union would not be complete without political 
union. The EU declaration has stated that, "Member States recognize the need for 
strong political commitment and undertake to pursue all such national policies as 
would facilitate the regional monetary integration process." 
 
There is a distinct Asian approach to building institutions that emphasizes informality, 
consensus-building and non-confrontational bargaining styles128. The emphasis on 
informal consensus-building rather than confrontational negotiations was pioneered 
by ASEAN in the 1960s and 1970s to build cohesion in a desperately poor region 
filled with historical animosities, economic disparity, and cultural antagonism. 
However, though excellent at promoting cohesion among diverse members, the 
"Asian approach" has been far less successful at encouraging economic reform or 
responding to crises. ASEAN, for instance, needs to move beyond the principle of 
non-interference, when coming to building a regional monetary union.  
 
Moving to a regional monetary union also requires a paradigm shift from nationalism 
to regionalism. The leadership in many countries is loathed to give up sovereignty for 
a supranational cause. Moreover, many nations may not also be willing to accept a 
currency that bears a foreign symbol, especially when citizens are accustomed to 
seeing their own national heroes or royalty on bills and coins. Furthermore, the legacy 
of World War Two has resulted in some degree of mistrust and animosity between 
Japan and many of its East Asian neighbors. Without a basic level of trust, an East 
Asian monetary union simply is not possible.  
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A regional monetary union would also require some form of leadership from an 
anchor country. There is no obvious choice now. But China and Japan is likely to be 
important economic and political leaders in East Asia. However, each has its own 
problems that will need to be resolved before asserting economic and political 
leadership in Asia. Both could play a leading role, but neither could be dominating the 
East Asian monetary transition process. This could in turn hamper East Asia from 
forming a common currency area. 
 
Although economic conditions and linkages in East Asia point to a greater degree of 
monetary cooperation, nonetheless, the political will necessary to drive the monetary 
integration process is apparently lacking. With talks of regional monetary integration 
increasing in other parts of the world (e.g. the West Africa Economic and Monetary 
Union, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, which expressed desire 
for a common currency area, Mercosur’s members’ interest for a common currency, 
as well as the on-going enlargement of the Euro Zone), how would East Asian nations 
and their leaders react to worldwide monetary regionalism? It appears from current 
trend that trade integration is likely to preside over regional monetary arrangements 
for quite some time to come. The pace of how monetary integration in East Asia 
would shape is something only time will tell.    
 
This thesis ends by reflecting on the absence of political commitment to monetary 
integration in East Asia. The political aspect, while harder to quantify, may be the 
most important ingredient. With the lack of it, the prospect for a common East Asian 
currency does not seem too promising at the present moment.  








CHAPTER 9:  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
 
  
The topic of monetary union has attracted much attention as a result of the currency 
upheavals in East Asia in the late 1990s. This study sets out to explore the feasible 
formation of an East Asian currency area. In particular, it seeks to determine whether 
groups of economies exist that are more compatible for monetary union based on the 
assessment of various criteria. Ultimately, the subject of monetary union is to 
determine the optimal domain of the currency area(s) or of the choice of union 
members. Nevertheless, the theory of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA), for 
instance, has not suggested a single criterion that can best be used to judge the 
suitability of currency union members. In exploring the case for a regional monetary 
arrangement, this research goes beyond an OCA framework and lays out a systematic 
plan for study. 
 
Chapter 1 provided the foundation for understanding the rationale and direction of this 
research. Chapters 2 and 3 reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature of 
monetary integration respectively. 
 
Chapter 4 provided a comparative overview of main indicators across countries of the 
East Asian region. The purpose was to give a backdrop to subsequent discussions. 
The chapter also gave an account of the various forms of East Asian monetary 
cooperation and the exchange rate policy preferences of regional countries. Chapter 4 
also examined the patterns of intra-regional trade flows, as rationale for fostering 
greater monetary cooperation. Pockets of particularly high trade intense partners exist; 
namely, Singapore-Malaysia, Hong Kong-China, and Australia-New Zealand. It 
makes economic sense to form some exchange-rate alliance among these respective 
groupings, based on the trade criterion alone, to stabilize bilateral currency volatility. 
However, the trade factor is not the only picture, considerations will also have to be 
made on the extent of economic similarity among the high trade partners going 
forward. 
 








Chapters 5 and 6 were then devoted to empirically examining whether the various 
groupings of high-trade economies were also compatible on other economic fronts, 
namely, in the confluence of economic characteristics, policies and shocks. This is 
because the economic option of a common exchange-rate arrangement also hinges on 
the countries’ initial conditions as well. The robustness of a regional exchange rate 
system depends on how common are the individual country’s economic structure, 
policies and shocks.  
 
Chapter 5 examined the degree of confluence across the East Asian countries in terms 
of economic characteristics and policies, as they provide an economic basis for 
monetary union. The chapter first used the European experience of monetary 
integration (specifically on EMU convergence characteristics) to provide a yardstick 
for similar integration in other parts of the world. Based on the Cluster Analysis 
methodology, this chapter found a core and periphery group of European economies 
prior the formation of the European monetary union (EMU). Given that the European 
quest for monetary integration has experienced several periods of turbulence; a multi-
speed approach to regional integration is thus recommended. In other words, to first 
start with the core, and then to extend to the periphery group based on convergence 
and harmonization. In this way, the sustainability of the union (short of political 
intervention) is more likely to ensue. Applying the EMU convergence characteristics 
to the Asia-Pacific region, it is found that these variables could not sufficiently 
delineate the heterogeneous set of economies. This is because the EMU convergence 
indicators alone do not necessarily capture the structural differences and levels of 
economic development of the participating countries. Hence, to improve on the 
delineation or typology of the economies, we include real economic and structural 
variables as well. In fact, a number of monetary economists noted the practical reality 
ultimately is the real convergence of economies that matters in the economics of 
successful monetary integration. Finally, the chapter assessed the degree of 
confluence in economic policies and freedom. It found interesting results on the 
degree of similarity in economic freedoms of regional countries, which ranges from 
the most economically free nations to the lesser ones, in the way market activities are 
conducted.  
 








Chapter 6 analyzed the nature of underlying shocks among the East Asian economies. 
A standard approach within the literature on symmetry of shocks in different countries 
and regions is to apply the Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) methodology to 
identify and estimate economic disturbances. It discovered that some groups of 
countries appeared to be better poised based on the commonality of shocks. If 
countries have strong trade and financial ties, idiosyncratic shocks will also be 
transmitted immediately from one country to another and these shocks will effectively 
become common shocks. On the other hand, evidence from the Variance 
Decomposition analysis revealed the extent of structural differences and responses to 
shocks as differing among the East Asian economies. This suggested that shocks 
affected countries in fundamentally different ways, which implied important 
differences in transmission mechanism and policy objectives and strategies across the 
East Asian economies. In addition, Chapter 6 also examined other suggested criteria 
of the OCA. At the present moment, East Asia does not appear to be an OCA. There 
is a limited degree of perfect labor mobility within the region, which has been limited 
mainly to one-directional labor flows from developing to more developed economies.   
 
This thesis seeks to provide interesting and alternative perspectives to the issue of 
monetary integration. Chapter 7 tackled the popular ‘endogeneity’ hypothesis. 
Although Frankel and Rose (1996, 1998) argued that the OCA criteria might be 
endogenous, such that a country fails the criteria ex-ante but fulfills them ex-post, 
however, if countries start out from very different initial positions, there are high costs 
to monetary integration. Furthermore, Frankel and Rose’s (1996, 1998) sample of 
countries, in which they had derived the ‘endogeneity’ argument, were neither 
existing currency unions nor at different stages of development. The balance of costs 
was higher in asymmetric monetary arrangements because of asymmetric founding 
members. Therefore, this thesis cautions against an undiscriminating acceptance of 
the proposition, by examining a real life currency union in East Asia. In so doing, this 
thesis highlighted the preconditions necessary to ensure endogeneity’.  
 
Chapter 8 explored the feasibility of several popular options for monetary cooperation 
in East Asia. In view of growing regional economic interdependence, there is an 
economic justification for greater currency coordination. However, the question lies in 
how the form and process of monetary cooperation should take shape. This chapter 








suggests a monetary roadmap for East Asia based on varying term goals. The short-
term goal is to stabilize intra-regional exchange rates among interdependent 
economies; the medium term goal is to increase harmonization among sub-clusters; 
and the long-term goal is to integrate the various sub-clusters into forming an Asian 
currency area. Ultimately, the decision to foster deeper monetary alliance is 
recognized to be a political issue.   
 
While political issues are beyond the scope of this paper, it is recognized that the 
political preconditions for monetary unification in East Asia are currently not in place. 
The lack of political will and consensus and institutional structures are definitely 
major obstacles to the prospective formation of an Asian monetary union (see also 




Tentative conclusion from this exploratory study 
 
At the current moment, the scope for forming a monetary union in East Asia (or 
among sub-sets of countries) is rather limited. This is evident through the various 
compatibility tests in earlier chapters to identify prospective candidates. There 
appears to be no distinct pairs or groupings of candidates better suited for monetary 
union formation. Furthermore, there appears to be no suitable currency anchor for the 
region at present. Therefore, regional monetary integration should proceed in a 
gradual manner and to start with smaller clusters first. 
 
Fundamentally, the drive towards future regional monetary union will depend on three 
key factors, they are:  
• Degree of intra-regional economic (trade and investment) interdependence 
• Degree of similarity of economies and policies 














Furthermore, it will also depend on external conditions, such as developments in the 
Euro zone as well as the dynamics affecting the stability of the international monetary 
system, which could hasten the pace towards regional monetary cooperation and even 
integration. 
 
In the meantime, countries in East Asia should focus on greater regional trade, 
economic and sectoral linkages prior to monetary union. The benefits of monetary 
union will also be enhanced if necessary structural reforms are implemented. 
Premised on the prospects of deeper economic cooperation in matters relating to 
trade, investments and flow of people, it is then hoped to move to a common regional 
currency arrangement. But it will certainly take some time for preconditions for an 
East Asian monetary union to be fully realized, and likely only in the very long run. 
 








Contributions of Thesis 
 
This thesis has been instrumental in providing an in-depth study on the East Asian 
monetary union issue, which carries policy implications. Amongst which, the study 
provided a disclosure into the current state of affairs and an inquiry into the region’s 
readiness for monetary union. Apparently, the preconditions for monetary union, 
notably on the political will and of compatibility of regional countries for monetary 
union is apparently lacking. Therefore, the thesis suggested practical strategies 
towards prospective regional monetary integration. Finally, the thesis has also 
provided new insights (e.g. the ‘endogeneity’ argument clarified) and methodology 





Suggestions and Implications for Future Research from this Study 
 
 Cross regional studies to be extended.  
 
This research thesis touched mainly on the East Asian region and drawing policy 
lessons and experiences from European monetary unification. Future studies can 
expand the research to other regions, such as the process of monetary integration in 
West Africa, Latin America or Pacific Islands, as a basis for cross regional 
comparison. In light of globalization and the prospects of regional currency areas 
formation, research along this direction will be of topical interest. The eventual 
research findings will be useful for drawing cross-regional policy implications. 
 
 
 The inclusion of non-economic variables. 
 
Non-economic indicators such as degrees of political freedoms, social and cultural 
(e.g. language integration) indexes and so forth can also be included in the research 
investigation. The aim is to provide a holistic coverage of all conceivable and 
quantifiable variables. This would certainly aid policy makers in obtaining a 













 Design a set of converge characteristics for East Asia. 
 
Just as Europe has the Maastricht convergence characteristics as a guide towards 
monetary union, there should also be a probable list of convergence characteristics 
designed for East Asia. The Maastricht convergence characteristics, for instance, may 
not be adequate or customized to the relevance of East Asia. For example, the 
adherence to a fiscal ratio may not be necessarily appropriate for East Asia, as most 
regional countries are typically characterized to practise some form of fiscal discipline 
to varying extent. Therefore, a more reflective set of convergence characteristics for 




 Monitoring of suggested Clusters for future policy implications and options. 
 
The thesis has provided the Cluster Analysis methodology for monitoring a group of 
countries for convergence over time. This would aid the decision-making process in 
the future selection of monetary union members. As such, future research could 
follow up on the various suggested clusters in this study, for e.g. the Brunei-Singapore 
cluster as lessons for monetary union, the other clusters include Malaysia and 
Thailand, in terms of economic similarity and levels of trade intensity.  
 
Finally, by applying an original approach to cluster countries based on a set of 
characteristics, this thesis hopes to enrich the methods of investigation on monetary 
union that bests reflect reality. Specifically, it aims to open a potential for monetary 
union research along the (clustering) lines, which is a practical approach towards 
regional monetary integration. In other words, monetary union should begin with 
smaller clusters of economies, and the enlargement of these clusters based on a 
sufficient degree of convergence and harmonization over time. 
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THE CLUSTER ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
 
The algorithm129 of agglomerative hierarchical clustering can be briefly described as 
follows. The dataset consists of N cases (countries) with k variables (various criteria 
used in our analysis) for each object and is denoted by XNk = {x1 ,x2 ,...,xN}, where 
each xi ={xi1 ,...,xik}.  
 
Each variable is standardized with mean zero and standard deviation of one in order to 
treat them as having equal importance in determining the structure. In some cases, the 
standardization of the variables is important to keep a variable with high variance 
from dominating the cluster analysis. It is also needed in cases where the variables are 
of different magnitude and are not directly comparable (e.g. budget deficit and 
government debt level, the latter always being much higher). The similarity 
coefficient between two objects is defined by the ‘distance’ measure. 
 
 
1.1A. ‘Distance’ Measures 
 
Suppose two cases; object e and object f, are to be compared for their ‘similarity’. Let 
the score (or variable) profile of e be represented by vector Xe (Xe1, Xe2, …, Xek) and the 
score profile of f be represented by vector Xf (Xf1, Xf2, …, Xfk)130. Let the vectors be 
located in a two-dimensional space as shown in Figure 1A and assume that the 
coordinate axes are orthogonal (rectangular). The length of vector e would be the 
square root of  [(Xe1)2 + (Xe2)2] and the length of f would be the square root of  [(Xf1)2 
+ (Xf2)2].  
Figure 1A:  













                                                 
129 An algorithm is a completely defined, finite sets of steps, operations, or procedures that will 
produce a particular outcome. There are several algorithms for clustering, and many studies of cluster 
analysis have indicated that the linkage on “Squared Euclidean Distances” is among the best 
hierarchical clustering algorithms. We use this method in our study. 
130 Each set of scores may be regarded as coordinates for a vector in a k-dimensional space. A vector is 
a quantity that has magnitude and direction. It may be represented by a directed line segment, of which 
the length of the vector represents its magnitude, while the direction indicates where the vector is 
















The greater the similarity between the (variables or indicators) profiles of e and f, the 
closer their vectors131. Conversely, the more dissimilar the profiles of e and f, the 
further their vectors. The similarity between the inter-object profiles can be evaluated 
in terms of the distance between the vector end points. According to the Pythagorean 
theorem, 
Def2 = (Xe1 – Xf1)2 + (Xe2 – Xf2)2.  
 
Its square root gives the distance between e and f, i.e.: 
 




Cluster analysis encompasses several different types of distance measures or 
classification algorithms132.  
 
The Euclidean distance is probably the most commonly chosen type of proximity 
measure between any two points used in cluster analysis. It simply is the geometric 
distance in the multidimensional space obtained by the generalized Pythagorean 






[(Xej – Xfj)2]}1/2 
 
Here, j signifies any of the variables, which are k in number, while e and f signify any 
of the objects (a, b, …h... , N). The score of e on variable j is Xej and the score of f on 
variable j is Xef. The summation is over the k variables. 
 
One may want to square the standard Euclidean distance in order to place 
progressively greater weight on objects or cases that are further apart. The distance 





[(Xej – Xfj)2] 
 
City-block (Manhattan) distance. This distance is simply the average difference 
across dimensions. In most cases, this distance measure yields results similar to the 
simple Euclidean distance. However, note that in this measure, the effect of single 
large differences (outliers) is dampened (since they are not squared). The city-block 









                                                 
131 For instance, the more similar the countries’ profiles (characteristics) in say, inflation rates, growth, 
exchange rates, and so forth, the closer their vector or distance measure. 
132 The clustering algorithm is the metric used to combine observations or entities into groups. 









Chebychev distance. This distance measure may be appropriate in cases when one 
wants to define two objects as "different" if they are different on any one of the 
dimensions. The Chebychev distance is computed as:  
 
Def = Maximum |Xej – Xfj| 
 
Power distance. Sometimes one may want to increase or decrease the progressive 
weight that is placed on dimensions on which the respective objects are very different. 
This can be accomplished via the power distance. The power distance is computed as:  
 




|Xej – Xfj|p)1/r 
 
where r and p are user-defined parameters. Parameter p controls the progressive 
weight that is placed on differences on individual dimensions, parameter r controls 
the progressive weight that is placed on larger differences between objects. If r and p 





1.2A. Proximity Matrix 
 
The matrix or table of relative similarities (based on a set of variables) between 
objects is known as the proximity matrix. The matrix of similarities (or dissimilarities) 
derived, depends upon the distance measure (such as the Euclidean distance or the 
Squared Euclidean distance) chosen.  
 
The distance (D) between any two objects or entities is reflected in a table of 
similarities, otherwise known as the proximity matrix. A proximity matrix would 
appear as in Table 1A.  
 
 
       Table 1A: Demonstrative Proximity Matrix 
OBJECT Def Dfg Dgh 
Def    
Dfg    













The proximity matrix contains similarities between entities Def, Dfg, Dgh and so on. 
The clustering process begins with the computation of the proximity matrix between 
the ½ N (N-1) possible pairs of cases. Once the cases are available, the matrix is 




1.3A. Methods of Clustering  
 
Two general techniques of clustering methods are available: the hierarchical and non-
hierarchical methods. The hierarchical or multi-level clustering method is often 
preferred due to its ability to organize classes into comprehensible arrangements. The 
hierarchical method can be classified as agglomerative and divisive. The 
agglomerative technique begins with all N individual entities or units and at each 
stage combines together the two entities or clusters that are the closest – finally, all 
cases are combined into one family or cluster. On the other hand, the divisive 
technique beings with the entire set and subdivides it into two and continues to 
subdivide each cluster into finer subsets. The agglomerative technique is separable 
into several sorting strategies, that is, ways of defining similarity/ dissimilarity 
between clusters, and these encompass the techniques of linkage (the single, complete 
and average linkages), the centroid technique and the minimum variance technique. 
 
a) Linkage or Amalgamation Techniques  
 
At the first step, when each object represents its own cluster, the distances between 
those objects are defined by the distance measure. However, once several objects have 
been linked together, how do we determine the distances between those new clusters? 
In other words, one would require a linkage or amalgamation rule to determine when 
two clusters are sufficiently similar to be linked together. These ‘rules’ comprise the 
techniques of single, complete and average linkages, the centroid and the minimum 
variance techniques respectively133.  
 
Single linkage (nearest neighbor). In this sorting strategy, the distance between two 
clusters is determined by the distance of the two closest objects (i.e. by the ‘nearest 
neighbors’) in the different clusters. In a sense, this rule will, string objects together to 
form clusters, and the resulting clusters tend to represent long "chains."  
 
Complete linkage (furthest neighbor). In this method, the distances between clusters 
are determined by the greatest distance between any two objects in the different 
clusters (i.e., by the ‘furthest neighbors’). This method usually performs quite well in 
cases when the objects actually form naturally distinct "clumps." If the clusters tend to 
be somehow elongated or of a "chain" type nature, then this sorting strategy is 
inappropriate.  
 
Unweighted pair-group average. In this method, the distance between two clusters is 
calculated as the average distance between all pairs of objects in the two different 
clusters. This method is also very efficient when the objects form natural distinct 
"clumps," and it performs equally well with elongated, "chain" type clusters. In recent 
                                                 
133 Refer to Statsoft, Inc. (2001). 








studies, the group average linkage technique is found to appear as the best and the 
most accurate among the hierarchical techniques. 
 
Weighted pair-group average. This method is identical to the unweighted pair-group 
average method, except that in the computations, the size of the respective clusters 
(i.e., the number of objects contained in them) is used as a weight. Thus, this method 
(rather than the previous method) should be used when the cluster sizes are suspected 
to be greatly uneven.  
 
b)  Centroid Technique 
 
Unweighted pair-group centroid. The centroid of a cluster is the average point in the 
multidimensional space defined by the dimensions. In a sense, it is the center of 
gravity for the respective cluster. In this sorting strategy, the distance between two 
clusters is determined as the difference between centroids.  
 
Weighted pair-group centroid (median). This method is identical to the previous one, 
except that weighting is introduced into the computations to take into consideration 
differences in cluster sizes (i.e., the number of objects contained in them). Thus, when 
there are (or one suspects there to be) considerable differences in cluster sizes, this 
method is preferable to the previous one134.  
 
c) Minimum Variance Technique 
 
Ward's method. This method is distinct from all other methods because it uses an 
analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances between clusters. In short, this 
method attempts to minimize the Sum of Squares (SS) of any two (hypothetical) 
clusters that can be formed at each step. Refer to Ward (1963) for details concerning 
this method. In general, this method is regarded as very efficient, however, it tends to 
create clusters of small size.  
 
 
1.4A. Output of a Hierarchical Cluster Analysis 
 
The major outputs of the hierarchical cluster analysis are: i) Proximity Matrix, ii) 
Agglomeration Schedule, iii) Cluster membership and iv) Dendrogram. The proximity 
matrix (as explained earlier) gives the distances or similarities between items. The 
agglomeration schedule displays the cases or clusters combined at each stage, the 
distances between the cases or clusters being combined, and the last cluster level at 
which a case (or variable) is joined the cluster level. A Dendrogram illustrates 
graphically in a hierarchical tree structure the varying levels of cluster solutions. The 
joining or hierarchical tree clustering method uses the dissimilarities or distances 
between cases when forming the clusters. Consider a Hierarchical Tree below.  
 
                                                 
134 Note that Sneath and Sokal (1973) introduced the abbreviation WPGMC to refer to the method of 
weighted pair-group method using the centroid average, and used the abbreviation UPGMC to refer to 
the method of unweighted pair-group method using the centroid average, while the abbreviation 
WPGMA to refer to the method of weighted pair-group method using arithmetic averages, and the 
abbreviation UPGMA to refer to the method of unweighted pair-group method using arithmetic 
averages. 









Source: StatSoft, Inc, 2001 
 
 
On the left of the plot, each case begins as a cluster in itself.  As more and more cases 
are linked, larger and larger clusters of (increasingly) dissimilar cases are being 
combined or aggregated. Finally, in the very last step, all cases are joined. When the 
data contain a clear "structure" in terms of clusters of cases that are similar to each 
other, then the structure will often be reflected in the hierarchical tree as distinct 
branches, and as the result, interpret those branches. Hence, for each node in the graph 
(where a new cluster is formed), one can read off the criterion distance at which the 
respective cases were linked together into a new single cluster. 
 
Dendrograms can be used to assess the cohesiveness of the clusters formed and can 
provide information about the appropriate number of clusters to keep. A dendrogram 
that clearly differentiates groups of objects will have small distances in the far 
branches of the tree and large differences in the near branches. Dendrograms are also 
useful in discovering "runts", or objects that are joined to a group in the near 
branches. A runt does not join the main group until the last step. Runts are exceptions 
to the grouping structure. 
 
 








APPENDIX 2:  
 
EUROPE’S OPTIMAL CLUSTER SELECTION 
 
 
Table 2.1A – Hit Ratio for 8-clusters solution 
 Classification Results(a) 
 
Predicted Group Membership 
    8clusters 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 Total 
1.00 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
2.00 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3.00 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.00 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
5.00 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
6.00 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
7.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Count 
8.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1.00 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0
2.00 .0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0
3.00 .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0
4.00 .0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0
5.00 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 100.0
6.00 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 100.0
7.00 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 100.0
Original 
% 
8.00 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 100.0
a  100.0% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 









Table 2.2A  
Eigenvalues
7629.788a 99.6 99.6 1.000
17.684a .2 99.8 .973





Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative %
Canonical
Correlation










.000 64.996 21 .000
.004 24.766 12 .016






















Table 2.4A – Hit Ratio for 5-clusters solution 
Classification Resultsa
6 0 0 0 0 6
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 2 2
100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0
.0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 100.0
.0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 100.0
.0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 100.0















1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Predicted Group Membership
Total








47.793a 91.3 91.3 .990
4.155a 7.9 99.3 .898





Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative %
Canonical
Correlation









.003 35.076 12 .000
.141 11.750 6 .068


















APPENDIX 3:  
 
CLASSIFICATION OF CLUSTERS BY CATEGORICAL 
VARIABLES (1989-1997) 
 
Clusters by Nominal Convergence  




.000 .784 .731 .058 .224 1.816 1.595 .532 1.234 .392 .247 .355
.784 .000 1.148 .434 .174 .337 .223 .085 .415 .107 .223 .116
.731 1.148 .000 .792 .785 1.663 1.264 .784 .531 1.085 .864 .995
.058 .434 .792 .000 .066 1.334 1.133 .295 .945 .163 .101 .143
.224 .174 .785 .066 .000 .811 .680 .088 .632 .034 .023 .022
1.816 .337 1.663 1.334 .811 .000 .139 .383 .531 .641 .774 .648
1.595 .223 1.264 1.133 .680 .139 .000 .348 .202 .598 .752 .598
.532 .085 .784 .295 .088 .383 .348 .000 .395 .074 .083 .061
1.234 .415 .531 .945 .632 .531 .202 .395 .000 .716 .747 .679
.392 .107 1.085 .163 .034 .641 .598 .074 .716 .000 .036 .002
.247 .223 .864 .101 .023 .774 .752 .083 .747 .036 .000 .023














1:Japan 2:S. Korea3:Hong Kong4:Singapore5:Malaysia6:Indonesia7:Philippines8:Thailand 9:China 10:Australia
11:New
Zealand 12:USA
 Squared Euclidean Distance




Cluster Combined Stage Cluster First Appears 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Next Stage 
1 10 12 .002 0 0 3
2 5 11 .023 0 0 3
3 5 10 .029 2 1 5
4 1 4 .058 0 0 8
5 5 8 .076 3 0 7
6 6 7 .139 0 0 9
7 2 5 .141 0 5 8
8 1 2 .311 4 7 10
9 6 9 .366 6 0 10
10 1 6 .768 8 9 11















1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 5 5 4 4 4 2 1 1 1
6 6 6 5 5 5 4 3 3 1
7 7 7 6 6 5 4 3 3 1
8 8 8 7 4 4 2 1 1 1
9 9 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 1
10 10 5 4 4 4 2 1 1 1
11 5 5 4 4 4 2 1 1 1














11 Clusters 10 Clusters 9 Clusters 8 Clusters 7 Clusters 6 Clusters 5 Clusters 4 Clusters 3 Clusters 2 Clusters
 
 
Nominal Convergence Clusters:  
It is interesting to note some results from the clustering of economies by nominal 
convergence (i.e. inflation and interest rates, M2/GDP ratio). Countries like Japan and 
Singapore ‘gel’ as a cluster, while countries like Malaysia, New Zealand and 
Australia formed another group. In addition, Hong Kong and China were the 
exceptional economies in terms of nominal characteristics. The cluster results goes to 
show that countries could be characterized into the low-inflation ones such as Japan 
and Singapore, the intermediate sub-group of Malaysia, New Zealand and Australia; 














Clusters by Real Convergence  




   Agglomeration Schedule 
 
Cluster Combined Stage Cluster First Appears 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Next Stage 
1 5 9 .032 0 0 2
2 5 8 .059 1 0 6
3 10 11 .061 0 0 7
4 1 3 .081 0 0 9
5 2 4 .108 0 0 8
6 5 6 .170 2 0 8
7 10 12 .172 3 0 9
8 2 5 .205 5 6 11
9 1 10 .286 4 7 10
10 1 7 .598 9 0 11






1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
5 5 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2
6 6 6 5 4 3 3 2 2 2
7 7 7 6 5 4 4 3 3 1
8 5 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2
5 5 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2
9 8 8 7 6 5 5 4 1 1
10 9 8 7 6 5 5 4 1 1


















Real Convergence Clusters:  
On the other hand, the clusters by real convergence could categorized into several 
groups, namely: Malaysia, China and Thailand (or developing and high growth 
economies); Australia and New Zealand (high income, low growth and matured 
economies); and Japan and Hong Kong (the ‘intermediate’ group) . 
 









Clusters by Structural Convergence  






.000 .099 .818 1.103 .663 .976 .973 .792 1.509 .082 .111 .070
.099 .000 .937 1.046 .310 .595 .542 .583 .988 .240 .132 .269
.818 .937 .000 .164 1.328 2.337 2.080 1.879 3.157 .555 .610 .645
1.103 1.046 .164 .000 1.258 2.421 2.158 2.054 3.150 .964 .930 1.092
.663 .310 1.328 1.258 .000 .207 .187 .244 .430 .854 .570 .878
.976 .595 2.337 2.421 .207 .000 .087 .150 .073 1.261 .932 1.228
.973 .542 2.080 2.158 .187 .087 .000 .355 .176 1.147 .766 1.191
.792 .583 1.879 2.054 .244 .150 .355 .000 .379 1.032 .838 .931
1.509 .988 3.157 3.150 .430 .073 .176 .379 .000 1.890 1.461 1.864
.082 .240 .555 .964 .854 1.261 1.147 1.032 1.890 .000 .051 .019
.111 .132 .610 .930 .570 .932 .766 .838 1.461 .051 .000 .102














1:Japan 2:S. Korea3:Hong Kong4:Singapore 5:Malaysia 6:Indonesia 7:Philippines 8:Thailand 9:China 10:Australia
11:New
Zealand 12:USA
 Squared Euclidean Distance





            Agglomeration Schedule 
 
Cluster Combined Stage Cluster First Appears 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Next Stage 
1 10 12 .019 0 0 3
2 6 9 .073 0 0 5
3 1 10 .076 0 1 4
4 1 11 .088 3 0 7
5 6 7 .132 2 0 9
6 3 4 .164 0 0 10
7 1 2 .185 4 0 10
8 5 8 .244 0 0 9
9 5 6 .285 8 5 11
10 1 3 .870 7 6 11























1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1
4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 1
5 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 2
6 6 6 6 6 5 4 4 3 2
7 7 7 7 6 5 4 4 3 2
8 8 8 8 7 6 5 3 3 2
9 6 6 6 6 5 4 4 3 2
10 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 10 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1


















Structural Convergence Clusters: 
In addition, the identified clusters sharing similar structural characteristics include: 
Australia and the U.S.A; Indonesia and China; Singapore and Hong Kong 
respectively.  Finally, combining nominal, real and structural characteristics give the 
cluster results reflected in Section 5.5.1 of this thesis. 








APPENDIX 4:  
 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS STATISTICS 
 




4 0 0 4
0 6 0 6
0 0 2 2
100.0 .0 .0 100.0
.0 100.0 .0 100.0




















64.516a 89.5 89.5 .992




Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative %
Canonical
Correlation









.002 47.486 8 .000




















Table 4.4A  
























where: ANUJ       = Australia, New Zealand, USA and Japan 
              KMIPTC = Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and China





* The discriminant function plot for 6-clusters is found in Fig. 5.4.   
 












4 0 0 0 0 0 4
0 3 0 0 0 0 3
0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 2 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0
.0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0
.0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 100.0
.0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 100.0
.0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 100.0

















ANUJ KMT H S IP C
Predicted Group Membership
Total





4595.843a 96.5 96.5 1.000
143.864a 3.0 99.5 .997
19.670a .4 100.0 .976
1.559a .0 100.0 .781







Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative %
Canonical
Correlation









.000 87.906 30 .000
.000 45.740 20 .001
.015 20.861 12 .052
.319 5.718 6 .455








Lambda Chi-square df Sig.
 
 
















 Classification Results(a) 
 
Predicted Group Membership 
    Clusters9 J K H S MT I P C ANU Total 
J 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
K 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
H 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
S 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
MT 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
I 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
P 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Count 
ANU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
J 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
K .0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
H .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
S .0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
MT .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
I .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
P .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 100.0 
C .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 100.0 
Original 
% 
ANU .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 100.0 
a  100.0% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
 











143914.596a 100.0 100.0 1.000
36.728a .0 100.0 .987





Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative %
Canonical
Correlation








.000 92.690 24 .000
.001 33.305 14 .003






Lambda Chi-square df Sig.














































where: ANU  = Australia, New Zealand and USA  
  MT     = Malaysia and Thailand  
  J        = Japan 
 S        = Singapore 
H       = Hong Kong  
                          K       = Korea 
              I        = Indonesia 
                          P       = Philippines 
                          C       = China  
